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Abstract 
Does applying an ethical or social conscience to a firm’s operations result in the inefficient 
allocation of scarce resources? In other words, does corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
deter the firm from its primary goal of profit maximisation? This thesis investigates this 
fundamental question through three empirical chapters. In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 
3), we apply an event study methodology surrounding announcements of firm inclusion to the 
FTSE4Good Global Index. Herein, we simultaneously answer whether investors care about 
CSR, or if indeed CSR is priced by capital markets. In the second empirical chapter (Chapter 
4), we explain sources of abnormal returns using firm-specific characteristics and other 
market-wide factors, which may not necessarily relate directly to sustainable activities, but 
may influence how the market perceives CSR. As part of this analysis, we focus on the 
discretionary role/ability to pay as proxy by financial constraints, and consider the important 
role of institutional trading behaviour, given their large presence and influence in the capital 
markets of today. In addition, we address the endogeneity issue that may be inherent in our 
study by employing propensity score matching (PSM). We answer, ceteris paribus, whether 
institutional investors are punishing those firms found to be engaging in CSR. In our last 
empirical chapter (Chapter 5), we investigate the strategic motivations behind CSR 
engagement. In this empirical chapter, our investigation explores across industries and their 
related sectors. Moreover, we go beyond reporting an association between CSR and corporate 
financial performance (CFP) by identifying consumer sensitivity as the overarching 
mediating factor behind most of our prior findings. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
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1.0 Preface  
The theme of environmental protection and social responsibility is often at the forefront of 
politics, society, and legality. Today, corporate leaders face increasing pressure to apply 
ethical standards and socially responsible practices in business. However, there is significant 
ambiguity and uncertainty regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR); from its 
definitions, purpose, as well role in the corporate vanguard. From a shareholder perspective, 
the real test of CSR is its ability to transition into sustainable profits. Some proponents argue 
that CSR is a deflection from the main business of wealth creation, or simply activities of 
theft and political subversion  (Friedman, 1970).  
1.1 Summary  
The goal of this thesis is to investigate whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a 
value-increasing or value-destroying firm initiative. Scholarly arguments about the 
relationship between CSR and firm value are based on two main perspectives. According to 
Friedman (1970), firms that engage in CSR do so to the detriment of maximising shareholder 
value. On the other hand, stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984) 
holds that CSR engagement can generate important economic rewards beyond the costs 
required to engage in such activities. Given these opposing views, the requirement to 
establish an empirical link between CSR and firm value is crucial to provide corporate 
credibility to continue CSR activities. Against this background, this thesis provides a 
comprehensive empirical analysis on the wealth effects of CSR through three empirical 
chapters.  
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In the first chapter, we apply an event study methodology surrounding announcements of firm 
inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index. By analysing how the underlying price of a firm 
changes given its announcement of social index inclusion, we can isolate the unique 
contribution of CSR less the mitigating effects of confounding factors. Further, we assume 
announcements of social index inclusion are proxy for high CSR activities – given many 
inclusion criteria require a substantial commitment of firm resources (Barnea and Rubin, 
2010; López et al., 2007). Consequently our analysis reveals CSR commitment is 
significantly associated with negative abnormal returns.  
In the second empirical chapter we explain sources of these negative abnormal returns. The 
findings from our cross-sectional analysis show low abnormal returns are significantly 
associated with the following firm characteristics:1 firms with high dividend payments, as 
CSR may impose additional risk to future income (Rakotomavo, 2012); firms with low 
financial performance, as CSR may incur additional resources that the firm cannot spare 
(Roberts, 1992); firms with high cash holdings, as CSR may be perceived to be inappropriate 
due to costly external financing (Dittmar et al., 2003); volatile cash flows (Opler et al., 1999) 
or greater financial constraints (Almeida et al., 2002); firms with high asset growth, as CSR 
may impede firms that tend to reinvest profits through expansion or acquisition (Penrose, 
1995); and firms with high commitment to capital expenditure, as announcements of social 
index inclusion can be seen as a subtraction of cash flows from future capital expenditure 
                                                            
1 Note that each finding reported in this section should be read as independent of all other findings. 
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decisions (see for example, Griner and Gordon, 1995; Fazzari et al., 1988), or unwise due to 
the high capital intensive environment (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003).2 
In addition, we also examine the mediating role of institutional investors. Consideration of 
institutional investors is important because their presence and underlying behaviour can 
dictate to a large degree market reaction to CSR. Our analysis reveals that negative abnormal 
returns are significantly associated with institutional selling (current versus post quarterly 
holdings) and firms with high investor turnover (indicative of institutional short-term or 
myopic behaviour). Our evidence regarding announcements of social index inclusion 
suggests that institutional investors are adverse to CSR. As CSR is generally considered a 
long-term investment with high costs and long payback periods (Keinert, 2008; Coffey and 
Fryxell, 1991), this finding is consistent with the notion that institutional investors are 
motivated by short-term objectives (Magnet and Labate, 1993; Graves and Waddock, 1994). 
Moreover, Barnett (2007) emphasises the time required, arguing that only firms with a 
genuine commitment to CSR will likely realise the full long-term benefits of such an 
investment.  
From the preceding results it may be reasonable to conclude that one of the major sources of 
negative abnormal returns is the selling activity of the institutional investor. However, there is 
                                                            
2 In particular McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find announcements of decreases in capital expenditures lead 
to significant negative stock returns for industrial firms. While they do not link decreases in capital expenditure 
to CSR expenses, in principle (and according to our findings) this extension is possible. That is, announcements 
of CSR commitment can be seen as unsustainable given a firm’s current high commitment to capital 
expenditure. This can by extension increase the risk of future announcements of decreases in capital 
expenditure. Similarly, while there are no studies directly linking high cash holdings to CSR, we argue due to 
the inherent characteristic of this variable (that is, volatile cash flows, high financial constraints), the extension 
to CSR in principle is possible.   
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every reason to believe that CSR inclusion is in fact endogenously determined by many of the 
same firm-specific features that affect changes in institutional ownership. Therefore a 
fundamental evaluation problem arises, via a question of causality – whether movements in 
institutional ownership are a direct consequence of CSR announcement, or in fact determined 
by some other endogenous variable. Thus in our fourth chapter, we control for endogeneity 
problems that may be inherent in our study by employing propensity score matching (PSM). 
In this, we find institutional owners – ceteris paribus – are punishing those firms found to be 
included to the FTSE4Good Global Index. 
In our last empirical chapter, we examine how CSR engagement can be used strategically to 
enhance firm value. Our study here is achieved via two stages. First, we ask, ‘Who benefits by 
doing good?’ and address this question by investigating across industries and their underlying 
sectors.3 Our analysis reveals important differences in CSR wealth effects across industries 
and their underlying super-sectors. For instance, we find the Health Care and Oil & Gas 
industries experience positive market reactions, while Industrials, Technology, 
Telecommunications and Utilities experience negative market reactions. An analysis at the 
super-sector level reveals the underlying performances of these industry results. For instance, 
while the Industries industry experienced negative abnormal returns, this was driven mostly 
by the Industrial Goods and Services super-sector, rather than the non-significant effects of 
Construction & Materials.  
In the second stage of this study we identify the mechanism underlying our findings. We find 
firms primarily serving industrial consumers are adversely affected by their announcement of 
                                                            
3 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) partitions its 10 level 1 industries into 19 super-sectors (level 2). 
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CSR inclusion. Conversely, we find firms primarily serving the end consumer have positive 
value effects in relation to CSR announcement. Employing cross sectional analysis finds an 
unexpected result; firm level considerations such as size, profitability, leverage and financial 
slack - generally well documented explanatory variables - are not important determinants of 
the CSP-CFP link. In fact our analysis reveals consumer sensitivity as the overarching 
mediating factor, one that can potentially explain the heterogeneity in prior research.   
1.1 Background  
1.1.1 Defining corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
CSR is a comprehensive set of policies, practices and programs that are integrated into 
business operations and supply chains. These are then used to address issues ranging from 
business ethics, community investment, environmental impact, governance, human rights, 
and the market place (Balabanis et al., 1998). Further, CSR involves examining the way firms 
make business decisions; the products and services they offer; their strength in achieving an 
open and honest culture; their management of environmental ‘footprints’; and their 
relationships with employees, customers and other key stakeholders (Balabanis et al., 1998). 
Not surprising then CSR is often referred to under the same terms as ‘business responsibility’, 
‘business citizenship’, ‘community relations’, and ‘social responsibility’.  
The literature is scattered with various definitions of this term. Friedman (1970) first defines 
CSR as a way in which “to conduct the business in accordance with shareholders’ desires, 
which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom”. Warhust 
(2001) defines CSR more specifically via three major elements: (1) product use and its 
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contribution to help the wellbeing and quality of life of society; (2) business practices 
focusing on good corporate governance; and (3) the minimisation of  environmental impact, 
and the equitable distribution of profits across different societies, particular to the host 
community.   
A growing number of scholars argue firms can no longer be seen as purely private 
institutions, but as social institutions instead (Frederick, 1992; Freeman, 1984; Lodge, 1977). 
Business has an obligation to society and therefore the role of CSR is to provide a mechanism 
in which to discuss how best to meet these obligations, as well as examine tools by which the 
related benefits can be optimally achieved. Angelidis and Ibrahim (1993) define CSR more 
simply as “corporate social actions whose purpose is to satisfy social needs”. Similarly, 
Carroll (1979) conveys the idea that CSR represent economic, legal, ethical and discretionary 
demands that society places on business. 
Another CSR theme follows Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder model, in which a firm’s 
responsibilities go beyond meeting just shareholders’ needs, but to all stakeholders as well 
(consumers, government, employees, supplies, creditors etc.), whose consideration is crucial 
to the firm’s success. Corporations are therefore accountable for any actions that may affect 
the people, community and the environment surrounding the business’s operations (Frederick, 
1992). Hill et al. (2007) relate CSR to a hierarchy of economical, legal, moral, and 
philanthropic actions that influences the quality of life of relevant stakeholders. According to 
Frooman (1997), the definition of CSR is an action by the firm that substantially affects social 
stakeholders’ welfare. Similarly, CSR is “a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Commission, 2001). More broadly, the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (1999) argues “CSR is the commitment of a 
          9 
 
business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with employees, their 
family, the local community and society at large to improve their quality of life”. Notice this 
definition includes both social and stakeholder dimensions. Dahlsrud (2008) in a review of 
the various definitions of CSR find stakeholder and social dimensions are considered equally 
important based on the frequency of counts in Google searches.  
Some scholars believe CSR is characterised by “actions that appear to further some social 
good, beyond the interest of the firm and that which is required by law” (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001). Thus companies that simply avoid discriminating against women or minorities 
cannot be considered as acting in a socially responsible manner – but are more accurately 
simply following set regulations (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). The authors also note the 
required decision to follow environmental compliance will not distinguish the firm from its 
competitors, as most of their peers are affected by the compliance in a similar way. Dowell et 
al. (2000), Hart and Ahuja (1996), and Russo and Fouts (1997) point out that real benefits to 
an organisation need to come from more rigorous and proactive forms of environmental 
performance. Such actions involve changing the way the firm provides its products and 
services, and a forward-looking management style. Ruggie (2002) goes further by defining 
CSR as a strategy that encompasses demonstrations of good faith, social legitimacy, and a 
commitment that goes beyond the financial bottom line. In other words, this definition 
suggests CSR would be adopted by firms that consider profits to be less or equally important 
to the broader corporate strategy of maintaining the wellbeing of society.  
Barnea and Rubin (2010) however argue that if going beyond entails a deviation from 
achieving maximum profits, such a social initiative is a waste of valuable resources and 
potentially a value-destroying strategy. The definition of CSR therefore may be closer to 
Holme and Watts (2002) who describe CSR as “… finding business opportunities in building 
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the skills of employees, the community and the government”. Hillman and Keim (2001) 
further stresses that CSR initiatives can only pay off under the premise that these efforts are 
in the interest of the company’s stakeholders. Ideally then CSR should be able to improve the 
quality of stakeholder experiences, while creating a competitive industry advantage by 
combining issues of social, environmental and economics in the firm’s corporate strategy. 
Elkington (2004) further highlights that sustainability requires firms to be financially secure 
in order to minimise or ideally eliminate negative environmental impact, while demonstrating 
behaviour consistent with societal expectations.  
Tuzzolino and Armandi (1981) provide a motivational theory to explain an organisation’s 
response to CSR based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. CSR allows the firm to fulfil 
“internal and external self-actualisation needs” (p. 23) which are located at the top of the 
needs pyramid. Consequently, firms will be in a position to engage in CSR only after they 
have satisfied three earlier layers of needs. These include ‘physiological’ or ‘survival’ needs 
fulfilled by corporate profits, ‘safety needs’ provided through dividend policy, integration, 
conglomeration and competitive position, and ‘affiliative needs’ that can be gained though 
participation in trade associations, lobby groups, and industry publication.  
Lastly, we examine Epstein’s (1987) definition of CSR, in which he emphasises the need to 
distinguish business ethics from CSR. According to Epstein, business ethics involve decisions 
or dilemmas about the morality of business actions or decisions. CSR on the other hand 
relates to the consequences of firm actions, in which CSR is defined as the “discernment of 
issues, expectations and claims on business organisational actions regarding the consequences 
of policies and behaviour on internal and external stakeholders” (Epstein, 1987). 
          11 
 
Overall, there is a variety of opinions on the definition, scope and basis of CSR, and it is 
apparent that the expected outcome of CSR will vary according to the definition used. For 
example, the concept of ‘social responsibility’ encompasses expectations that include simply 
maximising profits, meeting stakeholders’ needs, fulfilling an obligation to society, satisfying 
motivational theory, going beyond the law, and going beyond the financial line. This points to 
the fact that the notion of CSR has evolved without a clear consensus on its meaning or value. 
In fact, Baron (2001) argues that “corporate social responsibility is an ill- and incomplete-
defined concept”.  
Given its varying scope and definitions, as well as its often intangible and qualitative nature, 
we have chosen to view CSR much like an investment proposal. This means looking at CSR 
in the same way as a firm approaches any other investment decision, accounting for various 
factors and assessing anticipated benefits and related cash flows. Using a rigorous and 
systematic approach to CSR is likely to yield the best results by demonstrating the most 
efficient allocation of scarce resources. In this way, both the firm and society can benefit 
from socially responsible activities.  
1.1.2 Defining corporate social performance (CSP)  
Corporate social performance (CSP) has been defined in a number of different ways. One 
avenue portrays social performance as a multidimensional construct (Rowley and Berman, 
2000; Waddock and Graves, 1997), encompassing a company’s efforts to fulfil a number of 
social responsibilities – including economic, legal, and discretionary (Carroll, 1979). 
Similarly, Wood (1991), defines CSP as “a business organization’s configuration of 
principals of social responsibilities, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, 
programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s society relationships”. 
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Recognising the importance of stakeholder relationships, Wood (1995) later adjusts this 
definition to define ‘policies, programs, and outcomes’ as “internal stakeholder effects, 
external stakeholder effects, and external institutional effects”. Some scholars propose CSP is 
a ‘composite term’ (Jones, 1995; Bendheim et al., 1998), or simply  a measurement of how 
one treats its stakeholders (Campbell, 2007; Clarkson, 1995; Cooper, 2004; Post et al., 2002). 
Van Oosterhout and Heugens (2006) regard CSP as something that “simultaneously refers to 
organizational inputs, core transformation processes, and outputs, as well as to the 
development of more holistic programs concerning corporate values or business ethics”. 
Despite the abundance of CSP research, scholars still encounter significant concerns in 
operationally defining the CSP construct (Clarkson, 1995; Wood and Jones, 1995). As a 
consequence, measures of CSP tend to vary widely, either capturing single, specific 
dimensions of social responsibility such as philanthropic donations, pollution emissions, 
employee satisfaction, or broader appraisals of CSP – and often are the sum of these and 
other individual dimensions (Margolis et al., 2009). Given the various definitions of CSR, it 
is perhaps unsurprising to note that CSP is similarly ill defined. Therefore at this stage, and 
for the purposes of this thesis, we define CSP as simply measuring the consequence of CSR 
actions.   
1.1.3 Why do companies engage in CSR? 
The main argument expressed by CSR sceptics is that the costs associated with CSR 
outweigh the financial benefits of the exercise. Thus CSR is a value-destroying proposal and 
is inconsistent with the principals of shareholder wealth maximisation. Indeed, observers 
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have noted Merck’s donation of 2.5 billion tablets of Mectizan4 since 1987 have brought the 
firm little, if any, financial benefit (Dizik, 2009).  
Moreover Murray (2005) argues that some firms are coerced by non-government 
organisations (NGOs) into committing even more scarce resources, above the minimum 
requirement of the CSR initiative, due to the obligation of reporting on their sustainability 
efforts (Murray, 2005). Even worse is that such reports have been shown to contain nothing 
but ‘hot air’. For example, readers of British Petroleum (BP) sustainability reports may have 
been impressed by the company’s portrayal of high standards and principals in safety. 
However, regulators have noted their actual safety culture was poor. For instance, an 
investigation revealed over the past three years, BP accounted for almost 97 % of all 
violations in the refining industry, with most of these violations classified as ‘egregious, 
wilful’ (The Centre for Public Integrity, 2010). BP was eventually responsible for the largest 
accidental oil spill in history, resulting in numerous employee deaths and injuries (Robertson 
and Krauss, 2010). Thus critics have labelled CSR as “neither strategic nor operational but 
cosmetic” (Porter and Kramer, 2006).  
In contrast, CSR advocates argue that in today’s society firms are judged by more than 
merely the results they achieve, but rather how they achieve them. CSP can provide the 
‘license to operate’ that society demands of successful corporations (Post et al., 2002), 
establishing legitimacy which can be as important as financial returns in the ongoing success 
of its operations (Campbell, 2007; Galaskiewicz, 1997). Moreover, a large number of CSR 
                                                            
4 The drug Mectizan is used to eliminate river blindness in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. 
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advocates argue social activities provide a number of value-increasing benefits. The benefits 
of CSR engagement are often characterised in the following ways. 
Strong social performance can be a proxy for high labour conditions, in which socially 
responsible firms gain a competitive advantage by attracting, recruiting and retaining high-
quality employees. For example, Timberland provides its employees opportunities to take 
significant paid leave to volunteer for social causes. The company states the motivation 
behind this social program is to help “attract and retain valuable talent” (Pereira, 2003). 
Furthermore, increased employee motivation can be a key driver, as “people are seeking 
meaning at work … and, it has become clear that staff motivation is a powerful bottom-line 
benefit of corporate responsibility” (Murray, 2007). Recruiters at Target note many job 
candidates assert “commitment to the community is one of the top reasons they desire to 
work for the company” (Needleman, 2008). Indeed, there is evidence to show the cost of CSR 
is more than compensated by benefits gained in employee morale and productivity (Solomon 
and Hanson, 1985; Turban and Greening, 1997). In particular, Huselid (1995) reports firms 
that choose to increase ‘High Performance Work Practices’5 by one standard deviation, can 
expect employee turnover to decrease by 7.05 %, rewarding firms on a per employee basis 
with $27,044 more in sales, $18,641 more in market value and an extra $3,814 in profit.  
CSR can create customer-related benefits that lead to higher sales, particularly to consumers 
who may be more sensitive to social issues. For instance Hindustan Lever Ltd, found that 
after launching Project Shakti, a social initiative for creating livelihoods for rural woman in 
India, consumption of its products increased about 20 % (Sood and Arora, 2006). Many 
                                                            
5 High Performance Work Practices can include incentive compensation, extensive employee involvement and 
comprehensive recruitment and training.  
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social initiatives can help reap price premiums or gain increases in market share. For 
example, NBC’s decision to dedicate more programs to health and social issues attracted 
significant and increasingly harder to obtain advertising dollars from companies wishing to be 
associated with the shows’ socially responsible values (Vranica, 2009). Empirically, research 
indeed shows that adopting CSR approaches can positively affect sales and return on sales 
(Ruf et al., 2001). Becchetti et al. (2009) note that many previous studies find a positive effect 
on economic but not financial performance. This seems to indicate that social activities are 
beneficial to net sales or value added per worker, but not necessarily to shareholder wealth.  
Socially responsible behaviour can provide an indication of management skills. Evidence of 
CSR policy requires commitment to CSR from all levels of the firm, which requires forward 
thinking and long-term orientated management (Guenster et al., 2011). Moreover, the quality 
management principle proposes that averting problems in the manufacturing process is better 
than finding and fixing them after the fact (Imai, 1986). Thus firms with high quality 
management may be able to avoid issues such as: unsatisfactory human rights protection 
(Royal Dutch/Shell), reputations of brutality with child labour (Adidas), and more recently 
the milk poisoning incident in China. These examples show that firms with short-term 
orientations can suffer significant lawsuits, financial losses and considerable reputational 
damage. For instance, the news of pesticide content in Pepsi and Coca-Cola beverages in 
India reduced the sales of both companies by 60 % (Financial Express, 2006).  
CSR can lead to reductions in production costs, particularly in relation to environmental 
performance. In economic theory, this relates to the Porter hypothesis, which states that by 
introducing strict environmental regulations, firms will be inspired and encouraged to 
enhance productivity and efficiencies at the firm level. In parallel with this notion, firm 
pollution can therefore be viewed as a sign of inefficiency, with the waste a non-recoverable 
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cost (Shrivastava and Hart, 1992). Russo and Fouts (1997) put forward the resource view of 
environmental governance, in which proactive environmental policy requires structural 
changes to the production and service delivery of the firm. Such initiatives require the 
development, acquisition, and implementation of new technologies that can lead to economic 
and competitive advantages compared to their peers. For instance, Walmart was able to save 
$3.5 million due to changes made in the packaging of their toys. From an environmental 
perspective, this social initiative was reported to save “3,425 tons of corrugated materials, 
1,358 barrels of oil, 5,190 trees and 727 shipping containers’’ (Wallmart, 2006).  
CSR can also be viewed as an important component of a firm’s risk management efforts. In 
particular, CSR can provide an effective mechanism to avoid or mitigate risks related to 
compliance, litigation, regulatory constraints, environmental penalties, shareholder activism, 
and damages to firm reputation. Moreover, companies may take the initiative to self-regulate 
by reducing emissions or similar, in order to pre-empt legislation that could impose even 
tighter standards (Bradsher and Revkin, 2001). In addition, the costs of not managing social 
risks can be substantial. For example, BP’s Deepwater Horizon accident has been estimated 
to cost the company up to $37 billion in compensation and clean up. At the worst point in the 
spill disaster, BP shares lost almost half their value (Gregory et al., 2013).   
There is growing belief that the advantages and benefits of CSR do not come from simply 
complying with regulatory requirements, because most intra-industry peers are affected by 
compliance in a similar way (Guenster et al., 2011). Thus real benefits from social 
responsibility will likely come from more rigorous and proactive forms of social 
performance, which require changes in the way the firm delivers and produces its services, 
and a forward-looking management style (Dowell et al., 2000; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Russo 
and Fouts, 1997). This is consistent with McWilliams’ and Siegel’s (2001) definition of CSR, 
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“as actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that 
which is required by law”. Similarly this means to be responsive to “issues beyond the narrow 
economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm” (Davis, 1973). To harness the 
benefits of CSR, firms must look beyond a narrow view of regulatory compliance.   
1.2 Motivations 
As CSR becomes more popular, shifting from social trend to social movement (Friedman and 
Miles 2001), a fundamental question of credibility arises: do firms that engage in CSR do so 
as a value-increasing exercise, that is to earn higher profits, or do actions associated with 
CSR hurt the bottom line? In other words, does higher CSR lead to higher corporate financial 
performance (CFP)?  
For the last 40 years scholars have searched for an empirical link between CSR and CFP. 
Qualitative and quantitative reviews of the literature reveal a body of research filled with 
varying results. For instance, Peloza (2009) reports 63 % of studies are positive, 15 % to be 
negative, and 22 % neutral. And despite the majority of studies that conclude an overall 
positive relationship exists (Roman et al., 1999; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Wu, 2006; Margolis et 
al., 2009), correlation figures based on meta-analysis between CSP and CFP are relatively 
small of r = 0.133 (Margolis et al., 2009), and r = 0.18 (Orlitzky, Schmidt et al. 2003). 
Consequently, Peloza (2009), notes of the CSP–CFP link: “The relationship is relatively 
weak; questions of causality are unanswered; and the measures used to examine the business 
case are inconsistent”. Beginning from this basis, we outline the following motivations for 
this thesis.  
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1.2.1 Confounding issues  
We argue one of the major flaws of the previous research is that a large majority of these 
studies investigate the CSP–CFP relationship based on long-term evaluations, which can be 
exposed to a variety of confounding factors (such as business cycles, competition movements, 
new product opportunities, etc.). Moreover, Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) note that the 
long-term performance of firms classified as ‘socially responsible’ may be in part a function 
of demand by a subgroup of investors. For instance, pension funds that specifically screen for 
social criteria and that hold their investments unchanged for the long term.  
Considering these confounding issues, if the CSR factor is substituting in part or whole for 
another risk factor, any evidence that corporate sustainability is priced by the capital market 
becomes only a reiteration of the risk and return relationship. In the same way, any evidence 
that firms engaging in CSR perform better or worse than their non-CSR counterparts needs to 
make a distinction on whether financial performance differences are a result of a social factor, 
an unknown risk premium, or both (Lee and Faff, 2009).  
Under the free-market view professed by Friedman (1970), the market is arguably the final 
arbiter on whether CSR is truly value enhancing (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012). Therefore 
what is required is a market evaluation of CSR, one separated from any measurable risk 
factors and which isolates the unique contribution of CSR. Thus, this study focuses on one 
aspect of social performance that has received very little attention in the literature, despite its 
direct ability to circumvent the limitations mentioned above. In this, we refer to the ‘social 
index effect’ – analysing how the underlying price of a firm changes (through an event study) 
given its announcement of addition to the FTSE4Good Global Index.  
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Margolis et al. (2009) note in their meta-analysis of the literature that studies that use an 
event study are “unique in that they are unusually precise … and when done correctly 
[McWilliams and Siegal, 1997] confounding events are excluded”. Moreover, event studies 
can represent the “cleanest evidence we have on market efficiency” (Fama, 1991). Thus our 
contribution to the literature begins first by isolating a reliable, validated, and significantly 
‘clean’ measure of the CSR factor. 
1.2.2 Firm-specific issues  
Despite the extensive research investigating the link between CSP and CFP, the specific 
literature investigating the ‘social index effect’ so far consists of only four published studies 
and three unpublished studies. Since most of these only analyse abnormal returns from a 
market reaction perspective, and do not consider other aspects of trading activity or firm-
specific performances,6 the literature lacks substantial ability to explain why these abnormal 
returns occur, how they impact the related finance theories, and the implication of these 
results, if any, for practitioners. Peloza (2009) notes in his review of the related literature: 
“This situation leaves the ‘believers’ advocating for CSP based on broad studies that do not 
address firm-specific issues, and the ‘skeptics’ discounting CSP because the research findings 
are irrelevant”.   
                                                            
6 Clacher & Hagendorff (2012) and to a lesser degree Doh et al. (2010) are exceptions. Our study, however, uses 
a considerably larger sample size (n = 651 versus n = 356 as per Clacher & Hagendorff, 2012 and n = 56 as per 
Doh et al, 2010), a more comprehensive set of explanatory variables (for instance, Doh et al., 2010 examines 
only two variables), and is able to provide results robust to a global scale (Clacher & Hagendorff, 2012 study 
UK firms, while Doh et al., 2010 study US firms).  
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Following this line of criticism, we explain sources of abnormal returns using firm-specific 
characteristics, which may not necessarily relate directly to sustainable activities, but may 
reveal in finer detail why the market reacts in such a way. In particular, we focus on 
examining how financial constraints can impede the economic value of CSR.  
1.2.3 Presence of a mediating variable 
Although examining firm-specific variables is important to assist our understanding of the 
“isolated pieces of the overall puzzle” (Barnett, 2007), like previous studies there may still 
remain a large amount of unexplained variance in our research (Orlitzky et al., 2003). The 
discrepancy in results from past studies suggests the presence of a mediating variable that 
may be important in influencing market reaction to CSR.  In regards to this, Peloza (2009) 
notes:  
the most important direction for future research lies in understanding, through 
examination, the mediation process between CSP and financial performance. 
Capturing the mediation process is essential; first, for understanding how CSP creates 
business value, and second, for developing leading indicators to assess this value early 
in the process. 
The growth and role of institutional investors have grown substantially over the past 60 years. 
In the United States for example, institutional ownership has risen from a relatively small 
market capitalisation of 7 % in 1950, to about 67 % in 2010 (Tonello and Rabimov, 2010). In 
2009, if we consider only the largest 1000 firms in the United States, institutional investors 
are even more prominent, showing an ownership of about 73 % in outstanding equity 
(Tonello and Rabimov, 2010). Thus one of our key motivations in this thesis is to analyse the 
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biggest investor group in the market – institutional investors – and how their presence and 
underlying behaviour can dictate market reaction to CSR.  
Our analysis of institutional ownership is motivated by two observations. First, if corporate 
managers want their stock to remain attractive to institutional shareholders, they must 
consider the concerns of institutional owners. Therefore an analysis of changes in institutional 
ownership surrounding CSR engagement can provide important information about policy 
implications for corporate managers. Second, our analysis of institutional ownership is 
especially important because the CSR literature has not yet considered the impact of 
institutional ownership in detail before.  
1.2.4 Addressing endogeneity  
While there is evidence of changes in institutional ownership associated with CSR events, 
these could be the result of the regular institutional decisions in relation to balancing 
portfolios, or alternatively due to other events unrelated to CSR. Thus our next motivation is 
to address a fundamental problem that almost all microeconometric evaluation studies 
inevitably have to overcome – controlling for endogeneity. Lack of control here can lead to 
spurious correlations and thus difficulty in determining direct causality. 
Moreover, a caveat in many previous studies is that they treat CSR as an exogenous attribute. 
It is thus unsurprising that the lack of controlling for endogeneity has led to inconclusive 
results in the CSP–CFP literature. In a recent review of the literature, Margolis et al. (2009, p 
27) note:  
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the CSP->CFP causal mechanisms needs to be articulated and tested. Too many 
studies speculate about mechanisms that explain results or end with a call to 
investigate them. It is time to study mechanisms systematically. 
To this end, we ensure our institutional results account for endogeneity by employing 
propensity score matching (PSM). 
1.2.5 Strategic motives – across industries and the consumer sensitivity 
mechanism  
While many studies have analysed the CSP–CFP relationship, with qualitative and 
quantitative reviews of the literature suggesting a positive relationship does exist “probably; it 
depends” (Peloza, 2009), we restate the outcome of this potential relationship into an 
investigation of the strategic motivations of CSR. In particular, we analyse which industries, 
and then in turn which firms, will be increasing (decreasing) firm value by engaging in CSR. 
We then examine how these changes in the wealth effects of CSR can be mediated to a large 
degree by an industry’s sensitivity to consumers.  
This analysis is motivated by two key observations. 
First, while previous studies have controlled for ‘industry effects’ (industry control variables 
or a match based on industry are common in studies that use multi-industry samples), the 
large majority of these have only controlled for the industry effect on corporate financial 
performance (CFP), and not for the potentially distinct industry effect between CSR and CFP 
(Hoepner et al., 2010). These studies have therefore implicitly assumed that the CSR–CFP 
relationship is homogenous across industries.  
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Moreover, to date only a handful of studies have investigated the CSP–CFP relationship 
based on specific industries (Ogden and Watson, 1999; Simpson and Kohers, 2002), while 
even fewer have investigated the moderating effects of a specific industry characteristic 
(Baron et al., 2011; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008). It appears, to the best of our knowledge, that 
no studies have yet analysed the effects of CSP and CFP across industries.7  
Second, we address the view of Margolis et al. (2009, p. 28) who states:  
No matter how well measured the constructs, research must move beyond simply 
assessing the magnitude of the CSP–CFP relationship. Research must now show how 
CSP comes to bear upon CFP. 
Thus we attempt to explain our observed findings by analysing how consumer sensitivity can 
mediate to a large degree the direction of CSR–CFP performance.  
Based on the aforementioned motivations of this thesis, we outline the following objectives 
and key questions. 
1.3 Objectives 
1. To determine shareholder wealth effects in relation to the announcement of inclusion 
in a social index. 
2. To understand the determinants of the valuation effect due to inclusion in a social 
index.  
3. To investigate the mediating role of institutional investors.  
4. To address the endogeneity issue that is inherent in our study.  
                                                            
7 With the exception of one working series paper by Hoepner et al. (2010).  
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5. To test whether CSR is a strategic engagement by firms to retain market value. 
1.4 Key questions 
The key questions of this thesis are:  
1. What are the shareholder wealth effects of an announcement of inclusion in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index?  
2. Are firm characteristics important for understanding the market reaction to an 
announcement of inclusion in the FTSE4Good Index?  
3. What is the mediating role of institutional investors? 
4. Once endogeneity is controlled for, can changes in institutional ownership be 
attributed to CSR?  
5. Are firms that are more consumer conscious likely to benefit more from their 
investment in CSR?  
1.5 Contributions 
The basis of our research is to investigate whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 
evaluated as value increasing or value destroying. The literature investigating CSR effects on 
firm value can be divided into either short-term or long-term studies. This thesis is conducted 
from a short-term perspective (through an event study), which we argue is highly desirable 
given that long-term studies may be inherently exposed to confounding factors. As studies in 
CSR and firm value have been largely based on this latter category, many of our contributions 
to the short-term literature are arguably more significant and reliable. Moreover, our research 
employs data at the firm level (in contrast to studies who analyse at the fund level) which we 
argue is exceedingly warranted given the direct firm implications of CSR activities. Below 
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we outline our main contributions to the short-term literature (and where appropriate to the 
literature as a whole – that is, long term plus short term studies), followed by our minor 
contributions which are mostly data related.  
1.5.1 Main contributions 
Note: all contributions are described to the best of our knowledge:   
‐ Our study is one of the first in the short-term literature (that is, social index literature) 
to find characteristics of financial constraints (such as dividend payout, capital 
expenditure, and cash holdings) to impede the economic value of CSR.  
‐ Our study is one of the first to reveal – ceteris paribus – that institutional investors 
punish firms found to be engaged in high CSR practices (proxy by inclusion in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index).  
‐ Our study is one of the first in the general literature to analyse the CSR–CFP link 
across industries. Subsequently, we show that distinct industry characteristics are 
important factors in determining the economic value of CSR. These findings provide 
important implications for practitioners. For instance, our study finds positive firm-
value effects in the Banking sector; therefore banks should increase their CSR 
activities. In contrast, we find negative firm-value effects in the Technology sector; 
thus CSR activities do not benefit these firms.  
‐ In our analysis of heterogeneity across industries, we find consumer sensitivity is an 
important strategic motivation behind an industry’s (and their associated firms) 
decision to engage in CSR. Consequently our research provides evidence to justify 
CSR – from the perspective of maximizing shareholder wealth – as long as these 
social activities can be linked to enhancing customer satisfaction, and in turn firm 
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value. Likewise, we provide evidence to show that firms that cannot link their CSR 
activities to customer satisfaction (that is, the Industrial sectors) can increase their 
CFP – all else being equal – by avoiding further expenses in CSR. Establishing this 
link between CSR and consumer sensitivity is a first in the short-term literature.  
‐ Lastly, our research highlights a potential research caveat, especially for studies that 
use multi-industry samples. While they have controlled for industry effects on firm 
performance (CFP), they have failed to control for the industry effects on the CSP–
CFP relationship. Therefore the results of many past empirical studies using multi-
industry samples may need to be re-examined, or at least cited with greater caution 
than currently assumed.  
1.5.2 Minor contributions 
‐ First, we analyse abnormal returns surrounding announcements of inclusion in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index – an SRI index that to the best of our knowledge has not 
yet been comprehensively examined.8 Analysing the market reaction of firms’ 
inclusion in this social index provides a highly visible measure of CSR, separated 
from any measurable risk factors, and one that avoids the confounding problems of 
causality. Moreover, since this measure of CSP is evaluated based on a 
comprehensive set of criteria, which has been externally evaluated and quantified by 
an independent body, clear and strong signals concerning firm credibility in meeting 
strict CSR criteria can be captured. In addition, since there are relatively few SRI 
indices, abnormal price observations during announcement periods should provide an 
                                                            
8 In so far as Collison et al. (2008) who compares the performance of the FTSE4Good Index to an appropriate 
benchmark index.  
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unbiased indicator of the importance of corporate social responsibility (Kappou and 
Oikonomou, 2012).    
 
‐ In addition, through an analysis of the FTSE4Good Global Index, we access a sample 
of firms on a global scale, spanning 24 countries and 656 firms. The nature of this 
sample has allowed our research to contribute to the literature in a number of ways. 
First, we use the largest dataset to date (651 firms versus 356 firms in Clacher and 
Hagendorff, 2012). Second, as we are the largest study in this field to use a global 
sample, we can analyse with greater robustness the implications of social index 
inclusion on a global scale. Moreover, our global perspective is motivated by studies 
that suggest CSR may differ in implementation and outcome relative to each country 
context. Given these differences are still unclear, our study is important to provide 
further evidence within this research field.  
 
‐ We are the first in the CSR literature to consider institutional ownership based on two 
dimensions: changes to institutional ownership – a comparison of current and post 
quarterly institutional holdings surrounding the announcement of a firm’s inclusion in 
a CSR index – and institutional investment horizon – measured via the weighted 
average churn rate of a firm’s investor turnover. To the best of our knowledge, neither 
institutional variable has yet been considered in the CSR literature. Previous studies 
have used one-point-in-time yearly  measures of institutional ownership, either ‘the 
number of institutional investors’ (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Graves and Waddock, 
1994; Mahoney and Roberts, 2007), or the ‘total percentage holdings of institutional 
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shareholdings’ (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Mahoney 
and Roberts, 2007).  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. In the second chapter we discuss the 
neo-classical arguments underlying the relationship between CSP and CFP, as well as 
providing a general literature review of the major findings in this research field. In the third 
chapter we determine the shareholder wealth effects on announcements of inclusion in a 
social index. The fourth chapter explains the observed wealth effects by examining the 
impeding role of financial constraints, and the mediating influence of institutional ownership. 
With reference to the latter hypothesis, this chapter also controls for the endogeneity issues 
inherent in our institutional results. In the fifth chapter, we analyse CSR value across 
industries and test consumer sensitivity as a strategic motivation. In the sixth chapter we 
present a discussion and a conclusion to this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical background and general literature review 
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2.0 Introduction 
For the last 40 years, scholars have searched for an empirical link between corporate social 
performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). One of the first studies to 
undertake such an investigation is Bragdon and Marlin (1972) which asks a simple question: 
is pollution profitable? The authors find a positive relationship between CSP and CFP, and 
subsequently concluded that they have made “… a step in the direction of laying to rest the 
economic model that poses the alternative” (p. 17). Yet even after numerous articles, books, 
dissertations, and working papers, this largely identical empirical question of the relationship 
between CSP and CFP continues to be investigated with no clear consensus. Recently, Wu 
and Shen (2013) state: “we examine the relationship between CSR and CFP in the banking 
sector by using global banking data”. Ultimately while quantitative and qualitative reviews of 
the literature suggests an overall positive relationship exists “probably; it depends” (Peloza, 
2009), there may be no simple yes or no answer to this performance question (Margolis et al., 
2009).  
Therefore to understand how future research can address and advance this empirical question, 
it is prudent to first lay the groundwork surrounding the current research field between CSR 
and CFP. This chapter aims to provide an understanding of the theoretical basis of CSR 
engagement and a general literature review of studies investigating the CSP–CFP link. More 
specific literature regarding our individual contributions will be explored further in the 
respective empirical chapters.  
This chapter begins first by examining the key theoretical arguments underlying CSR 
engagement, and which dictate the basis on which CSR should lead to higher or lower CFP. 
With these arguments in the foreground, we study the empirical implications in two parts. 
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First, we review of the most recent meta-analysis, and discuss an overall view of the 
literature, including any general relationships and common limitations. Second, we review the 
latest and key studies in the CSP–CFP research field. This section of the literature review is 
divided into research that finds a positive effect, research that finds a negative effect, research 
that finds a neutral effect, and research that finds a curve-linear effect. In the last section, we 
end with a summary and conclusion. In this, we critique the current literature and 
subsequently identify a direction for future research – the need/ability to isolate a reliable, 
validated, and significantly ‘clean’ measure of CSR. Appendix 1: Flow Chart 1 illustrates the 
structure and individual sections of this chapter.  
2.1 Background 
2.1.1 Is there a theoretical basis?  
We note – as of yet – there is no explicit theory linking CSP disclosures to CFP measures. As 
Wood and Jones (1995) put it, “there is no theory to explain why stockholders would or 
would not prefer a company that gives one % of pre-tax earnings to charity, that hires and 
develops minority or women workers, or that ranks higher in pollution control indices”. The 
consequences of this ‘lack in theory’ are consistent with meta-analysis findings by Orlitzky 
(2007), who reports that correlation figures between CSP disclosures and accounting CFP 
measures are small and negative. Similarly, social audits and other observable CSP measures 
(such as dollar amount of charitable contributions) are found to have correlations of close to 
zero with market-based measures of CFP. These findings overall are supportive of a CSP 
literature “… still most accurately seen as a vast collection of disparate views of 
interpenetrating business and society relationships” (Wood and Jones, 1995). Due to the 
normative basis (that is, what should be rather than what is) that underlies many of these 
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relationships, studies have relied on neoclassical arguments to establish a theoretical 
relationship between CSP and CFP (Wood and Jones, 1995). In the next section, we present 
these key neoclassical arguments.  
2.1.2 Arguments opposing CSR and firm value (value-decreasing hypothesis)  
2.1.2.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory proposes that a firm exists in a world parallel to a “nexus of contracts” (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) between managers (agent) and their shareholders (principal). When both 
parties to this contract strive to maximise their utility, conflicts of interest can often arise 
when managers and shareholders have motivations that are not perfectly aligned. This 
fundamental problem between the manager and the shareholder is conceptualised by agency 
theory, which proposes that managers pursue their own personal goals at the cost of 
maximising shareholder returns.  
The opportunities for managers to pursue their own personal goals are several. These include 
perquisite consumption, empire building, manipulating financial figures to increase bonuses, 
and enacting antitakeover defences to protect positions.9 The prospect of managers preferring 
to enhance personal goals over shareholder value is further highlighted when we consider 
their actual level of ownership is small in most cases. For example, in a study of large public 
firms, it was found that 90 % of CEOs held less than 5 % of the firm (Ofek and Yermack, 
2000).  
                                                            
9 The threat of hostile takeovers is considered as an important disciplining device for incumbent managers. 
Researchers find poor-performing managers are often dismissed soon after a change of control (Walsh, 1991; 
Martin, 1991; Furtado, 1990). 
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Extending agency theory to CSR, scholars argue that CSR activities produce significant 
managerial benefits that are often obtained to the detriment of maximising shareholder wealth 
(see for example Atkinson and Galaskiewicz, 1988; Friedman, 1970). For instance, CSR can 
be used by managers to enhance their personal reputation/image in communities, to gain 
better career opportunities, and create greater negotiating powers. Moreover, management 
may pursue certain social initiatives (for example labour-friendly programs) as a quid pro 
quo, in which key stakeholders may be more likely to ignore managerial excesses, in 
exchange for socially responsible benefits (such as above-market wages and generous paid 
parental leave). Therefore, under the premise that shareholders may prefer to use company 
resources on other activities, such as firm reinvestment or higher dividends, CSR can be 
argued from an agency theory perspective to be a value-destroying activity.     
2.1.2.2 The Friedman view (classical view) 
Milton Friedman (1970) emphasises that business has “… one and only one social 
responsibility … to use its resources and to engage in activities designed to increase profits”. 
He argues that under the “cloak of social responsibility”, managers exploit CSR as a means to 
promote their own social, political, or career agendas, imposing costs and reducing returns to 
the shareholder (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). According to this view, CSR is seen to 
neither contribute to nor enhance shareholder value and from a social perspective resources 
devoted to CSR would be more wisely spent on increasing firm efficiency (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001).  
An Economist report estimates a ‘full-fledged’ CSR program would cost a large multinational 
firm as much as 2 % of total revenue (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005). Clearly, engaging 
in CSR activities can entail significant costs to a firm, ranging from community and 
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philanthropy programs, employee day care, paid parental leave, and the changes in operations 
needed to minimise environmental footprints. According to a special report in BusinessWeek 
(Berner, 2005), large companies have engaged in significant CSR costs – particularly in 
charitable donations. For example, Target’s donation of $107.8 million represented 3.6 % of 
its pre-tax profit, Merck’s donation of $921 million represented 11.3 % of its pre-tax profits, 
while Hospital Corporation of America’s donation of $926 million represented a staggering 
43.3 % of its pre-tax profits.  
Moreover the cost of pursuing social missions is further compounded if firms are avoiding 
lucrative business opportunities due to social concerns or norms, as this, by default, must 
result in a lower economic performance. Thus Milton Friedman (1970) asserts engagement in 
CSR is tantamount to managers “approaching fraud” (Friedman, 1970). 
2.1.3 Arguments supporting CSR and firm value (value-increasing hypothesis)  
2.1.3.1 Stakeholder theory:  
Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as “groups and individuals that can affect, or are 
affected by, the accomplishment of the organizational purpose”. While Clarkson (1995) 
provides a narrower definition of stakeholders as those who “bear some form of risk as a 
result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a 
firm”. Whichever the definition one uses, the underlying implication remains the same – each 
group that holds a ‘stake’ in the firm has a right not to be treated as a means to some end, as 
their consideration is crucial to the firm’s wellbeing (Freeman, 1984). This statement 
essentially conceptualises stakeholder theory, in which much of Friedman’s (1970) argument 
of an ‘all or nothing’ pursuit of profits can be considered rather short-sighted;  especially 
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when we consider the well-accepted rationale that firms need to look beyond the needs of 
their shareholders if they wish to remain successful.  
Given the globalisation of worldwide boundaries and the ease of information sharing due to 
advances in technology, companies’ actions are being more intensely scrutinised. Thus 
stakeholder support – or the lack thereof – can often be to the detriment of the firm. When 
stakeholders no longer have confidence in the firm’s performance, it loses its critical support 
structure and customer base (Lee, 2008). This can range from customers boycotting products, 
shareholders dumping stocks, individuals (or bodies) more inclined to pursue legal action 
over offences, suppliers unresponsive to fairer or more favourable terms, and employees 
becoming more disgruntled and less loyal. Consequently, any major stakeholder group that 
withdraws its support for the firm can become adversely affected (Clarkson, 1995). 
Further, Lee et al. (2009) highlight the need for firms to consider not only the explicit claims 
of shareholders and bondholders, but also the implicit claims from their wider range of 
stakeholders too. For instance, if firms do not adequately manage their implicit claims (such 
as to not pollute), those affected could seek compensation, and thus transform implicit claims 
into explicit claims (for example a claim for damages). Moreover, firms displaying poor CSP 
can influence the views of their other stakeholders, who may cast doubt on the firm’s ability 
to meet its other claims (Lee et al., 2009). Subsequently, firms with leading CSP reputations 
may be exposed to lower implicit costs, relative to their lagging CSP counterparts. Overall, 
stakeholder theory recognises that, by leading CSP performance, companies are able to 
improve their stakeholder relations, and therefore ensure sustained future success (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1994).  
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The effective management of key stakeholders such customers, investors, governments, 
employees, suppliers, and the local community can provide benefits that go beyond merely 
continued participation (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Hillman and Keim (2001) propose 
managing stakeholders (particularly primary stakeholders) to have the potential to create 
valuable intangible assets such as reduced employee turnover, increased customer and 
supplier loyalty, and improved reputation. Moreover, managing ties with key stakeholders 
can build goodwill, buffering firms from unforseen problems (Fombrun and Gardberg, 2000) 
protecting and enhancing corporate brands (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Freeman et al., 
2007), and providing firms with a competitive advantage  (Hart, 1995; Litz, 1996; Rugman 
and Verbeke, 1998; McWilliams et al., 2002; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). This, in turn, 
leads to increasing shareholder wealth (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984).  
In a recent interview, Freeman (2009) describe stakeholder theory as an important 
philosophy, where if one focuses on shareholders alone, one misses on what makes capitalism 
‘tick’ – shareholders, employees, suppliers, and communities working together “... to create 
something, that no one of them can create alone” (Freeman, 2009).   
2.1.3.2 Resource theory 
Underlying the resource-based theory of the firm (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1995; Wernerfelt, 
1984), is the premise that a firm’s ability to outperform its competition depends on the unique 
interplay of human, organisation, and physical resources over time (Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Many scholars in fact now argue that it is the 
intangible difficult-to-replicate resources that are key to a firm’s ability to outperform its 
rivals and create value for their shareholders (Atkinson et al., 1997; Teece, 1998; Barney, 
1991). Moreover, using know-how or expertise that typically takes years to develop limits a 
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competitor’s ability to readily replicate these resources (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Common 
attributes of resources likely to lead to a sustained competitive advantage are those that are 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). 
One example of such a resource comes from attaining high levels of CSP, which can generate 
favourable corporate reputation (Podolny and Phillips, 1996), and lead to a variety of 
stakeholders showing positive preference. For instance, key stakeholders may be less inclined 
to engage in relationships requiring significant investments, effort or valuable information, in 
contrast to positive preferences shown to firms with strong CSP (Adams, 1963). Similarly, 
suppliers may prefer to be associated with strong social performers, as the cash flows and 
operations from these firms may be perceived to be less risky to the negative impact of 
corporate scandal (Godfrey, 2005; Graves and Waddock, 1994). Moreover, customers may be 
more inclined to purchase products or services from companies that display a higher regard to 
social performance, especially if the use of that product or service is observable (Brown and 
Dacin, 1997). In sum, CSR can lead to competitive advantages by creating resources such as 
reputation, corporate culture, or knowledge assets (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Barney, 1986; 
Leonard-Barton, 1998; Teece, 1998), which in part or sum can add considerable value to the 
firm.  
2.1.3.3 Social contract theory  
Using social contract theory, advocates of CSR argue that social responsibility is a 
contractual obligation firms have with society. Accordingly, firms must behave in a socially 
responsible manner, not only because it is in their commercial interest to do so, but also 
because it is part of what society implicitly expects. Moreover, it is society in the first 
instance that has allowed firms to use both natural and human resources in the pursuit of their 
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productive functions and attainment of power status (Donaldson, 1983). The Committee for 
Economic Development (CED) further notes this social contract is changing in extensive and 
significant ways: 
Business is being asked to assume broader responsibilities to society than ever before 
and to serve a wider range of human values. Business enterprises, in effect, are being 
asked to contribute more to the quality of American life than just supplying quantities 
of goods and services. In as much as business exists to serve society, its future will 
depend on the quality of management’s response to the changing expectations of the 
public (CED, 1971, p. 16)  
It follows that while this contract may change as societal conditions change, the contract in 
general will always remain the basis of the legitimacy, demand and need for CSR (Balabanis 
et al., 1998).  
2.2 Key meta-analysis reviews 
Before we review the latest and key studies investigating the relationship between CSP and 
CFP, it is prudent to first examine the latest meta-analysis reviews concerning this field of 
study. 
The meta-analysis of Orlitzky et al. (2003) integrates research between 1972 and 1997. The 
authors find a positive relationship between CSP and CFP (r = 0.18, but after correcting for 
sampling and measurement error this correlation figure increased to 0.36).10 The extent to 
                                                            
10 Interestingly, Orlitzky (2007) in a later study suggests the strength of the relationship between CSP and CFP 
is reliant on the discipline of the researcher, which implies that research in this field is highly subjective and 
fragmented (Peloza, 2009). 
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which social responsibility influences financial performance, however, was found to be 
dependent on the operationalisation of CSP and CFP. For instance, the authors find CSP is 
more correlated with accounting-based measures of CFP (as oppose to market-based 
measures of CFP), while CSP measures via reputational indices (such as Fortune magazine 
ratings), were in particular found to have higher correlations with CFP.   
In addition, the authors report that differences in previous findings result from ‘study 
artefacts’, ‘stakeholder mismatching’, and ‘lack of theory’, which wholly or in part can 
explain between 15 % and 100 % of the variation observed. For instance, the ‘lack of theory’ 
between CSP disclosures such as charitable contributions, assisting minorities etc., and 
stockholder preferences (high preferences compared to low preferences) are consistent with 
findings by Orlitzky et al. (2003) of negative and small correlations between CSP disclosures 
and accounting CFP measures. Moreover correlations between social audits11 and other 
observable CSP measures (such as dollar amount of charitable contributions) are found to be 
close to zero with market based measures of CFP.  
In the most comprehensive meta-analysis review to date across 251 studies and spanning 
from 1972 to 2007, Margolis et al. (2009) find that while an overall positive relationship 
exists between CSP and CFP, this relationship is small (mean r = 0.13, median r = 0.09, 
weighted r = 0.11). The last 106 studies in the past decade, in particular, demonstrate even 
smaller correlations (mean r = 0.09, median r = 0.063). Thus, the authors conclude, “while 
not discouraging managers from doing good, [this] seems to provide no pressing financial 
imperative to do good” (p. 24).  
                                                            
11 Third-party evaluations to assess CSP behaviours such as community service, environmental programmes, 
and corporate philanthropy (Orlitzky et al. 2003).  
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Moreover, the literature seems to have fallen short in demonstrating the casual direction of 
CSP and CFP, both theoretically and empirically. For instance, only 37 % of effects studied 
used CSP measures that precede measures of CSP, a figure surprisingly low if the goal is to 
establish a causal link (Margolis et al., 2009). The authors suggest that future studies should 
employ two-stage sample selection models, first to control for the likelihood that firms will 
engage in CSP, and second to test the relationship between CSP and CFP.  
In a systematic review of 159 studies (128 academic studies and 31 practitioner studies), 
Peloza (2009)  reports that 63 % show a positive relationship (this figure is reduced to 59 % if 
we only examine the academic literature), 15 % show a negative relationship, while the 
remaining 22 % demonstrate a neutral or mixed relationship. The author notes that while this 
small but positive relationship seems to exists, “probably; it depends” (Peloza, 2009), the 
relationship between CSP and CFP has not been casually demonstrated. To demonstrate 
causality, Peloza (2009) highlights the importance of measuring CFP impact as close as 
possible to the CSP activity.   
Moreover, Peloza (2009) emphasises that research in this field provides little guidance to 
managers on how they should assess the financial impact of their CSP activities. This is likely 
because commonly used market measures of CFP, such as share prices, or accounting 
measures such as return on equity and return on assets are inherently confounded by a variety 
of other factors. CSP activities therefore “tend to be lost in hundreds or thousands of other 
firm initiatives” unrelated to CSP (Peloza, 2009). Thus, the authors note simply examining 
CFP, which are essentially ‘end state metrics’, cannot provide the necessarily level of detail 
for managers to effectively determine an optimal level of CSP investment. 
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Further, while the majority of studies discussed the mediation process between CSP and CFP, 
only three of these (at the time of Peloza’s review) carefully investigated the business case for 
CSP; from initial action, to mediation process, then to final impact to financial performance. 
However, only one of these three investigated this relationship empirically. Instead, Peloza 
finds the majority of researchers to rely on the correlations between CSP and CFP. Thus the 
study concludes:  
The most important direction for future research lies in understanding, through 
examination, the mediation process between CSP and financial performance. 
Capturing the mediation process is essential; first, for understanding how CSP creates 
business value, and second, for developing leading indicators to assess this value early 
in the process (2009, p. 1530).  
2.3 Studies on the performance of CSR 
In the next section we provide a review of the latest and key studies investigating the 
relationship between CSR and CFP. We divide studies in this area into research that finds a 
positive effect, research that finds a negative effect, research that finds a neutral effect, and 
research that finds a curve-linear effect. Please note, studies specifically relating to our 
empirical chapters (that is, the literature analysing market reaction to social index 
inclusion/exclusion etc.), will be examined directly in their respective chapters.  
2.3.1 Research that finds a positive effect 
Bolanle et al. (2012) collect CSR expenditure data related to the First Bank of Nigeria Plc 
over a period of almost ten years. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression reveals 
that every unit change in CSR expenditure leads to a 95 % increase in profit after tax for the 
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bank. Their results show CSR is crucial for determining the financial performance of banks in 
Nigeria, and concludes CSR should be integrated with spending culture.  
Ehsan and Kaleem (2012) construct a proxy for CSR using data on donations and spending 
related to the Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, a requirement by the Pakistani government 
that companies must disclose the amounts of spending directed to workers’ welfare. Using a 
sample of manufacturing firms in Pakistan, they find CSR is positively related to accounting 
base measures of financial performance, particularly those of return on assets (correlation 
coefficient: 0.276), return on equity (0.267) and earnings per share (0.225).  
Goll and Rasheed (2004) find that a firm’s environment is an important moderator in 
determining the financial consequences of socially responsible behaviour. For instance, they 
find CSR behaviour provides a positive influence under highly munificent environments 
(settings supportive of sustained growth and opportunities), as well as dynamic environments 
(fast-changing and unpredictable settings), in which CSR can create legitimacy and 
protection, while enhancing social reputation and support. Overall, their results suggest that 
while socially responsible activities may have their own individual benefits and costs, they 
may also provide a strong economic rationale under certain types of environments.  
Kapoor and Sandhu (2010) use content analysis based on the level of disclosure of several 
social dimensions including: ‘Community Involvement’, ‘Human Resources’, 
‘Environmental Contribution’, ‘Product Contribution and Customer Relations’, ‘Shareholder 
Relations’, and ‘Rural Development and Diversity’, to construct their CSR scores. Their 
study shows that based on a sample of Indian firms, CSR has a significant positive influence 
to corporate profitability. However, CSR and its association with corporate growth (growth in 
sales and growth in net assets) are found to be insignificant. This result suggests corporate 
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growth may be due to other factors unrelated to CSR, such as product quality and marketing 
strategy.   
Lev et al. (2010) investigates how corporate philanthropy impacts sales growth. Applying a 
Granger causality test, their analysis shows growth in charitable contributions is significantly 
associated with subsequent revenue growth. Upon further analysis, their results were revealed 
to be specifically driven by industries sensitive to consumer perception such as the retailers 
and the financial services. The report concludes that customer satisfaction mediates the 
relationship between corporate giving and sales. For instance, firms that engage in corporate 
philanthropy activities, particularly those highly sensitive to consumer perception, are able to 
develop more loyal and satisfied customers, and consequently improve revenue growth.  
Despite a large body of evidence showing research and development investment has a strong 
positive impact on firm profitability, very little research in the CSR–CFP literature directly 
controls for this variable. One of the first studies to control for research and development 
expenses (based on a sample of Taiwanese firms), is Lin et al. (2009). Using charitable 
donations as proxy for CSR expenses, the authors find that with a properly specified model, 
CSR activities do not necessarily translate to higher profits in the short term.  However, upon 
long-term analysis (over three years), CSR expenses may be instrumental to enhancing 
financial performance.  
Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) develop a conceptual model that proposes customer satisfaction 
mediates the relationship between CSR and market value. Specifically, they find CSR 
initiatives enable firms to build a base of satisfied customers, which in turn contributes to 
higher market value. This is achieved as CSR creates favourable conditions to boost 
evaluations and perceived value, as well as allowing consumers to identify firms as not only 
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economic entities – but part of the community and country as well. Furthermore, the study 
reveals firms with better corporate abilities (that is, innovative capabilities and product 
quality) tend to generate more market value from their CSR activities. Interestingly, this also 
implies a ‘dark side’ to CSR, in which social activities reduce customer satisfaction in 
relation to firms with low corporate abilities. Thus, for these firms, engagement in CSR can 
harm market value.  
Rais and Goedegebuure (2009) survey Indonesian manufacturing firms and their related 
stakeholders (shareholders, customers, suppliers, employees, and community members) to 
build a measure of CSP based on the strength of stakeholder relations. They find a 
stakeholder-orientated approach to social responsibility leads to higher financial performance. 
This supports the notion that CSP management, particularly that surrounding stakeholder 
relations, is the driving source of market positional advantage. This is especially the case for 
industries characterised by heterogeneous demands and imperfect and costly consumer 
information.  
To control for sample bias that may be inherent when analysing CSR effects, Shen and Chang 
(2009) employ a matching methodology. They construct a control sample of non-CSR firms, 
which resemble as closely as possible the sample of CSR firms. Through this matching 
methodology, differences in the two groups can be attributed to the ‘treatment effect’, that is, 
the CSR factor. Based on a sample of Taiwanese firms, they find CSR firms significantly 
outperform their otherwise conventional counterparts, with higher pre-tax income and gross 
margins. The authors conclude that corporate social ambition, at least in Taiwanese firms, 
produces more ‘gains than pains’.  
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The US Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 mandates that depository institutions 
serve their communities, low-income customers, and provide private funding for local 
housing needs and economic development. Using CRA ratings based on the degree of 
compliance, Simpson and Kohers (2002) analyse how this proxy for CSP is related to the  
financial performance of a large sample of commercial  banks in the US. They find that banks 
with high social ratings substantially outperform their counterparts with lower social ratings, 
with the former showing 78 % more profitability. Moreover, the group with high social 
ratings experience only one-half of the loan losses compared with their peers with lower 
social ratings.   
Schnietz and Epstein (2005) analyse whether reputation for social responsibility provides a 
‘reservoir of goodwill’ during economic shocks that may otherwise cause significant financial 
harm to the firm. Examining investors’ reaction to the 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization 
failure, they find that reputation for CSR provides an insulating effect for this negative shock. 
In particular, they find when comparing two portfolios representing ‘irresponsible’ industries 
(such as mining, steel, chemical, energy etc.), the portfolio characterised by high reputations 
of social responsibility did not experience a significant decline in returns. This was in contrast 
with the counterpart portfolio (the irresponsible industries without a reputation for social 
responsibility), which experienced a significant negative cumulative return of about 3 %. This 
translates roughly to an average of US$418 million loss of shareholder value per firm.  
During the apartheid period in South Africa, US investment in this country became an 
important social issue. In fact, whether a firm had investments in South Africa was 
considered a key measure of CSP. During the 1980s and early 1990s many firms abandoned 
their operations in South Africa, while others avoided investment or commercial dealings 
with firms doing business in this country. Kumar et al. (2002) analyse the stock market 
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reaction to firms that remained in South Africa during the aftermath of Nelson Mandela’s 
speech to end the investment boycott – a signal to the world that the apartheid period had 
ended. Their findings indicate institutional ownership increased at a significantly greater rate 
(a comparison beginning two years before and ending two years after the lifting of the 
sanctions) compared with other firms in the market. Moreover, this portfolio of firms 
experienced significant long-term (40 days) cumulative returns of 5.94 %.  
Ruf et al. (2001) examine how changes to CSP relate to changes to financial performance. To 
understand this relationship more clearly, they emphasise that analysis must first recognise a 
company has contracts with multiple stakeholders. From this perspective, the study develops 
a composite measure of CSP based on questionnaire data (delivered to each stakeholder 
group), and the firm’s KLD12 social rating. They find stakeholders, and particularly 
shareholders, benefit most when corporate management engages in meeting stakeholder 
needs. They also find that there are short-term benefits for financial performance, with 
changes to CSP positively related to increases in sales for both the current and subsequent 
year. In addition, long-term financial performance (return on equity in the third year) was also 
observed to experience positive changes to CSP.  
As corporations become more concerned about their environmental impact, purchasing 
managers have also become more focused on these issues. Defining environmental 
purchasing as “purchasing's involvement in supply chain management activities in order to 
facilitate recycling, reuse, and resource reduction” (p. 220), Carter et al. (2000) analyse 
survey data and find environmental purchasing significantly relates to improving net income 
                                                            
12 Short for Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD)  
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and decreasing the cost of goods. Their results run in contrast to perceptions that these 
programs are costly and that recycling is uneconomic. In fact, the opposite is found, with 
evidence suggesting these environmental efforts by purchasing managers can actually 
improve firm performance.  
Environmentalists have long argued that multinational enterprises (MNE) that invest in 
emerging and developing markets often engage in ‘dirty’ operations. These can range from 
avoiding pollution controls, reducing costs by recapitalising old equipment, and the 
continuation of products no longer accepted in more regulated markets. While some MNE’s 
clearly do employ such practices, what is less evident is whether these firms are gaining any 
systematic advantage. Dowell et al. (2000) attempt to answer this empirical question by 
analysing a sample of MNEs drawn from the S&P 500. They find MNE’s that adopt a global 
environmental standard have higher market valuations compared with firms that default to the 
less stringent or poorly enforced standards of the host country. This shows firms that pursue 
high environmental standards can indeed be rewarded for their efforts.  
Graves and Waddock (1999) examine whether ‘quality of management’ can mediate the 
relationship between CSP (as measured by stakeholder relations) and the financial 
performance of firms. Controlling for ‘quality of management’ via the Fortune reputational 
index, they find that better-managed firms have better financial performance. This 
relationship remains strong whether financial performance is measured by a market base (10-
year total return to shareholders) or accounting base measure (return on assets and return on 
equities). In addition, of the stakeholder relationships analysed, only shareholder and 
employee relations show the strongest association with financial performance, while 
community relations and product/consumer and environmental ratings experience the 
weakest.  
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2.3.2 Research that finds a negative relationship 
Brammer (2006) uses disaggregate indicators of social performance (in particular those 
measuring environment, employment and community activities) to achieve a closer 
evaluation of the interactions between social and financial performance. The investigation 
reveals that while the composite social performance indicator is negatively related to stock 
returns, it is high (good) employment scores that contribute most to this negative relation, 
rather than to a lesser extent other social aspects.  Moreover, as the analysis is driven by firm-
level data, the results support the notion that ethical fund underperformance is a result of 
inherently poor stocks, rather than the selection skills of the fund manager.   
Crisóstomo et al. (2011) provide a study on Brazilian non-financial firms through an analysis 
of a CSR index based on the relative amounts spent on sustainable activities. This index uses 
data on funds spent on three social corporate actions – ‘relationship with employees’, 
‘external social action’, and ‘environmental action’. The study shows that spending on social 
actions have a strong negative impact on firm value, particularly those of the employee and 
environmental dimensions. Indeed, these two social initiatives represent the strongest focus 
on CSR by Brazilian firms, and consequently represent the largest source of value-decreasing 
influence.  
Dianita (2011) hypothesises that companies that participate in earnings management 
(manipulation) tend to over-invest in CSR activities, as behind the ‘socially responsible 
image’ the company hopes to be less exposed to thorough investigations by their 
stakeholders. Moreover, the CSR mechanism can be considered a form of powerful self-
defence, to gain support from their stakeholders and thus reduce the damage when their 
dishonest activities are exposed. Using an accruals model to empirically detect earnings 
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management, and a CSR index measuring disclosure intensity, the authors indeed find 
support for this hypothesis. In particular, they find higher levels of earnings management lead 
to an increase in CSR activities, and consequently a worsening of company financial 
performance.  
In light of the growing concerns of misconduct in the defence industry, including claims of 
defective pricing, subcontractors’ kickbacks and breaches of compliance, a set of minimum 
standards known as the Defence Industries Initiative (DII) was drafted in the US. Defence 
contractors who signed the DII agreed to adopt and implement a set of business ethics 
governing corporate social responsibility initiatives. Boyle et al. (1997) analyse the stock 
market reaction to contractors who signed the DII. This analysis finds those contractors 
experience a significant negative market reaction, in contrast with contractors that did not 
sign, and also when compared with the wider sample of firms engaged in defence contracting. 
These results indicate two possible scenarios: DII is a precursor for future sanctions against 
firms engaged in defence contracting, and/or second, as a penalty for socially responsible 
practices. Whichever the interpretation, their findings support the view that corporate social 
activities are largely destructive of future cash flows.  
2.3.3 Research that finds a neutral/no relationship (CSR does not matter)  
Brine et al. (2006) apply the CSR–CFP investigation to an Australian context, by identifying 
CSR companies (from the ASX 300) according to whether or not they issued sustainability 
reports. The authors acknowledge that identifying CSR firms using this method may provide 
greater indications of a firm’s willingness to report, rather than actual extents of CSR 
incorporation, but they urge readers not to underestimate this useful indicator of CSP. For 
instance, sustainability reports often contain information about energy efficiency, water 
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usage, greenhouse gas emissions, retention policies etc. Their preliminary results show firms 
that adopt CSR experience an increase in sales and an increase in equity, but a decrease on 
return on assets. None of their results however are statistically significant.  
Garcia-Castro et al. (2010) argue the heterogeneity in previous research regarding the CSP–
CFP link is due mostly to the lack of controlling for endogeneity. The authors assert that 
decisions by company management to engage in social activities (that is, initiatives designed 
to improve the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders) are endogenous. Applying 
instrumental variables to control for endogeneity, they find that while a positive effect is 
present, these effects are diluted once endogeneity is properly accounted for. In fact, the 
authors suggest previous findings of a positive link are mostly driven by self-selection (such 
as good management quality, organisational culture, quality of corporate board, decision-
making style, etc.), and once endogeneity is considered, results can become non-significant 
and even negative. Overall, their findings highlight the importance of analysing firm-specific 
characteristics that increase the likelihood a firm will engage in CSR. Only then can a clearer 
cause–effect relationship between CSP and CFP be established.  
Rennings et al. (2006) analyse the sustainability performance of European firms based on two 
dimensions: environmental performance and social performance. Analysing the first 
dimension reveals that high environmental performance has a positive effect on shareholder 
value, while in contrast high social performance has a negative effect. This rivalry between 
positive and negative forces means overall sustainability performance (that is, the composite 
of environmental performance plus social performance) has no statistical significance for 
average monthly stock returns.  
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A widely accepted hypothesis is that corporate philanthropy relies on available resources, 
often referred to as ‘slack resources’. While Seifert et al. (2003) find empirical evidence 
supporting this premise – high cash holdings are related to high cash donations – the actual 
level of corporate philanthropy of these firms has a non-significant impact on financial 
performance. In other words, Wall Street seems to be ‘indifferent’ to firms giving large 
donations compared with small donations, whether corporate philanthropy is measured as 
direct cash payouts, or as total contributions received by charities. The authors propose their 
results point to more important influences on stock performance, and that corporate 
philanthropy at best can be regarded as a secondary influence.  
In an analysis of the UK supermarket industry, Moore (2001) finds a positive relationship 
between lagged CFP and CSP. However, the relationship between contemporaneous financial 
performance and CSP is negative. Both results together seem to suggest a cycle of events in 
which good financial performance leads, to at least in the beginning, to higher social 
performance, but then through the detraction of doing ‘real business’, poorer financial results 
occur in the following period. While hypothetically insightful, both results are reported to be 
insignificant.   
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) demonstrate a particular flaw in the previous empirical 
analyses – the literature’s lack of controlling for research and development, which the authors 
assert can explain the majority of the heterogeneity in results so far. Subsequently the authors 
find research and development to be highly correlated with CSP. For instance, many firms 
that engaged in CSR are also actively pursuing differentiating strategies through investment 
in research and development. Thus, if studies do not control for research and development 
(particularly intensity of research and development), this misspecification can create an 
upward bias to estimates of the CSR effect on financial performance. McWilliams and Siegel 
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(2000) show once research and development is properly considered in empirical analysis, 
CSP has a neutral impact on firm profitability.   
Balabanis et al. (1998) investigate firms operating in the UK. Despite their use of a 
comprehensive measure of CSR based on eight dimensions (CSR disclosure, advancement of 
women, advancement of minorities, philanthropy, environmental actions, donations to 
political parties, subscription to the economic league, impact to environment), the authors 
were not able to conclude that CSR has a significant impact on financial performance. In fact, 
the study finds capital markets are indifferent to firms undertaking CSR activities. Overall, 
their findings suggest the CSR–CFP link is weak and inconsistent. This conclusion holds 
despite the authors’ attempts to distinguish economic performance between past, concurrent, 
and subsequent periods.  
2.3.4 Research that finds a curve-linear relationship  
While some researchers find a positive relationship between CSP and CFP, others find a 
negative relationship. It seems that whether the relationship is positive or negative (or neutral) 
is still far from well established in the literature (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). Recently, 
however, research has emerged to suggest that both findings, positive and negative, may be 
accurate over some range. In other words, the relationship between CSP and CFP may be 
more complex than simple linear models. In this regard, an optimal level of social 
performance may exist between levels of resource/social commitment.  
Barnett and Salomon (2012) hypothesise that firms that engage in socially responsible 
activities accrue stakeholder influence capacity (SIC). Once SIC is adequately accumulated, it 
allows the firm to profit from its social investments. Conversely, firms with low levels of SIC 
are unable to generate favourable returns on their social activities. The authors find evidence 
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supporting this underlying quadratic relationship. Specifically, as a corporation’s KLD ratings 
increase, its financial performance declines at first to reach a low point, but then it begins to 
experience increasing financial performance. Their findings imply CSR should be viewed as 
a long-term investment. In the short term, the corporation may experience some financial 
burden, but in the long term it may reap financial benefits if adequate stakeholder relations 
are developed.  
In contrast to the previous study, Wang et al. (2008) document an inverse U-shape 
relationship instead. At first, corporate philanthropy can provide positive financial benefits to 
the firm, however as social contributions increase beyond a certain level, these positive 
effects will begin to fall. The authors propose their results show that while CSR giving can 
help secure critical resources controlled by various stakeholders and provide related 
insurance-like benefits, corporate philanthropy beyond a certain level can begin to apply 
constraints on stakeholder support. This leads to higher direct costs and agency costs. 
Moreover, this inverse U-shape relationship between corporate philanthropy and corporate 
financial performance can become more pronounced (at least on the positive side) under more 
dynamic environments (as opposed to stable environments), in which corporate philanthropy 
plays a greater role in gaining support and thus securing critical resources from stakeholders. 
Firms operating in dynamic environments will therefore experience higher levels of financial 
performance, despite the same level of commitment to corporate philanthropy exercised by 
firms in less dynamic environments.  
2.4 Summary and conclusion  
At the heart of this growing movement lies a fundamental question of credibility – can firms 
that adhere to corporate social responsibility earn higher profits, or do these activities damage 
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the bottom line? The key to the credibility of CSR therefore lies in its ability to contribute to 
profitability, a contribution that must go beyond the expenses required to engage in such 
activities.  
The empirical relationship between CSP and CFP has been investigated extensively. Some 
studies find a positive effect on financial performance (Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Galema et 
al., 2008; Fernandez-Izquierdo and Matallin-Saez, 2008; Gil-Bazo et al., 2010), while others 
find that while CSR does not necessarily lead to material changes to financial performance, it 
by the same token does not necessarily entail a sacrifice of financial returns (Bauer et al., 
2005; Gregory et al., 1997; Hamilton et al., 1993; Statman, 2000). Yet others find firms 
engaging in CSR do indeed demonstrate an underperformance trait and that “it can hurt to be 
good” (Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008; Brammer et al., 2006).  
In a statistical meta-analysis study by Orlitzky et al. (2003), Margolis et al. (2009), and 
Peloza (2009), an overall positive relationship has been shown to exist – social responsibility 
does translate to higher financial performance – although reviewers acknowledge its actual 
contribution in this regard is small.  
After more than 40 years of research that has provided conflicting and inconclusive evidence, 
we ask: what direction should future research take? First is the well-worn path of research 
refinement, seeking better precision in analysing the link between CSP and CFP (Margolis et 
al., 2009). Indeed scholars critiquing the relationship between these variables show past 
studies are imperfect in a variety of ways (see Wood and Jones, 1995; Griffin and Mahon, 
1997; Rowley and Berman, 2000; Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). Common among them include 
‘stakeholder mismatching’ (Wood and Jones, 1995), neglect of ‘contingency factors’ (for 
example, Ullmann, 1985), existence of ‘measurement errors’ (e.g Waddock and Graves, 
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1997), bias from ‘omitted variables’ (Aupperle and Hatfield, 1985; Cochran and Wood, 1984; 
Ullmann, 1985) or, as McWilliams and Siegel (2000) surmise, an overall ‘flawed empirical 
analysis’. It is unsurprising then that one reviewer of the literature highlights the futility 
researchers face in their attempt to find a general relationship between CSR and CFP 
(Margolis and Walsh, 2003).  
Observers only have to note the number of studies investigating this one empirical 
relationship to appreciate the current disparity in the literature. For instance, reviewers of the 
literature show that from 1972 to 2007, the CSR–CFP relationship was the subject of over 
251 separate investigations (Margolis et al., 2009). Other reviewers note that the strength of 
the relationship identified between CSP and CFP is reliant on the discipline of the academic 
researcher (Orlitzky, 2007). This last statement implies a research field that is highly 
fragmented and subjective (Peloza, 2009).  
Of the limitations in the literature so far, we argue one of the most important among them is 
the inability to measure and validate the ‘CSR factor’. Indeed many social activities and 
initiatives are difficult to measure, let alone quantify (for example, preventive benefits such 
as countering bribery). As a consequence, many studies use single-dimensional measures of 
corporate social performance. For instance, and to name only a few, Ehsan and Kaleem 
(2012) consider donations and spending related to the Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance; Lev 
et al.(2010) analyse levels of charitable contributions; Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) employ 
Fortune America’s Most Admired Corporation Ratings; while Cowen et al. (1987) examine 
the number of CSR disclosures. In terms of single-dimensional measures of environmental 
performance, King and Lenox (2001) consider emissions levels recorded by the Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI), Potoski and Prakash (2005) analyse voluntary participation in ISO 
          56 
 
14001 certification, while Shimshack and Ward (2005) examine self-assessed compliance 
with environmental regulation.  
In fact, in a comprehensive review of the CSR matrices used in the literature, Peloza (2009) 
identifies 39 unique types, ranging from pollution measures (18 %), environmental health and 
safety (16 %), third party audits or awards (12 %); the KLD index (9 %); and rankings from 
Fortune magazine (9 %). While these specific measures of social performance are important, 
they nevertheless provide a too-narrow indicator of CSR, even when used as a measurement 
of environmental sustainability. Thus, one of the key sources of the heterogeneity in previous 
findings is the variety of ways in which the CSR factor has been conceptualised, making it 
difficult to compare CSP performance. Moreover, with such a wide selection of CSP 
strategies, each with its own expectations and relevance, it is unsurprising to find a diverse 
range of financial implications. Indeed this is consistent with Margolis et al. (2009) analysis 
across eight categories of CSR, which finds that different social initiatives have significantly 
varying impacts on financial performance.  
Further, while there are numerous studies that analyse the long-term financial performance of 
socially responsible firms (for example, see the previously mentioned meta-analysis reviews), 
this is not an accurate test of how the market evaluates CSR because any long-term 
performance evaluation may be due to confounding factors (for example, business cycles, 
competition movements, etc.). Moreover, Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) note the long-term 
performance of firms classified as ‘socially responsible’ may be in part a function of demand 
by a subgroup of investors. For instance, pension funds that specifically screen for social 
criteria and hold their investments unchanged for the long term.  
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In addition, if the CSR factor is substituting in part or whole for another risk factor, any 
evidence that corporate sustainability is priced by capital markets becomes only a reiteration 
of the risk and return relationship. In the same way, any evidence that firms that engage in 
CSR perform better or worse than their non-CSR counterparts needs to determine whether 
performance differences are a result of a social factor, an unknown risk premium, or both 
(Lee and Faff, 2009).  
Under the free-market view professed by Friedman (1970), the market is arguably the final 
arbiter on whether CSR is truly value enhancing (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012). Therefore 
what’s required is a market evaluation of CSR that is separated from any measurable risk 
factors and isolates the unique contribution of CSR. Thus, this study focuses on one aspect of 
social performance that has received very little attention in the literature, despite its direct 
abilities to circumvent common limitations cited above. This is the ‘social index effect’ – 
analysing how the underlying price of a firm changes (through an event study) given its 
announcement of addition to the FTSE4Good Global Index.  
These announcements represent the world’s leading socially responsible firms. Inclusion on 
this social index indicates to the market a firm has achieved the highest standards of CSR. 
Further, these announcements act as a clear and strong signal concerning the credibility of a 
firm’s CSR activities, since firms are evaluated against a comprehensive set of criteria, which 
are externally evaluated and quantified by an independent body. Thus, an event study of 
market reactions to firms’ inclusion in this social index, if done correctly, can capture a 
measure of CSR separated from any measurable risk factors, and one that avoids the 
confounding problems of causality.  
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Therefore our contribution to the literature begins first with the underpinning of being able to 
isolate a reliable, validated, and significantly ‘clean’ measure of the CSR factor. This is 
achieved next in our first empirical chapter – analysing the shareholder wealth effects 
(through an event study) surrounding announcements of firm inclusion in the FTSE4Good 
Global Index.  
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Chapter 3: Shareholder wealth effects  
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3.0 Introduction 
Free market enthusiasts believe applying ethical considerations or ‘social consciousness’ to a 
firm (that is, CSR engagement) is a misallocation of scarce resources, and ultimately deters 
the firm from its primary goal of profit maximisation. The most influential of these detractors 
is the Nobel-winning economist Milton Friedman, who expresses his emphatic views against 
social responsibility in a well-known article titled, ‘The social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits’. In this article, Friedman (1970) argues that under the “cloak of social 
responsibility”, managers exploit CSR as a means to promote their own social, political, or 
career agendas, eventually imposing costs and reducing the returns to the shareholder. This 
according to Milton Friedman is tantamount to managers “approaching fraud”. Further, while 
CSR engagement can be argued to be in the interest of maximising profits, it is not difficult to 
imagine how a firm can increase its financial returns in contrast with very little concern to 
environmental, social and governance issues. As one SRI critic surmises “socially conscious 
investing is a dumb idea, yielding sub-par returns, and screaming with contradictions” 
(Rothchild, 1996).  
However, in light of high profile scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and more recently 
Lehman Brothers, the viability of simply maximising shareholder returns has been 
questioned. Instead, investment market participants are seeing a growing movement to a 
broader strategy, in which all stakeholders are considered important. Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) in their analysis of stakeholder theory state that there is an intrinsic value in managing 
stakeholder relationships. Consequently, it is possible for CSR to increase the value of a 
firm’s stakeholder relationships without disadvantaging the wealth of its shareholders. 
Studies have indicated effective management of key relationships (such as governments, 
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suppliers, employees, and the local community), can foster an environment leading to higher 
financial performance (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995), a source of 
competitive advantage (Hart, 1995; Litz, 1996; Rugman and Verbeke, 1998; McWilliams et 
al., 2002; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006), and even dictate firm survival (Hart, 1995; Russo 
and Fouts, 1997; Berman et al., 1999).  
As CSR becomes more mainstream in capital markets, the extent to which firms engage in 
socially responsible activities becomes more scrutinised. From an empirical perspective, 
scholars have investigated the relationship between CSP and financial performance. A wide 
range of measures have been used as a proxy for CSP; in fact, in a comprehensive review of 
the CSR literature, Peloza (2009) identifies 39 unique types, ranging from pollution measures 
(18 % as per proportion of sample studied), environmental health and safety (16 %), third 
party audits or awards (12 %); the KLD index (9 %); and rankings from Fortune magazine (9 
%). Given the variety of ways CSR can be conceptualised, comparisons of CSP performance 
are very difficult. With such a wide selection of CSP strategies, each with its individual 
motivation, and varying relevance to stakeholders, it is unsurprising to find a diverse range of 
financial implications. Moreover, this problem is compounded because many of these 
studies13 use single-dimensional measures of social performance, despite CSP being a multi-
dimensional construct (Carroll, 1979; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Therefore in order to 
accurately study the impact of CSR, researchers require a proxy based on a variety of CSP 
measures.   
                                                            
13 For instance, Peloza (2009) in meta-analysis finds 82 per cent of the sample studied use single CSP measures.  
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Given many CSP actions lack quantitative data, or are difficult to observe (for example, 
employee morale, pollution emissions), stakeholders and investors attempting to evaluate 
overall CSP performance may be more inclined to accept CSR reputation assessments from 
third party institutional endorsement. Kappou and Oikonomou (2012) describes this as 
acquiring the ‘social seal’, which can be gained through three key methods: presence in a 
CSR list (Fortune’s ‘Most Admired’ and ‘Best Companies to Work For’ being the most 
used), social ratings (most widely utilised is the MSCI KLD database), or inclusion in a well-
known social index (Dow Jones Sustainability Index, MSCI KLD400, FTSE4Good Index 
etc.).   
Although social seals are important to infer CSR reputation, they are not without their 
limitations. For instance, inclusion in a reputation list has been shown to be dependent 
significantly on the strength of the corporation’s financial performance (Brown and Perry, 
1994). In addition, the effects of social ratings and their relationship with financial 
performance are difficult to isolate due to the lack of precise dates or detailed information on 
the exact cause (for example, changes in ratings are not announced nor are the details of the 
sources of change). Thus, in this thesis we argue announcements of inclusion (exclusion) 
from a well-known established social index can send clear and strong signals regarding CSR 
performance. Moreover, as this social seal is established on multidimensional criteria, that 
have been evaluated based on the strict and high standards set by these social institutions 
(Kappou and Oikonomou, 2012; Doh et al., 2010), strong and credible signals regarding 
changes in market perception can be captured.  
Based on this premise, the first stage of our empirical analysis begins by applying an event 
study methodology surrounding announcements of inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global 
Index. Before this analysis begins however, it is prudent to first examine the theoretical 
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background regarding index reconstitution effects. This is then followed by a brief review of 
the socially responsible indices literature. In the third section we present our key hypotheses 
underlying the market reaction to social index inclusion. The fourth section examines our data 
sources and methodology concerning our use of the event study. In the fifth section we 
present our key results stemming from our empirical analysis, which is then followed by our 
robustness checks in the sixth section. The chapter ends with a discussion and conclusion.  
3.1 Literature review  
3.1.1 Theoretical background  
According to the efficient market hypothesis (Malkiel and Fama, 1970), changes in index 
compositions should have no effect on stock prices.14 However despite this, numerous studies 
(in particular those concerning the S&P 500, as we will soon discuss) have shown significant 
price and volume changes associated with these events. Consequently a number of theories 
have emerged. The following is a brief review of those theories. Forward note: while the first 
two hypotheses assume index announcements (inclusion or exclusion) contain no information 
and therefore cannot affect share prices, the remaining hypotheses in contrast assume these 
events do carry information, and consequently can fundamentally change the value of the 
affected stock.  
Price pressure (not information based)  
The price pressure hypothesis asserts changes in price and volume from index composition 
events are observed only in the short-term. As announcements of this event do not carry any 
                                                            
14 Assuming announcements have no impact to the discounted sum of future expected returns to shareholders.  
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information, shifts in demand (and thus changes in price and volume) are only temporary. 
Therefore, despite short-term movements (created by excess demand that eventually abates), 
long-run demand is inherently horizontal.  
Support for the price pressure hypothesis is provided by Harris and Gurel (1986) who find 
inclusion events in relation to the S&P 500 experience on average significant price increases 
of 3.13 %, only to abate almost fully after two weeks. Similarly, Woolridge and Ghosh 
(1995) and Arnott and Vincent (1986), find significant price rises were subsequently met with 
almost equal price declines.  
Downward-sloping demand curve (not information based)  
Studies documenting a positive stock reaction to announcements of inclusion in the S&P 500 
index have often been interpreted as evidence of a downward-sloping demand curve. This 
suggests (unlike in the classical capital asset pricing model world) that investors do not have 
access to near-perfect substitutes, and therefore any significant price movements can be due 
to non–information based portfolio decisions. For instance large block trades (often resulting 
from index buying/selling to minimise tracking errors) can change the prices of the affected 
stock, as investors require higher compensation (due to a lack of perfect substitutes) to adjust 
their portfolios (Kraus and Stoll, 1972). Moreover, following from the previous hypothesis, if 
indeed the demand curve was horizontal, buying/selling from such trades would not be 
accompanied by any lasting increases or decreases in share prices (Shleifer, 1986). Any 
excess return surrounding such changes is therefore consistent with a downward-sloping 
demand curve, in which movements in demand are permanent, as well as any corresponding 
changes in price and volume.  
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Information-cost hypothesis  
The information-cost hypothesis argues index inclusion allows investors to increase their 
awareness of the firm, and thus reduce the costs related to information searching and 
information asymmetry. Therefore, price responses due to changes in information asymmetry 
result in permanent price changes. Moreover, this hypothesis dictates price changes from this 
initial event will not be lost due to exclusion from the index. Consequently any changes in 
price from the information-cost hypothesis remain permanent after inclusion (Chen et al., 
2005).  
Signaling content  
According to the signalling hypothesis, changes in the composition of the index are 
interpreted by investors as signals regarding the future value of the firm, as private 
information held by these index companies are revealed by these events (Wai Kong Cheung, 
2011). All else being equal, if announcements of firm inclusion indicate higher future value, 
upon announcement, the firm will experience a subsequent increase in share price. In line 
with this hypothesis is evidence by Denis et al. (2003), who find inclusion in the S&P 500 
index is consistent with significant increases in earnings-per-share forecasts and 
improvements in realised earnings. Therefore according to this hypothesis, index 
reconstitution events are not information-free events, and thus any related price effects should 
be permanent.  
Liquidity  
The liquidity hypothesis argues index inclusion can provide opportunities for firms to 
permanently increase their liquidity. Liquidity can increase due to increases in information-
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based trading, and greater trading behaviour by market investors (Chordia, 2001; Hegde and 
McDermott, 2003). This in turn will show in increases in both price and trading volume to 
reflect this new benefit. One of the first supporters of this hypothesis are Edmister et al. 
(1994), who find price effects post inclusion do not disappear over time. While Hegde and 
McDermott (2003) find evidence of a positive relationship between stock price and changes 
in liquidity, they were unable to ascertain whether this was a consequence of higher 
investment opportunities or a potentially lower discount rate.    
Following the theories presented above, we argue that as announcements of social index 
inclusion can represent a strong signalling event, which is inherently not information free 
(that is, entry to the FTSE4Good Index event can represent high credibility in meeting strict 
CSR criteria), any abnormal price performances observed represent a fundamental 
revaluation of the firm. Importantly, this proposal is consistent with the conclusions of Jain 
(1987) and Dhillon and Johnson (1991) that market price movements related to the 
reconstitution events of the S&P 500 are a consequence of a transference of new information, 
rather than from price pressures created from stock purchases or sales. Thus, similar to other 
studies in the social index literature (Kappou and Oikonomou, 2012; Doh et al., 2010; 
Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012), and to the aforementioned authors, we anticipate 
announcements of social index inclusion can be attributed and explained by the signalling-
content hypothesis.  
3.1.2 Portfolio performance and social index effect 
Nearly one out of every six dollars, or 18 % of all assets under professional management in 
the US, are dedicated in some way to socially responsible investments (SRIs) (USSIF, 2014) 
– an investment approach in which environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors are 
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incorporated in the management of assets. Although SRIs was once only considered for the 
religious ‘hard-core’ (for example, Quakers and Catholics), investments based on ethical 
criteria are now a significant part of capital markets. Market investors need to be able to 
benchmark these performances, which has led to the creation of socially responsible indices.  
Recently the literature has focused on analysing the performance credibility of this asset 
class. Where past studies analysing SRI investment funds (or mutual funds) were jointly 
testing the performance of the underlying asset and the skills of the fund manager, the 
analysis of socially responsible indices avoids these investigative problems; particularly the 
ability to measure social performances net of transaction costs and fees, and/or the 
confounding effects of managers’ stock-picking skills. Thus an analysis of socially 
responsible indices can determine more effectively whether SRI equities are underperforming 
or outperforming their otherwise conventional counterparts. In the following literature review 
we examine the performance of this asset class divided into two key areas: studies that 
analyse the ‘portfolio performance’ of socially responsible indices, and studies that 
specifically investigate the ‘social index effect’ (that is, the announcement effect of 
reconstitution events).   
3.1.3 Studies on the portfolio performance of social indices  
Schröder (2007) analyses 29 international social indices using both single and multifactor 
models. The study finds that social indices on average neither outperform nor underperform 
their relative benchmarks, although most were noted to carry higher risk on average. These 
results echo similar findings of investigations concerning one of the oldest established social 
indices available – the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI) or now renamed the MSCI KLD 400. 
Sauer (1997) finds that regardless of market proxy selected, the social criteria employed by 
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the DSI had negligible impact on financial returns. While Statman (2000) conclude in a 
comparison of the DSI and the S&P 500 that “pooling investing  power for something other 
than  making  money is no  worse at making money than pooling it for money alone” (p. 38). 
Moreover any outperformances observed by the DSI have been attributed to factors unrelated 
to social criteria. For instance, outperformance may be due to the economic and sector 
exposures inherent in the social screening (DiBartolomeo and Kurtz, 1999), or to the higher 
price volatility and price-to-book ratios in the stocks making up the DSI (Kurtz and 
diBartolomeo, 1996).  
Turning now to the family of the FTSE4Good indices,15 Collison et al. (2008) report that 
while this set of social indices earn higher returns compared with their base universes (in 
which they were drawn), higher returns are only obtained by taking on constituents with 
higher risk. Interestingly, the authors note that when they disaggregated their sample into 
periods before and after the indices went ‘live’, they found the majority of positive returns 
were achieved before fund managers were able to trade the index. Once the index went ‘live’, 
social index returns were on average negative, lower and riskier than those achieved by their 
relevant benchmark.  
López et al. (2007) construct two groups of firms. The first group belonged to the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Social Index (DSI) and thus were classified as firms that had adopted high 
sustainability practices. The second group is a control group matched according to similar 
size and capital structure. Through regression analysis the authors find that high CSP 
practices have a significant and negative association with financial performance. Further, they 
                                                            
15 The family of the FTSE4Good includes: FTSE4Good UK, FTSE4Good Europe, FTSE4Good US, 
FGTSE4Good Global, and variations of these indices for example, FTSE4Good UK 50.  
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considered whether this CSP–CFP relationship endures over time. During the seven years of 
the study, they find measures of profitability (for example, profit margins, return on assets 
and return on equity) are only significantly lower in the third year post CSR adoption (that is, 
from the time the index was first constituted). As there are no revenue differences between 
both groups during this period, López et al. (2007) suggest performance differences must be 
attributed to the higher sustained costs of CSR and thus lower observed profitability. 
Consequently, they surmise the expenses occurred in the pursuit of socially responsible 
criteria can place firms at an economic disadvantage compared with their less-responsible 
counterparts.  
3.1.4 Studies on the evaluation of social inclusion/exclusion (specifically event 
studies)  
In this section we review the literature investigating the announcement effects of social index 
reconstitutions. We note the literature in this research field is limited both in number and 
scope. At the time of writing, to the best of our knowledge, there exist only four published 
studies and three unpublished studies. The following is a review of those papers.  
Cheung (2011) investigates the announcement effect of reconstitution events related to the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) based on three measures of stock performances: 
changes in price (return), risk and liquidity. Analysing cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
when firms announce they are included in the DJSI shows evidence of an anticipation effect. 
CAR begins rising from negative territory during the few days prior to announcement, but 
then loses momentum a few days after the announcement. Movements in CAR during this 
event window are found to be insignificant. Moreover, an analysis 15 days and 60 days after 
the event reveal that price changes are largely temporary. Nevertheless abnormal returns on 
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day zero are reported to be significant and negative (although this too was concluded to be 
largely temporary).  
In their second analysis, two proxies of liquidity are examined. First the authors find trading 
volume for both inclusion and exclusion stocks to significantly decrease in the opening five 
days post announcement, while in the long term, particularly after the change of constituents 
is implemented (usually 9–14 days after the announcement date), trading volume is found to 
be generally higher for both announcement effects. Second, they find bid-to-ask spreads to be 
lower (an indication of lower transaction cost) for both included and excluded stocks; 
however the outcome of these spreads are observed to be different in the long run – bid-to-ask 
spreads for included firms remain lower in the long run, and become wider for excluded 
firms. This result is consistent with changes in information produced by inclusion or 
exclusion from a trading index.16 Lastly, idiosyncratic risk for both included and excluded 
stocks is found to significantly change around the announcement of the event.  
Curran and Moran (2007) perform an event study related to announcements of inclusion and 
exclusion to the FTSE4Good UK index. They hypothesise announcements of inclusion are 
rewarded in the market place, as this provides an indication of greater abilities to derive 
benefits (such as reputational gains that can lead to higher profitability) from a superior CSR 
profile. Equally, they propose a counter-hypothesis that announcements of exclusion are 
                                                            
16 Two forces can cause a reduction of bid-to-ask spreads, with both forces often working at the same time. If 
announcements contain new information and consequently reduce uncertainty, bid-to-ask spreads are expected 
to be lower. On the other hand, bid-to-ask spreads can become lower due to increases in trading volume, as these 
tend to reduce the inventory cost of market makers. Thus while trading volume is lower for included stocks (and 
thus implying higher bid-to-ask spreads), it seems the dominant effect of reducing uncertainty and adverse-
selection in the end lowered the bid-to-ask spread.  
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received negatively by the markets (for example, ‘reputational slurs’ for being non-members, 
especially if their competitors are constituents). While their results show a trend towards the 
expected direction, abnormal returns observed are ultimately found to be statistically 
insignificant. They interpret the non-significance in their results as investors adjusting the 
share price and expected impact on cash flows well before the announcement of the event. 
We note one key limitation in this study is the relatively short span of analysis (that is, 
collection of announcements) of only two years.  
Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) employ an event study methodology centred on UK firms 
found to be announced for inclusion in the FTSE4Good Index. While the authors find 
positive market reactions as measured by CARS to announcements of inclusion, the reported 
results are not significant. As a consequence they are unable to conclusively state that social 
index inclusion provides any long-term value. Partitioning their sample into high and low 
quintiles, they find investors react more positively to the event if stocks are characterised by 
larger size, higher return on equity and greater employee productivity. Last, the authors carry 
out regression analysis to determine the cross-sectional determinants of CARS. Their results 
confirm those of their quintile analysis: CARS is significantly and positively related to size 
and employee productivity, and negatively and significantly related to leverage, with the 
exception of return on equity, which is found to be insignificant.  
Doh et al. (2010) explore the notion that ‘virtuous’ firms are rewarded in the marketplace, 
however they highlight that such endorsements of socially responsible behaviour are reliant 
on institutional assessment. Thus focusing their research on institutional theory, the authors 
perform an event study on the Calvert Social Index by analysing both additions and deletions 
of US firms. While firms announced for addition showed no significant results, firms that are 
deleted lose on average more than 1.2 % of their market value on the day and following the 
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announcement (on the day negative 2 %, but insignificant, and following the event day a loss 
of 1.1 % and significant). It appears that removal from the index is far more important to 
investors than the positive endorsements offered by announcements of inclusion. Dividing 
their sample into portfolios of ‘included’ or ‘excluded’ firms, they find the former portfolio 
experiences significantly higher operating performance in the period prior to the event 
compared with their excluded peers. In terms of prediction powers, prior operating 
performances seem to be a good indicator of future social performance (that is, a prelude to 
announcement of addition to a social index).  
In the next stage of their analysis, the authors employ OLS regression to evaluate the cross-
sectional determinants of CARS, based on prior CSR ratings (provided by KLD) and 
measures of sales growth and firm size (they control variables). They find, as expected, that 
firms that are deleted from the index had a negative relationship with CARS. Moreover, the 
intensity of market reaction is found to be tempered by prior CSR ratings. For instance, firms 
with high CSR reputations are buffered by the downward pressure on stock prices related to 
announcements of deletion, while firms with poorer CSR reputations experience greater 
market reaction associated with announcements of inclusion. These results as mentioned 
earlier suggest a tempering effect – limiting both the positive effects to firms with high prior 
CSR reputation and mitigating the downside effects of negative announcements of deletion. 
Turning now to control variables, they find firms with faster sales growth experience poorer 
returns when they are excluded, while firms with slower sales growth experience higher 
returns when they are included. Larger firms are found to experience higher abnormal returns.  
Kappou and Oikonomou (2012) propose that the reconstitution events of social indices is not 
an information-free event, but a process in which valuable information regarding the social 
performances of firms is revealed. As social performances can have important implications 
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for firm value (that is, value increasing or value decreasing), announcements of changes to 
the social index can reveal important changes to the cash flows of these firms. To investigate 
this hypothesis, they analyse announcements of addition and deletion from two prominent US 
social indices – the Calvert Social Index and MSCI KLD 400 Index. Their findings using an 
event study show announcements of addition to both social indices provide non-significant 
abnormal returns, while announcements of deletion, particularly for the MSCI KLD 400, are 
negative and significant on the event date. While CARs for the short-term period (windows 
from –5 to +15 days) provide no viable results for either announcement event, in the long run 
(six months) the deletion sample of the MSCI KLD 400 experiences highly significant CARs 
of up to negative 14 %. In addition, they find the trading volume for the MSCI KLD 400 
Index significantly increases two weeks before the event (possibly evidence of an anticipation 
effect), and is significant again on the event date – with this effect lasting for almost two 
weeks.  
Lastly, the authors test average differences in earnings per share based on a pre and post 
analysis of the event. They find firms added to the social index experience higher earnings 
per share in the post period, while firms deleted from the social index experience lower 
earnings per share in the post period. However, while these results follow the expected 
direction, they are not statistically significant. On balance, the MSCI KLD 400 provides more 
pronounced results compared with the Calvert Social Index. This is attributed to the MSCI 
KLD 400 Index containing fewer constituents (and therefore signalling effects can be more 
prominent) and to contain larger firms than the Calvert Social Index (a possible indication 
that larger firms have a greater market response compared with smaller firms).  
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Chow et al. (2009) focus on an event study based on additions and deletions from the Domini 
400 Index. 17 While short-run event studies provide weak evidence of a wealth effect, long-
run analysis reveals significantly positive abnormal returns. One firm in particular was found 
to experience abnormal positive returns of up to 50 % post inclusion. Deletion results 
however, in both the short-term and long-term analysis, are mixed. The researchers argue this 
result is unsurprising, given deletions in themselves are not signals that the firm is the worst – 
but in fact similar to the analogy that “contestants who don’t win a beauty contest are 
probably not ugly” (Chow et al., 2009).  
Becchetti et al. (2009) highlight an important advantage within the clear chorological order in 
which firms are added or deleted from a social index – the ability to identify causality. This 
begins first with a corporation’s decision to engage in social activities, the index committee’s 
assessment of such activities and thus ranking of social performance, the consequential 
announcement of addition to or deletion from the social index, and then lastly the market 
reaction to this announcement. According to the authors, this clear course from initial 
decision to consequential announcement allows research in this field to alleviate the issues of 
causality. Based on this premise, Becchetti et al. (2009) conduct an event study and find that 
while announcements of addition to the Domini 400 Social index provide no significant 
results, firms that were deleted experienced negative CARS of up to 4 %. Abnormal returns 
are robust to parametric and non-parametric methods, controls for seasonality effects, 
variations in the length of the event window, and the use of different benchmarks and models 
to measure expected returns.  
                                                            
17 Renamed the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index. 
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3.1.5 Summary 
The increasing emergence of sustainable indices including MSCI KLD 400 Social Index, 
FTSE4Good Index and the DJSI World Index has led a small group of researchers to 
scrutinise the performance credibility of this asset class. Our literature review indicates 
socially responsible indices in general neither outperform nor underperform their relative 
benchmarks, although one study in particular by López et al. (2007) provides a strong 
alternative case – firms that adopt CSR practices (identified via inclusion on the DJSI) are 
significantly and economically disadvantaged as a consequence of their socially responsible 
activities.  
However to make definitive conclusions on this basis ignores a major limitation of these 
studies – that any long-term comparison of performance (which these studies are inherently 
based on) can be confounded by a range of other factors. For instance, one-year performance 
comparisons can be confounded by differences in business cycles, competition movements, 
or to other activities unrelated to CSR. Moreover, the main weakness of studies in this field is 
that only the average economic performance of all firms in the portfolio is considered, further 
masking any important influences of CSR.  
In this regard, although studying the ‘portfolio’ performance of socially responsible indices 
has its limitations, an analysis of the reconstitution events of this asset class can alleviate 
these issues.  Moreover, if done correctly (consequently via an event study), we access one 
overarching advantage of analysis of this asset class – an ability to isolate the relationship 
between CSR and financial performance, less the confounding effects inherent in any long-
term study.  
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Thus a small group of studies have analysed the ‘social index effect’, producing mostly 
mixed results. For instance, some studies find that announcements of social index inclusion 
lead to positive market reactions (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Chow et al., 2009); others 
find this announcement effect to be insignificant (Curran and Moran, 2007; Doh et al., 2010; 
Kappou and Oikonomou, 2012); while some find social index inclusion involves an 
underperformance trait and that “it can hurt to be good” (Wai Kong Cheung, 2011). Table 1 
summarises the findings of the ‘social index effect’ literature.  
Table 1: Summary of the current ‘social index effect’ literature by effect analysed and result 
‘Negative’ or ‘Positive’ indicates the direction of abnormal returns found to be associated with the 
announcement analysed, either announcement of inclusion or exclusion. In this thesis we define event windows 
longer than five days from t = 0 as a long-term event study.  
Inclusion Exclusion Study  ST/LT Period 
Negative Negative Wai Kong Cheung (2011) Short-term 2002–2008 
Non-significant Non-significant Curran and Moran (2007) Short-term 1999–2002 
Positive – Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) Short-term 2001–2008 
Non-significant Negative Doh et al. (2010) Short-term 2000–2005 
Non-significant Negative Kappou and Oikonomou (2012) 
Short-term and long-
term 
1990–
201118 
Positive Non-significant Chow et al. (2009) Long-term19 1990–2007 
Non-significant Negative Becchetti et al. (2009) Short-term 1990–2004 
 
                                                            
18 Two social indices are analysed by this author: MSCI KLD 400 from 1990–2010, and the Calvert Social 
Index from 2000–2011. In addition, the negative result of exclusion was observed both in the short-term (t = 0) 
and long-term analyses (0, +125).  
19 The shortest event window in Chow et al. (2009) is 20 days after the event date.  
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It is clear from the inconsistency of results (particularly those belonging to studies of 
inclusion effects) that the above studies may have limitations. These include the use of small 
sample sizes in Doh et al. (2010) and Curran and Moran (2007) (refer to Table 2 for details); 
deficiencies in removing for confounding effects in Ziegler and Schröder (2010), Becchetti et 
al. (2009) and Cheung et al. (2010); the absence of a non-parametric test in Curran and Moran 
(2007) and Kappou and Oikonomou (2012) 20; and the pitfalls involved in drawing inferences 
from long run studies as in Chow et al. (2009) and Kappou and Oikonomou (2012), which as  
- Lyon et al. (1999) points out - even when using the best methods is considered treacherous.  
Given that CSR studies can have important implications for corporate decisions and public 
policies, it is critical that any further research designs are flawless (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). In this study, we address each of these identified limitations as follows. We use the 
largest sample size to date (n = 651 firms), remove all confounding effects surrounding our 
event window, apply the non-parametric test of the Wilcoxon sign rank test, and use an 
appropriately short event window of (–2, +2).21 Further discussion on the assessment of our 
event study can be found in section 3.4.   
Moreover, studies in this research field focus only on two main markets – the US (Doh et al., 
2010; Kappou and Oikonomou, 2012; Chow et al., 2009; Becchetti et al., 2009) and the UK 
(Curran and Moran, 2007; Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012). Therefore any future research 
needs to extend analysis to other country contexts and ensure future findings are applicable in 
                                                            
20 McWilliams and Siegel (1997) identifies the lack in non-parametric tests as a critical issue, due to test 
statistics’ high sensitivity to outliers, which becomes more pronounced the smaller the sample size.  
21 McWilliams and Siegel (1997) note event windows “should be long enough to capture the significant effect of 
the event, but short enough to exclude confounding events” (p. 636). 
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other regions. Thus we use the FTSE4Good Global Index, a CSP proxy not yet studied in this 
research field. For instance, past studies have employed the following social indices: the Dow 
Jones Sustainability index (Wai Kong Cheung, 2011), the FTSE4Good UK Index (Curran and 
Moran, 2007; Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012), the Calvert Social Index (Doh et al., 2010; 
Kappou and Oikonomou, 2012), and the MSCI KLD 400 Index (Chow et al., 2009; Becchetti 
et al., 2009). Table 2 summarises the ‘social index effect’ literature by CSP proxy employed, 
sample size (N) and other important details as replicated in Table 1 for comparison.  
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Table 2: Summary of the current ‘social index effect’ literature by CSP proxy  
ST denotes short-term event studies and LT denotes long-term event studies. In this thesis we define any event 
window longer than five days from t = 0 as a long-term event study. Period represents the sample period 
analysed. N denotes sample size. ‘Inclusions’ and ‘Exclusions’ denote announcement effect analysed in each 
study. That is, announcements of social index inclusion or exclusion, where ‘Mix’ represents both a study of 
inclusion and exclusion events.  
CSP social index Study ST/LT Period Country N          Effect  
Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index 
Wai Kong Cheung (2011) ST 2002–
2008 
US 80 
97 
Inclusions 
Exclusions 
FTSE4Good UK Index Curran and Moran (2007) 
 
ST 1999–
2002 
UK 
UK 
34 
19 
Inclusions 
Exclusions 
 Clacher and Hagendorff 
(2012) 
ST 2001–
2008 
UK 356 inclusions 
Calvert Social Index Doh et al. (2010) ST 2000–
2005 
US 
US 
56 
65 
Inclusions 
Exclusions 
 Kappou and Oikonomou 
(2012) 
LT/ST 2000–
2011 
US 365 
177 
Inclusions 
Exclusions 
MSCI KLD 400 Index Kappou and Oikonomou 
(2012) 
 
LT 1990–
2010 
US 201 
77 
Inclusions 
Exclusions 
 Chow et al. (2009) LT 1990–
2007 
US 309 
86 
Inclusions 
Exclusions 
 Becchetti et al. (2009) ST 1990–
2004 
US 263 Mix 
FTSE4Good Global Index As per this thesis… ST 2003–
2012 
GLOBAL 651 Inclusions 
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3.2 Hypothesis development  
The literature regarding the CSR–CFP relationship has often quoted two opposing 
hypotheses: the Friedman (1970) view – whether CSR engagement is a value-destroying 
exercise; or the stakeholder view – whether CSR engagement is a value-enhancing exercise. 
Given the mixed results observed in the previous research, this chapter presents both 
opposing hypotheses to explain market reaction to the reconstitution effects of inclusion on 
the FTSE4Good Global Index.  
3.2.1 Value decreasing  
When the costs of tilting the company towards CSR fall short of the benefits that may be 
received, these firms will be placed at a competitive disadvantage relative to their corporate 
peers. For example, Abowd (1989) finds increases in employee pay increases firms’ costs, 
without showing the same increasing benefits to their shareholders. Moreover firms that 
engage in CSR are routinely more committed to more informative and extensive disclosure 
(Gelb and Strawser, 2001), a requirement that ultimately translates to greater costs in training, 
product quality and safety (Waddock and Graves, 1997).  Similarly, Barnea and Rubin (2010) 
argue company managers may be willing to engage in CSR to achieve global reputations and 
the ‘warm-glow’ effect, despite costs exceeding benefits.  
Further, while CSR advocates promote the cost-saving benefits of CSR (for example, 
increasing product efficiencies), scholars argue that cost-based approaches to assessing 
initiatives have an inbuilt bias due to their focus on cost savings, rather than actual cost 
increases. For example, Epstein (1996) cautions that while cost savings tend to be attributed 
to the CSP investment, cost increases are allocated to ongoing operations or overheads. By 
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carefully identifying all costs associated with the CSR initiative, the author reveals a figure 
five times higher than original estimates. 
Moreover, as many CSR initiatives are of a long-term nature (for example, improvements in 
reputation), it is more likely these activities will impact short-term earnings in a negative 
rather than positive way. In particular, CSR activities often require an immediate reduction in 
cash flow (such as paying above-market wages), but their benefits to corporate earnings are 
only usually realised in the longer term (for example, through improved employee morale, 
lower risk of labour disruptions etc.). Given the high costs, long payback periods, and 
uncertainty in outcomes (Christie et al., 1995; Zhuang and Synodinos, 1997), corporate 
resources under this context are more wisely spent on increasing firm efficiency or returned 
to shareholders as dividends (Barnett, 2007). 
Another consideration is that engagement in CSR activities requires the availability of surplus 
funds (McGuire et al., 1988; Orlitzky et al., 2003), or the allocation of resources that were 
once set aside for another (potentially more profitable) purpose (López et al., 2007). 
Therefore announcements of social index inclusion can represent a continued devotion of 
resources of a “wasteful discretionary act of management” (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), 
which may lead to a negative market reaction. Jensen (2010) characterises this scenario 
further by stating “companies that try to do so either will be eliminated by competitors who 
choose not to be so civic minded, or will survive only by consuming their economic rents in 
this manner”.  
In summary, Friedman (1970) states CSR is an excess cost borne by shareholders and thus is 
contrary to the objectives of increasing shareholder wealth.  
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H1A: There will be a negative market reaction to announcement of a firm’s inclusion in 
the FTSE4Good Global Index. 
 
3.2.2 Value increasing  
In contrast, investors can interpret announcements of social index inclusion to be consistent 
with Freeman’s (1984) view of managing stakeholder relationships. According to stakeholder 
theory, positive wealth effects can be sourced if various stakeholders are managed with the 
overarching strategy of enhancing corporate value. Alternatively, when stakeholders no 
longer have confidence in a firm’s performance, it loses its critical support structure and 
customer base (Lee, 2008). This can range from customers boycotting products, shareholders 
dumping stocks, and employees becoming more disgruntled and less loyal. Thus CSR 
activities consistent with the underlying business goals and governance strategy of the firm 
can (under these considerations) increase firm value (Maxfield, 2008).  
Moreover, studies have shown that CSR activities can provide credible signals of higher 
reputation and brand loyalty (Fombrun, 2005; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Freeman et al., 
2007), an ability to attract and retain the best managers and employees (Berman et al., 1999; 
Greening and Turban, 2000; Jones and Murrell, 2001; Turban and Greening, 1997; Wright et 
al., 1995; Waddock, 2000), higher employee morale and productivity (Solomon, 1985; 
Brekke and Nyborg, 2008), and/or greater aptitudes in minimising regulatory and 
environmental liabilities (Hart and Ahuja, 1996; King and Lenox, 2002; Klassen and 
McLaughlin, 1996; Klassen and Whybark, 1999; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Russo and Fouts, 
1997; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). If these value-increasing benefits are perceived to be 
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associated with CSR, we can expect positive market reactions to announcements of inclusion 
to the FTSE4Good Global Index.  
H1B: There will be a positive market reaction to announcement of firm inclusion in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index.  
 
3.3 Data and methodology  
3.3.1 Data sources  
In this section we provide a description of our major data sources for this study; a 
comprehensive collection of announcements of inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index 
sourced from FTSE4GOOD, as well as a brief of the various financial and accounting data 
sourced from Worldscope.  
3.3.1.1 The FTSE4Good Global Index 
Launched in July 2001, FTSE4Good was established with three main objectives: to provide 
investors a means to identify companies that are leaders in environmental, social and 
governance performance; to provide investors a tool for benchmarking and tracking the 
performance of socially responsible investments; to develop and promote greater CSR 
practices around the world.  
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To qualify for inclusion, firms must first reside in the FTSE All-World Developed Index.22 
Following this requirement, firms are then screened out if they are involved with tobacco 
producers, companies in the production of weapons systems or nuclear weapons systems, 
either producing whole systems, or components, and industry-specific criteria including 
marketing of breastmilk substitutes and uranium and nuclear power activities.  
If firms are not filtered at this stage, they are then required to meet key performance criteria 
related to environmental, social, and governance issues. These are split into five areas: 
‘working towards environmental sustainability’, ‘upholding and supporting universal human 
rights’, ‘ensuring good supply chain labour standards’, ‘countering bribery’, and ‘mitigating 
and adapting to climate change’. Over the years the inclusion criteria have gone through 
continued improvements. For example in 2002 and 2003 the environmental and human and 
labour rights criteria were strengthened, while new criteria such as bribery and uranium 
mining were introduced in 2006. More recently, infant formula and breastmilk substitutes 
criteria were introduced in 2010. As these criteria continue to evolve and become more 
comprehensive, FTSE4Good challenges companies in the index to continually improve their 
CSR, or risk losing their listing (FTSE, 2012).  
The FTSE4Good policy committee is responsible for: ensuring key policy criteria and 
methodology are followed correctly; overseeing the consultation process of new criteria; and 
approving additions to and deletions from the FTSE4Good Index. To assess a firm’s 
eligibility for the index, a number of different sources are used. These include: scrutiny of 
annual reports; analysis of company websites; company questionnaires; liaison with corporate 
                                                            
22 In regards to the FTSE4Good Global Index, UK and Spanish companies are also eligible for selection if they 
reside in either the FTSE All Share Index, FTSE All Cap (Spanish) Index, or IBEX 35 Index.  
          85 
 
managers; examination of publicly available material; and continued correspondence with the 
associated parties to ensure information held is updated and accurate.  
In order to provide a comprehensive assessment of CSP, the FTSE4Good policy committee 
works in conjunction with Experts in Responsible Investment Solutions (EIRIS) and its 
network of internal partners, including Corporate Analysis Enhanced Responsibility (CAER, 
Australia), EthiFinance (France), Avanzi (Italy), Institut fur Markt-Umwelt-Gesellschaft 
(IMUG, Germany), and Fundacion Ecologia y Desarrollo (FED, Spain). These external 
partners cooperate to analyse and report on a firm’s suitability to remain in the index, along 
with assessments of new additions or deletions to the index, on a semi-annual basis. These 
details are found in the semi-annual release of the FTSE4Good policy committee review on 
their website (see http://www.ftse.com/products/index-notices/home/getnotices/?id= 
FTSE4GOOD). 
3.3.1.2 Worldscope 
Worldscope (via DataStream) has over 25 years of data collection experience and offers one 
of the leading coverages of fundamental data (that is, representing 99 % of global market 
capitalisation). This database is widely used by researchers and industry for its content 
quality, depth of detail, extensive coverage, as well as access to variety of data types 
including annual and interim/quarterly data, detailed historical financial data, per share data, 
ratios, pricing and textual information. The wide range of data-type availability allows users 
to undertake sophisticated analysis across a broad range of financial instruments.  
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3.3.1.3 Alternative sources of accounting and market price data 
As previous studies in the social index literature have mostly been country specific in their 
sample, the use of commonly used databases such as CRSP and Compustat for US firms, or 
similar databases for UK firms, will be inappropriate given the global nature of our sample. 
Therefore, like Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) and Kappou and Oikonomou (2012), we 
employ Worldscope (via DataStream) for sources of global accounting and market price data.  
 
3.3.2 Sample of interest  
The objective of our first empirical chapter is to evaluate market reaction (via an event study) 
to announcements of firm inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index.  
We achieve this analysis and arrive at our final sample of interest through the following key 
steps and considerations:   
‐ Every March and September (with exact dates varying for every year), the 
FTSE4Good policy committee releases their semi-annual review of approved 
inclusions and exclusions to the FTSE4Good Global Index. From September 2003 to 
March 2012, we extract from these reviews data related to the firms found to be 
announced for social index inclusion. Specifically we collect the name, country, 
industry classification, and announcement date of each announcement of inclusion. 
From this initial extraction, we collect 729 firms.  
‐ To form part of our analysis, firms in our initial collection must have identifiable ISIN 
codes and thus have share price data on Worldscope to cross-reference. Using 
Worldscope, we cross-reference the name of each firm with its appropriate ISIN 
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codes. Based on ISIN codes, we collect a history of the share prices for each firm 
according to the period required. We choose Total Return Index (price adjusted for 
gross dividends) to accurately capture firm return. Based on the available share prices, 
this leaves us with a sample of 699 firms, or 699 index inclusions.  
‐ Benchmark indices are appropriately identified from the family of MSCI Country 
Indices. Therefore each firm is benchmarked according to its country of origin 
ensuring ‘normal’ returns are controlled for on a country-by-country basis. Moreover, 
the family of MSCI country indices (as of May 2002) employs a free–float adjusted 
market capitalisation, a methodology that provides a more accurate reflection of 
market movements.  
‐ To ensure the focus of our analysis is isolated to the ‘social index effect’, we follow 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) and eliminate from our sample firms that may have 
confounding effects. Confounding effects can lead to erroneous statistical inferences 
and may include events such as dividend announcements, rumors of, or impending, 
mergers, new business contracts and products, unexpected earnings announcements, 
and key changes to the board of directors. Any of these events have the potential to 
impact share prices during the event window.23 Thus we check for confounding 
effects during the three days preceding and the three days immediately following the 
event (at t = 0). To remove from our sample possible confounding effects, we use 
Dow Jones Factiva to identify all sources of announcements, articles and publications 
related to each firm. These announcements are then individually examined to 
determine possible impact on share prices. Our investigation identifies 48 firms with 
                                                            
23 Moreover, the longer the event window the more difficult it is to control for confounding effects (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). 
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confounding effects.24 These firms were eliminated, leaving a final sample comprising 
651 firms.25  
Table 3 provides a sample of confounding effects identified and consequently removed from 
our study. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate our windows of interest and the period of confounding 
effects removed in contrast with the event window period. Table 4 divides this sample into 
inclusions per year as a total number (N) and as a percentage of the total sample. Appendix 2 
provides a summary of the data construction breakdown according to each empirical analysis 
in this thesis.  
                                                            
24 For example, we find the following confounding events: Premier Oil announcement of net profit up 188%, the 
Laird Group announcement of acquisition of Home Doors limited and Houseproud, and SES global 
announcement of a new state of the art DVB-RCS platform. 
25 Note since we only sample firms announced for inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index that - it can be 
argued - out study to be exposed to selection bias; since firms may only engage in CSR to enhance financial 
performance. This point is alleviated by our sample comprising of firms of different sizes, industries and 
countries, and thus is largely representative. 
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Table 3: Sample of confounding effects identified and decision for removal  
A sample of firms found to have confounding effects, and consequently removed from the analysis. All 
confounding effects lie in either the three days preceding or following the event at t = 0. A total of 48 firms were 
eliminated this way.  
Firm name Confounding event  Decision 
Rockwool International Announcement of significant increase in profit  Remove 
Alcatel-Lucent Preliminary talks of merger  Remove 
Spice Announcement of record full-year profits  Remove 
Auckland International Acceptance of partial takeover offer  Remove 
Enel Proposal of new dividend Remove 
Covidien Announcement of tender offer for acquisition  Remove 
Google Approval by European regulators to acquire new company  Remove 
Energias de Portugal Revision in recommendation from BUY to NEUTRAL Remove 
Fujitsu Volatile trading due to disputes regarding former presidents Remove 
 
Table 4 shows that announcement dates are clustered around days within March and 
September each year, the periods in which the semi-annual reviews are published online. 
While the number of inclusions can be argued to have greater concentrations in certain 
periods of the sample (the highest is 72 additions in March 2004, while the lowest is 11 
additions in September 2010), this potential effect of clustering is nevertheless taken into 
account in our choice of empirical methods.  
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Table 4: Number of inclusions per year and their respective percentages as a total sample   
‘N’ denotes sample size. Percentage is calculated as a proportion of the total sample count.  
Announcement 
date 
N Percent 
(%) 
8 March 2012 24 3.68 
8 September 2011 19 2.91 
10 March 2011 49 7.52 
9 September 2010 11 1.69 
10 March 2010 20 3.07 
9 September 2009 32 4.91 
11 March 2009 22 3.37 
11 September 33 5.06 
13 March 2008 35 5.21 
12 September 36 5.52 
7 March 2007 15 2.30 
7 September 2006 20 3.07 
8 March 2006 36 5.52 
7 September 2005 36 5.52 
10 March 2005 54 8.28 
10 September 70 10.74 
12 March 2004 72 11.04 
18 September 68 10.43 
Total 651 100 
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3.3.3 The event-study methodology 
The first objective of this thesis is to evaluate shareholder wealth effects (that is, market 
reaction) to announcements of firm inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index. Our 
methodology for this analysis must be able to isolate (through a precise date) the existence of 
an information effect. A frequently applied and useful method is the event-study 
methodology (MacKinlay, 1997). The premise of this method is based on the assumption of 
market rationality, in which the outcome of any event (assuming price relevancy) will be 
incorporated and reflected instantly in security prices (Campbell and Andrew, 1997).  
Moreover, due to a precise known date (that is, we use the date of the semi-annual release), 
our event-study methodology can use a short-run analysis, which if done correctly can avoid 
confounding effects. And while long-term research methods have certainly improved, serious 
limitations still remain in which inferences from these studies “at a minimum … require 
extreme caution” (Kothari and Warner, 1997), and indeed using the best methods is still 
considered “treacherous” (Lyon et al., 1999). This is in contrast to short-run event studies that 
are comparatively “straightforward and trouble free” (Kothari and Warner, 2006), and can 
represent the “cleanest evidence we have on efficiency” (Fama, 1991).  
Overall, the event study methodology is arguably “the standard method of measuring security 
price reaction to some announcement or event” (Binder, 1998), and thus along with the 
evident advantages (as discussed in the next section), we choose this research methodology to 
address the first empirical objective of this thesis.   
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3.3.3.1 Estimation of the event study  
Standard event-study methodology is used to estimate the stock market reaction to firm 
inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index. Our estimation period to calculate ‘normal’ 
returns is 249 days preceding the event (from t = 0), with an additional 12 days’ buffer to 
ensure our calculation of normal returns is not contaminated by the event of interest 
(effectively –260 to –12, see Figure 1), for example due to insider trading.  
Our event window is defined as two days preceding and following the announcement date (–2 
to +2) which is similar to studies such as Faccio et al. (2006). We select a short event window 
to ensure abnormal returns captured are focused on the impact of the event, while minimising 
the influence of other noise. Moreover, the event window length we have chosen is 
particularly suitable for our multi-country sample, in which different time zones can impact 
the date in which information is reflected in stock prices (Campbell et al., 2010).  
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the time frame of our event study 
In addition, our event window is within the period in which all confounding events (with an 
additional one day extra on either side) were eliminated to the best of our abilities, giving the 
study further legitimacy in relation to any abnormal returns detected (See Figure 2).  
 –260                             –12           –2               0            +2
Estimation window
Buffer
Event window
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Figure 2: Illustration of removal of confounding event period relative to the event window 
period.  
In order to calculate the abnormal return associated with announcements of inclusion, there 
first needs to be a basis of relative ‘normal’ or expected returns. Although many complex 
models have been used in the literature to account for additional factors that may be 
important in determining this return (Fama and French, 1992; Carhart, 1997), the gains from 
employing additional explanatory variables beyond the market factor are small (Campbell 
and Andrew, 1997). Moreover, the coefficients from a simple model (such as the market 
model) are generally always significant and therefore estimated abnormal returns are highly 
reliable (Becchetti et al., 2007). This is in contrast to more sophisticated models (for example, 
multifactor models) that may not possess this same advantage, and rarely improve goodness 
of fit compared with their simple counterparts (Brown and Warner, 1985; Campbell and 
Andrew, 1997). Ultimately, the use of short-run event windows (such as the one employed by 
this study) ensures the final choice of normal return model has little impact on results 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Thus given these advantages, we employ the market model as our basis 
of ‘normal returns’.   
Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between the observed return of firm ݅ and the 
expected/normal return predicted by the market model. This difference cannot be explained 
 –3     –2     –1       0       +1        +2         +3
Event window
Removal of confounding 
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by market movements, and therefore is assumed to capture the influence of the event. 
Formally: 
ܴ௜௧	 ൌ 	 ∝௜ 	 ൅ 	ߚ௜ܴ௠௧	 ൅ 	ߝ௜௧						ݐ	 ൌ 	 െ 260… . . , 	 െ 12 
and 
ܣܴ௜௧	 ൌ 	ܴ௜௧	 െ 	 ∝௜	െ 	ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ 
Where 
ܣܴ௜௧ = abnormal return of firm  ݅ on day ݐ 
ܴ௜௧ = observed return of firm ݅ on day ݐ 
∝௜ = market model intercept, estimated by OLS based on the estimation period 
(–260 to –12) 
ߚ௜ = slope, estimated by OLS based on the estimation period (–260 to –12) 
ܴ௠௧ = observed return on the appropriate MSCI country market index on day ݐ 
As our sample of firms is global, spanning more than 24 countries, we begin by identifying 
for each firm the country of primary operations, then apply the appropriate country index 
from the family of MSCI Country Indices. This is to ensure our calculation of ‘normal 
returns’ is controlled for on a country-by-country basis. By the same token our results are 
robust to more than one benchmark index, while avoiding the bias that may result from using 
a single global or other benchmark.  
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3.3.3.2 Test statistics  
To test the significance of abnormal returns, we follow Patell (1976) and standardise 
abnormal returns on the event day ܧ by the square root of the estimation period return 
variance ߪො௜, and an additional adjustment for forecasting error.  
ܵܣܴ௜ா	 ൌ 	 ܣܴ௜ா	 	 ቎ߪො௜ඨ1	 ൅ 	 1௜ܶ 	 ൅ 	
ሺܴ௠ா	 െ 	ഥܴ௠ሻଶ
∑ 	ሺܴ௠௧	 െ 	 തܴ௠ሻଶ௅௜௠	ୀ	ଵ ቏൘  
Where: 
 ܵܣܴ௜ா = standardised abnormal return of firm ݅ on event day ܧ 
௜ܶ = number of days in firm ݅‘s estimation period (249 days) 
തܴ௠ = average market return during the estimation period 
 
Cumulative standardised abnormal returns (CSAR) are summed across different event 
windows as follows: (0), (0, +1), (–1, +1), (–2, +2), and lastly (–5, +5). These windows are 
calculated in addition to our primary event window of (–2, +2) to ensure enough 
opportunities in analysis are available to capture any possible changes in return due to the 
event.  
To test the significance of CSAR we use three standard test statistics commonly found in the 
event study literature: the t-statistics of Patell (1976) and Boehmer et al. (1991), and the z-
statistic of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Each test statistic is chosen based on their 
econometric advantages. 
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The Patell (1976) t-statistic accounts for the event period residuals being calculated based on 
an out-of-sample prediction. In addition, the test-statistic controls for heteroscedasticity that 
may result from our cross-sectional analysis. These benefits are achieved by normalising the 
residuals as follows:  
ݐ	 ൌ 	෍ ܵܣܴ௜ா
ே
௜	ୀ	ଵ
	 	ඩ෍ ௜ܶ	 െ 	2
௜ܶ	 െ 	4
ே
௜	ୀ	ଵ
൙  
As announcements of inclusion occur semi-annually every March and September each year, 
the concentration of our events on the cross-section may occur over a small number of days 
(this is known as event clustering). This will invalidate our assumption that abnormal returns 
are independently distributed across firms. We therefore employ the t-statistic of Boehmer et 
al. (1991) which is unaffected by event clustering and allows for event-induced variance. This 
is achieved by dividing the average event period standardised residual by its 
contemporaneous cross-sectional standard error, as follows:  
ߪௌ஺ோ೟	 ൌ 	ඨ
∑ ሺܵܣܴ௜௧	– 	 ∑ ܵܣܴ௜௧	௡௜	ୀ	ଵ 	݊ሻଶ⁄௡௜	ୀ	ଵ
݊	ሺ݊	 െ 	1ሻ  
 
Yielding the following t-statistic:  
ݐ	 ൌ 	෍ ܵܣܴ௜௧	 	݊⁄ߪௌ஺ோ೟
௡
௜	ୀ	ଵ
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Finally we employ a non-parametric test to ensure our results are robust to the effects of 
outliers. We use the Wilcoxon signed rank test, which considers that both the magnitude and 
sign of abnormal returns contain important information. We rank all CAR values from 
smallest to largest by absolute value. The sign is then re-attached to each rank and summed. 
The basic premise is that under a random scenario the sum of positive ranks should roughly 
equal the sum of negative ranks. If this null hypothesis is not rejected, it can be concluded 
that over a particular event window no significance in either negative or positive abnormal 
returns exists. Lastly, while the first two t-statistics implicitly assume that residuals follow a 
normal distribution, the Wilcoxon signed rank can be excused of that assumption.  
3.3.3.3 Assessment of the event-study methodology 
The use of the event-study methodology, especially in CSP–CFP studies is highly criticised 
by McWilliams and Siegel (1997). Most notably their criticisms relate to the validity of the 
identified ‘event’, the use of long-run event windows,26 the lack of non-parametric tests for 
detecting outliers, the deficiencies in removing for confounding effects, and the absence of 
explaining sources of abnormal returns.  
Given the importance of event studies in organisational and public policy decisions, it is vital 
research designs and implementation of such studies are flawless (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). Thus we address the aforementioned concerns as follows. First, we identify the event 
of interest by tracing the precise dates of announcements of inclusion in the FTSE4Good 
Global Index. Second, our primary event window for analysis of (–2, +2) can be considered 
                                                            
26 Brown and Warner (1980) and Brown and Warner (1985) show the use of long-run event windows can 
severely reduce the power of the z-statistic.  
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short and of appropriate length, given McWilliams’ and Siegel’s (1997) requirement that 
event windows “should be long enough to capture the significant effect of the event, but short 
enough to exclude confounding events”. Third, to account for outliers and non-normal 
distributions we use one non-parametric test, as well as an additional two parametric tests. 
Fourth, we remove all confounding effects (to our best abilities) surrounding our primary 
event window, with an additional ‘cleaning’ process of one day before and after our 
prescribed window (see Figure 2). Fifth, we explain abnormal returns by applying cross-
sectional analysis using firm-specific variables that have been shown to be important in the 
CSR literature. This particular concern will be addressed in the next chapter.  
Although the event-study methodology has been widely used for measuring the market 
reaction of a specific event, and consequently can represent the “cleanest evidence we have 
on efficiency” (Fama, 1991), it has received some important criticisms. Henderson (1990) 
highlights that “[t]he problems in event studies cannot be solved as such. They can only be 
dealt with”. In addition, Becchetti et al. (2007) recognise a key limitation of event-study 
analysis – its sensitivity to market fluctuations or periods of pessimism and optimism. 
Moreover, the event-study methodology relies on perhaps an unrealistic assumption that 
investors’ reactions are based on well-informed, fully rational decisions to maximise expected 
wealth.27 In addition, McWilliams et al. (1999) argue that CSR studies that employ event 
studies may be insufficient as they only provide estimates of the short-run impact to 
shareholders. The authors also note that event studies are sensitive to even the smallest 
change in research design.  
                                                            
27 On this basis the assumption of wealth maximisation may not apply for socially responsible investors; 
decisions to buy or sell the stock are based on the abilities of the stock to comply with CSR standards, rather 
than the investment’s capacity to maximise profits.    
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However, we assert that given the advantages of the event-study methodology, and when 
common issues arising from this method are addressed (as per the previous section), the 
statistical properties of an event-study methodology are less disputed than other methods of 
analysis. Indeed, particularly in relation to the CSP–CFP literature, event-study analyses have 
been noted to be “unique in that they are unusually precise” (Margolis et al., 2009). In the 
next section we provide our key results stemming from our event-study analysis.  
3.4 Results 
Table 5: Event study basic summary statistics  
Abnormal return Index inclusion 
Mean (5-DAY –0.001 
Standard Deviation 0.049 
Min –0.656 
Max 0.286 
Skewness –3.296 
Kurtosis   51.126 
N    651 
Notes: This table displays the basic summary statistics of the five-day cumulative abnormal return (5-DAY 
CAR). Summary statistics reported are estimates of mean 5-DAY CAR, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, skewness and kurtosis and sample size N.   
 
Table 5 contains several descriptive statistics of the five-day cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) related to the announcement effect. Examining CAR around the event date, it is clear 
that based on the large value of kurtosis, our sample is non-normal.28 Consequently, standard 
                                                            
28 Our large kurtosis value is similar to other event studies investigating social index inclusions. See Cheung 
(2010).  
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hypothesis testing procedures requiring the assumption of normality can become problematic. 
Although our sample size is sufficiently large (N = 651), the large kurtosis value nevertheless 
justifies the use of the Wilcoxon sign rank test. This test statistic is particularly suitable for 
hypothesis testing with non-normal data.  
Table 6: Pairwise correlations of firm characteristics 
This table presents pairwise correlations between out studied variables (unbalanced sample). CARs are abnormal 
returns over the –2, +2 days surrounding announcements of inclusion to the FTSE4GOOD Global Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) CARs           
(2) Size 0.09**          
(3) Leverage –0.01 0.00         
(4) ROE –0.03 0.00 0.06        
(5) CAPEX –0.01 0.01 0.13*** 0.00       
(6) Payout –0.06 0.00 –0.04 –0.01 –0.01      
(7) Cash 0.02 –0.03 –0.38 0.05 –0.17*** 0.00     
(8) Growth –0.01 –0.14*** 0.03 0.02 0.05 –0.05 0.04    
(9) Asset.Turn.  –0.04 –0.10** –0.18*** 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.03 –0.09   
(10) ∆Insti.Own 0.04 0.11* 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 –0.05 0.05 –0.02  
(11) Turnover 0.02 –0.23*** 0.19** 0.23*** 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.06 
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
 
From Table 6, pairwise correlations reveal no real concern. The highest correlation figure is 
experienced between cash holdings (Cash) and leverage (Leverage) with a moderately 
negative relationship of –0.38, followed by investor turnover (Turnover) and size (Size) of –
0.23.  
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3.4.1 Full sample results 
Table 7: Event study results for full sample  
This table displays our key results (based on the full sample) of our event study analysis. Event window defines 
the number of days surrounding the event date at time 0. N represents the number of firms in the sample. The 
abnormal return for stock ݅ on day ݐ ሺܣܴ௜௧ሻ	is calculated as follows: ܣܴ௜௧ 	ൌ 	ܴ௜௧	 െ 	 ∝௜ 	 െ 	ߚ௜ܴ௠௧, where ܴ௜௧ is 
the observed return of firm ݅ on day ݐ, ∝௜ is the market model intercept, ߚ௜ is the slope of firm ݅ based on the 
estimation period (–260 to –12) , and ܴ௠௧ is the observed return on the appropriate MSCI country market index 
on day ݐ. ܣܴ௜௧ are standardised following Patell (1976) on the event day ܧ by the square root of their estimation 
period return variance ߪො௜, with additional adjustment for forecasting error. CAR is the cumulative aggregate 
standardized abnormal return calculated for each corresponding event window. To test the significance of CSAR 
(cumulative standardized abnormal return), three standard tests of significance were applied: the t-statistics of 
Patell (1976) and Boehmer et al. (1991), and the z-statistic of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
Event window N CAR CSAR Patell t-stat Boehmer t-
stat 
Wilcoxon z-
stat 
0 651 -0.038 % -14.769 -0.579 -0.642 -1.747* 
(0, +1) 651 -0.044 % -51.300 -1.422 -1.144 -1.116 
(–1, +1) 651 -0.018 % -28.583 -0.647 -0.550 -0.680 
(–2, +2) 651 -0.242 % -135.356 -2.372** -1.912* -2.091** 
(–5, +5) 651 -0.026 % -49.123 -0.580 -0.516 -0.698 
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
 
Table 7 displays the abnormal returns related to the market reaction to announcements of 
inclusion to the FTSE4GOOD Global Index. Standardised abnormal returns are calculated for 
each day of the event window, spanning (0), (0, +1), (–1, +1), (–2, +2), and (–5, +5), with day 
0 as the announcement date. The change day (that is, the day of implementation of 
announcements) varies in our sample from 8 to 12 days after the announcement date. It is 
assumed that any effect from the initial announcement has already been reflected in prices 
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well before this date, and thus the period surrounding the change date is not included in our 
analysis.  
Over all various event windows, abnormal returns are consistently negative surrounding the 
days of announcement of CSR inclusion. However nearly all event windows, with the 
exception of the (–2, +2) are found to be insignificant.  According to the latter window, firms 
that are announced for social index inclusion lose about 0.242 % (median -0.426%) of their 
market value on the 2 days preceding and following the announcement date. The change in 
market value is similar in magnitude to other studies that investigate social index constituent 
announcement effects, with CAR figures ranging from -0.3 % to 0.6 % (see for instance, Wai 
Kong Cheung, 2011; Doh et al., 2010; and Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012). In relation to our 
study, this lost in market value represents about USD $18.8 million dollars on average per 
firm. Congruently our results are robust for heteroskedasticity (confirmed by the Patell t-stat), 
clustering and event-induced variance (confirmed by the Boehmer t-stat), and the effects of 
outliers (confirmed by the Wilcoxon sign rank test). Thus according to the (–2, +2) window, 
our results indicate significant negative abnormal returns to announcements of FTSE4Good 
Global Index inclusion both in direction and economic significance.    
Collectively this chapter provides results supporting the Friedman (1970) hypothesis, that 
CSR is an excess cost borne by shareholders and thus contrary to the objectives of 
maximising shareholder wealth. Indeed the cost of CSR engagement can be significant, with 
a ‘full-fledged’ CSR program costing as much as 2 % of total revenue (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2005). This is consistent with greater CSR costs related to initiatives that 
seemingly invoke greater cost increases than cost decreases (Epstein, 1996); and the wilful 
act of management in their pursuit of the ‘warm-glow’ effect. Moreover, as many CSR 
initiatives are of a long-term nature (for example, improvements in reputation) it is more 
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likely these activities will impact short-term earnings in a negative rather than positive way. 
Given the high cost and long payback periods, CSR resources from a social perspective are 
more wisely spent on increasing firm efficiency or returned to shareholders as dividends 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Thus, announcements of social index inclusion represents a 
continued devotion of resources of a “wasteful discretionary act of management” (Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2006), which unsurprisingly has led to a negative market reaction.  
3.4.2 Sub-results – differences between the US, UK and Japan 
In the following section, we present our event study partitioned into three countries: the US, 
the UK and Japan. These three countries in sum represent almost 75 % of our whole sample 
(US = 15.5 %, UK = 25.5 %, Japan = 33.2 %). Due to the significant proportions of these 
countries, we examine the US, UK and Japan samples individually to observe possible 
differences due to country effects.  
Tables 8 and 9 display the results of our event study analysis divided into the US and UK 
firms respectively. Both the US and UK market show, over various events windows, 
consistently negative market reactions to social index inclusion. According to the (-2, +2) 
window, firms in the US and UK lose about -0.366 % and 0.341 % of their market value, 
which represents approximately a loss in dollar terms of USD $55.429 million and USD $6.15 
million on average per firm respectively.   
  
                                                            
29 The average market value for US firms in our sample is $15141.23 million dollars.  
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Table 8: Event study result for US sample  
This table presents event study results partitioned to only US firms. N represents the number of firms in the 
sample. CAR is the cumulative aggregate standardized abnormal return calculated for each corresponding event 
window. To test the significance of CSAR (cumulative standardized abnormal return), three standard tests of 
significance are applied: the t-statistics of Patell (1976) and Boehmer et al. (1991), and the z-statistic of the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
Event window N CAR CSAR Patell t-stat Boehmer t-
stat 
Wilcoxon z-
stat 
0 101 -0.340 % -21.132 -2.103** -2.366** -2.363** 
(0, +1) 101 -0.307 % -28.647 -2.016** -2.522** -2.363** 
(–1, +1) 101 -0.430 % -43.075 -2.475** -2.700*** -2.363** 
(–2, +2) 101 -0.366 % -53.829 -2.395** -3.013*** -2.444** 
(–5, +5) 101 -0.144 % -1.461 -0.044 -0.048 -0.534 
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
 
Moreover in comparison with the full sample, our country-specific results are more 
pronounced in relation to the announcement effect. In particular, higher t-statistics are 
observed (for example, more incidences of 5 % than 10 % levels of significance), occurring 
over shorter event windows compared with the full sample results. In the US especially, 
significant and negative abnormal returns are observed in the (0), (0, +1), (–1, +1), and (–2, 
+2) windows. By comparison, the full sample shows only one consistent and significant event 
window on the (–2, +2) period. 
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Table 9: Event study results for UK sample  
This table presents event study results partitioned to only UK firms. N represents the number of firms in the 
sample. CAR is the cumulative aggregate standardized abnormal return calculated for each corresponding event 
window. To test the significance of CSAR (cumulative standardized abnormal return), three standard tests of 
significance are applied: the t-statistics of Patell (1976) and Boehmer et al. (1991), and the z-statistic of the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
Event window N CAR CSAR Patell t-stat Boehmer t-
stat 
Wilcoxon z-
stat 
0 166 -0.130 % -9.699 -0.685 -0.819 -1.288 
(0, +1) 166 -0.202 % -49.310 -2.666*** -1.362 -1.359 
(–1, +1) 166 -0.043 % -40.142 -1.736* -1.007 -1.237 
(–2, +2) 166 -0.341 % -92.100 -3.136*** -1.672* -1.685* 
(–5, +5) 166 -0.725 % -141.977 -3.332*** -2.362** -2.386** 
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
 
Interestingly, the results of the US and UK firms are in contrast to their Japanese 
counterparts. From Table 10, we report that Japanese firms experience significant and 
positive abnormal returns on announcements of social index inclusion. According to the (-2, 
+2) window, firms in Japan gain about 0.088 % of their market value, which represents 
approximately a gain of USD $5.5 million dollars on average per firm. Without further 
analysis we can only hypothesise this is due to the more socially favorable culture of 
Japanese firms.30 
                                                            
30 For example, the economic system in Japan is traditionally founded on relational trading between firms and 
long-term relationships established with employees.  
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Table 10: Event study results for Japanese sample  
This table presents event study results partitioned to only Japanese firms. N represents the number of firms in 
the sample. CAR is the cumulative aggregate standardized abnormal return calculated for each corresponding 
event window. To test the significance of CSAR (cumulative standardized abnormal return), three standard tests 
of significance were applied: the t-statistics of Patell (1976) and Boehmer et al. (1991), and the z-statistic of the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
Event window N CAR CSAR Patell t-stat Boehmer t-
stat 
Wilcoxon z-
stat 
0 216 0.129 % 14.538 0.989 1.063 -0.108 
(0, +1) 216 0.289 % 32.543 1.566 1.759* 1.087 
(–1, +1) 216 0.365 % 46.903 1.843* 2.075** 1.364 
(–2, +2) 216 0.088 % 11.653 0.355 0.370 -0.097 
(–5, +5) 216 0.406 % 51.135 1.049 1.022 0.745 
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
 
3.5 Robustness  
In the following section we provide additional robustness to our event study results.  
3.5.1 Liquidity 
As announcements of social index inclusion can affect stock performances in a number of 
different ways (in addition to evaluating price effects or market reaction), we employ a 
liquidity measure to provide further robustness on the observed performance effects related to 
CSR inclusion.  
Following Harris and Gurel (1986) and similarly to Wai Kong Cheung (2011), we measure 
abnormal  trading volume ܣ ௜ܸ௧ adjusted for market-wide movements as follows: 
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ܣ ௜ܸ௧	 ൌ 	 ௜ܸ௧௠ܸ௧ 	 ∗ 	
௠ܸ
௜ܸ
 
   
Where ௜ܸ௧ and ௠ܸ௧ are the trading volumes of firm ݅ and of the market portfolio (proxied by 
the MSCI country index for each firm) respectively at time ݐ, while ௜ܸ and ௠ܸ are the average 
trading volumes of firm ݅ and the market portfolio in the eight weeks prior to the end of the 
estimation period. The ratio and consequent product of the aforementioned volume measures 
generates ܣ ௜ܸ௧, a standardised trading volume ratio of firm ݅, adjusted for market-wide 
movements in trading volume. This ratio is relatively simple to interpret: if there are no 
changes in trading volume at time ݐ for firm ݅ relative to the eight weeks prior to the event, 
ܣܸ	is expected to have a value of one.  
We measure abnormal trading, adjusted for market-wide movements on day zero and day one 
(day one is the first complete day of trading) over 2003 and 2012. Average ܣܸ for these 
periods is reported to be 1.16 and 1.33 respectively. Moreover, in the first five days of trading 
(days zero to four), average trading volume over this event window is 1.22.31 All figures 
reported in this section are statistically different to one, at the 1 % level. In summary, the 
results of this section confirm the price effects reported earlier. Announcement effects of 
social index inclusion correspond with both a significant movement in prices (via an event 
study) and a significantly higher abnormal trading volume (via ܣܸ).  
                                                            
31 The sum of the trading volume in the first five days is 6.14. Dividing this number by five is the estimate of the 
daily trading volume in the first five days of trading.  
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3.5.2 Varying the estimation window 
We vary the estimation period from (–260, –12) to a shorter (–200, –12) window. The results 
of this event study are reported in Table 11.  
Table 11: Event study results based on the (–200, –12) estimation window. 
N represents the number of firms in the sample. CAR is the cumulative aggregate standardized abnormal return 
calculated for each corresponding event window. To test the significance of CSAR (cumulative standardized 
abnormal return), three standard tests of significance are applied: he t-statistics of Patell (1976) and Boehmer et 
al. (1991), and the z-statistic of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
Event 
window 
N CAR CSAR Patell t-
statistic 
Boehmer t-
statistic 
Wilcoxon z-
statistic 
0 651 -0.034 % -13.866 -0.543 -0.604 -1.708* 
(0, +1) 651 -0.046 % -52.048 -1.442 -1.159 -1.070 
(–1, +1) 651 0.074 % -26.901 -0.609 -0.515 -0.507 
(–2, +2) 651 -0.186 % -133.477 -2.340** -1.878* -1.888* 
(–5, +5) 651 0.024 % -48.220 -0.570 -0.507 -0.610 
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
 
Although we use a shorter estimation window, our results remain overall unchanged; the 
Patell t-test, Boehmer t-test and the Wilcoxon sign rank test remain at similar levels of 
significance, abiet lower for the latter two test statistics. Nevertheless overall, our conclusion 
remains the same – the event window of (–2, +2) continues to exhibit significant and negative 
abnormal returns.   
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3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter we apply standard event-study methodology to announcements of social index 
inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index. Our analysis finds results supporting the 
Friedman (1970) hypothesis: CSR is an excess cost borne by shareholders and thus contrary 
to the objectives of maximising shareholder wealth. Examining country-specific results 
reveals distinct differences in market reaction. The US and UK experience negative abnormal 
returns, while interestingly firms in Japan experienced positive abnormal returns.32 Lastly in 
robustness testing, we find trading volume significantly increases immediately after 
announcements of social index inclusion (therefore confirming the price effects of our event 
study), while varying the estimation window does not significantly alter our results.  
Overall, our empirical findings are similar to Cheung (2011), but they contradict a number of 
other studies in this research field (such as Martin Curran and Moran, 2007; Becchetti et al., 
2009; Chow et al., 2009; Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012). It appears our research is only part 
of the same contradictory story observed so far. Indeed while meta-analysis reviews of the 
research literature note the CSP–CFP relationship is small, but positive “probably; it 
depends” (Peloza, 2009); the exact relationship between these variables is still very much far 
from well established (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). When we examine specifically the social 
index literature, this same disparity in findings is found. For instance, some studies find social 
index inclusion brings positive rewards (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Chow et al., 2009), 
                                                            
32 While we do not formally explore the hypotheses regarding our country specific results, an obvious avenue for 
future research would be an investigation of the aforementioned path.  Future research can employ country 
specific variables concerning governance and culture to name a few.  
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while others find a non-significant relationship instead (Curran and Moran, 2007; Doh et al., 
2010; Kappou and Oikonomou, 2012). 
A large part of this inconsistency can be attributed to differences in previous methodologies, 
sample sizes, datasets, as well as definitions or proxies of CSP. For instance, we are the first 
in the literature (to the best of our knowledge) to analyse market reactions to announcements 
of social index inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index. In addition, as we access a sample 
of firms on a global scale, our study is the first (to the best of our knowledge) to provide 
robust results at the worldwide level. Previous research in this field has been isolated to the 
US (Doh et al., 2010; Kappou and Oikonomou, 2012; Chow et al., 2009; Becchetti et al., 
2009) or UK only (Curran and Moran, 2007; Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012).  
Moreover, our event study differs from previous attempts in the strength of our 
implementation; for example, we use the largest sample size to date (651 firms versus 356 
firms in Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012), apply non-parametric and parametric tests, remove 
firms for confounding effects, and employ short-run event windows. In combination, these 
differences in sample, method and strength of implementation can be expected to provide 
contrasting differences in results.  
Nevertheless, our study appears to support the main criticism of research based on event 
study analysis: that findings from this method are sensitive to even the slightest change in 
research design (McWilliams et al., 1999). However, given the vast amount of studies now 
integral to financial economics – especially those that use event study (Kothari and Warner, 
2006) – the advantages and current standing of this method cannot be overlooked. In 
particular, short-run event studies are relatively “straightforward and trouble free” (Kothari 
and Warner, 2006), and can represent the “cleanest evidence we have on efficiency” (Fama, 
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1991). Moreover, while the event study has evolved over time, there seems to be relatively 
little controversy about its statistical properties (Kothari and Warner, 2006), and thus this 
method may arguably become ‘the standard’ in analysing asset price reactions to events 
(Binder, 1998).  
Finally our results in this chapter provide evidence that announcements of social index 
inclusion cannot be considered as information-free events, but in fact contain critical 
information regarding the financial performance consequences of CSR engagement. In 
relation to this chapter, we find market reactions to announcements of inclusion in the 
FTSE4Good Global Index provide significant signaling evidence. Thus our results are 
consistent with the signaling hypothesis, and similar to findings by Klassen and McLaughlin 
(1996), who find environmental awards generate significant market reaction, Jones and 
Murrell (2001), who find significant abnormal returns to inclusion to the Working Mothers 
list of ‘most family-friendly’ companies, and Doh et al. (2010), who find investors are 
influenced to a significant degree by announcements of exclusion from the Calvert Social 
Index.  
In our next chapter, we argue one of the most significant limitations of the current social 
index literature is that most previous studies only analyse abnormal returns from a market 
reaction perspective.33 Consequently, these studies have not considered other aspects of 
                                                            
33 With the exception of Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) and to a lesser degree Doh et al. (2010). Our study 
however uses a considerably larger sample size (n = 356 in Clacher and Hagendorff [2012] and n = 56 in Doh et 
al. [2010]), a more comprehensive set of explanatory variables. For instance, Doh et al. (2010) examine 
essentially only one variable, variations in a CSR dummy along with a set of control variable), and provide 
results robust to a global scale. Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) focus only on the UK, while Doh et al. (2010) 
focuses on the US).  
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trading activity or firm-specific performances,34 and thus have lacked any substantial ability 
to explain why these abnormal returns occur, how they impact the related finance theories, 
and the implication of these results, if any, for practitioners. By examining firm-specific 
measures of financial constraints, along with measures of institutional ownership, our next 
empirical chapter attempts to uncover further evidence to explain the abnormal returns 
observed in this chapter. We achieve this objective via cross-sectional analysis of the five-day 
CAR in the following chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                            
34 Clacher (2012) employs size, ROE, Leverage, PDCT (EBIT/number of employees), and VISIBLE – a 
measure of the number of times the firm appears in press. Doh (2010) analyses how prior ESG ratings affect 
market reaction to these announcements. The study also controls for firm size and sales growth.  
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Chapter 4: Determinants of shareholder wealth effects 
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4.0 Introduction 
Is CSR engagement a value-enhancing activity? Certainly based on meta-analysis reviews of 
the literature between CSP and CFP, an overall positive relationship is said to exist (Orlitzky 
et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2009; Peloza, 2009), “probably; it depends” (Peloza, 2009). For 
instance, while some studies find a positive effect on financial performance (Kempf and 
Osthoff, 2007; Galema et al., 2008; Fernandez-Izquierdo and Matallin-Saez, 2008; Gil-Bazo 
et al., 2010), others find insignificant differences instead (Bauer et al., 2005; Gregory et al., 
1997; Hamilton et al., 1993; Statman, 2000), while some find CSR involves an 
underperformance trait and that “it can hurt to be good” (Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 
2008; Brammer et al., 2006).  
When we examine the specific literature regarding the ‘social index effect’, that is, studies 
investigating the reconstitution effects of social index inclusion/exclusion, we note that the 
same disparity – if not more – is observed. This inconsistency is highlighted further by only a 
handful of studies that investigate the announcement effect of social index inclusion, but each 
subsequently reveal distinct differences in market reaction; for instance studies have found a 
positive market reaction (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Chow et al., 2009), a negative 
market reaction (Wai Kong Cheung, 2011), or insignificant differences (Curran and Moran, 
2007; Doh et al., 2010; Kappou and Oikonomou, 2012).  
Further, while some studies conclude a positive relationship exists, the direction of causality 
remains unclear. Are firms that are more financially empowered able to engage in higher CSP 
(a slack resource theory), or are higher financial performances attained by managing key 
stakeholder relationships (a stakeholder theory)? Clearly the emphasis of the literature so far 
has been to investigate how socially responsible activities affect financial performance – and 
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not the other way around. For instance, only 37 % of effects studied used CSP measures that 
preceded measures of CFP, a figure surprisingly low if the goal is to establish a causal link 
(Margolis et al., 2009). Moreover they criticise the literature for ignoring factors other than 
CFP when investigating the consequences of CSR engagement.  
This lack of depth is especially pronounced in the ‘social index effect’ literature. Since most 
of these studies only analyse abnormal returns from a market reaction perspective, and do not 
consider other aspects of trading activity or firm-specific performances,35 the literature has 
lacked any substantial ability to explain why these abnormal returns occur, how they impact 
the related finance theories, and the implication of these results if any to practitioners. 
Moreover, Peloza notes in his review of the literature:   
This situation leaves the ‘believers’ advocating for CSP based on broad studies that do 
not address firm-specific issues, and the ‘skeptics’ discounting CSP because the 
research findings are irrelevant (2009, p. 1532).   
Following this line of criticism, we explain sources of abnormal returns using firm-specific 
characteristics that may not necessarily relate directly to sustainable activities, but may reveal 
in finer detail why the market reacts in such a way. Such variables for example can analyse 
the slack resource theory, which suggest the availability of excess funds provides the 
opportunity for firms to invest in environmental and social activities (Waddock and Graves, 
1997). Indeed scholars have argued that firms with stronger financial performance have less 
                                                            
35 With the exception of Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) and to a lesser degree Doh et al. (2010). Our study 
however uses a considerably larger sample size (n = 356 in Clacher and Hagendorff [2012] and n = 56 in Doh et 
al. [2010]), a more comprehensive set of explanatory variables. For instance, Doh et al. (2010) examine only two 
variables, and are able to provide results robust to a global scale. Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) focus on the 
UK, while Doh et al. (2010) study focus on the US).  
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difficulties engaging in CSR, and thus inevitably achieve higher CSP (Margolis and Walsh, 
2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003).  
Moreover while our previous results (Chapter 3) support the hypothesis that CSR is value 
destroying, this conclusion does not negate the possibility that market reaction to CSR is 
dependent on the firm’s prior financial performance. Further, while current studies have 
investigated the effects of slack resources, these have been limited to broad financial 
performance measures (such as return on equity, return on assets, and sales) as proxy for 
slack. As a consequence they do not capture the varying discretionary nature of slack, as 
highlighted in the wider literature investigating the role of this effect on organisational 
outcomes (see for example, George, 2005).  
Therefore as a first prudent step, we use the following measures of financial constraint: 
capital expenditure (CAPEX), dividend payout (Payout), and cash holdings (Cash). Each 
variable is important to the capital structure of the firm, and thus can represent significant 
financing and managerial decisions (see Myers, 2001). For instance, both CAPEX and Payout 
often represent large outflows of internal resources, and consequently can severely restrict a 
firm’s ability to make additional investment choices, for example in CSR. 
From the perspective of the CSR literature, these variables have had very limited use. While 
CAPEX (for example, Cai et al., 2012), Cash (for example, Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011), 
and Payout (for example, Rakotomavo, 2012) have been employed before, the studies (as per 
the parentheses) using these variables have all been in the context of a long-term analyses; 
either evaluating CSR impact on long-term financial performance indicators or evaluating 
long term CSP proxies that lack precise dates – commonly KLD ratings. For instance, Cai et 
al. (2012) analyse the explanatory effects on firm value (Tobin Q) on CAPEX and a proxy for 
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CSR commitment (KLD ratings); Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) explains CSR (KLD ratings) 
using organisational slack as captured by cash and accounts receivables; while Rakotomavo 
(2012) explains how CSR investment (again proxy by KLD ratings) can be impacted by the 
firm’s level of contemporaneous dividend income. While these studies in summary 
essentially analyse the relationship between CSR and measures of financial constraints, since 
all dependent variables are inherently long-term constructs (for example, KLD ratings lack 
precise dates to pinpoint time of impact, while firm value proxies - for instance, Tobin Q in 
Cai et al. 2012 - are based on an aggregate one-year measure), any conclusions reached from 
such analysis can be confounded by a range of other factors unrelated to CSR. 
In this chapter we address this limitation via a short-term study, that is, by analysing the 
determinants of five-day CAR (from our earlier event study), and which we argue is a short 
term construct that (to the best of our knowledge) has been removed of all confounding 
effects. Consequently by isolating a more reliable, validated and ‘cleaner’ measure of the 
CSR factor, variables such as CAPEX, Cash and Payout can reveal important details of the 
relationship between slack resources and CSR not yet clearly examined.  
In addition, this chapter also examines the relationship between institutional ownership and 
the announcement effect of social index inclusion. The role of institutional investors is 
especially marked given their growth and prominence in the capital markets of today.36 Thus 
if corporate managers want their stock to remain attractive to institutional shareholders, they 
must take into consideration the concerns of their institutional owners.  
                                                            
36 For example, in 2009 if we consider only the largest 1000 firms in the United States, institutional 
investors represent an ownership of about 73 per cent in outstanding equity ‐ (Tonello and Rabimov, 
2010). 
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When we examine the literature investigating the relationship between institutional ownership 
and CSP we note mixed results. For instance, while some find institutional ownership is 
lower in firms engaging in CSR practices (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Barnea and Rubin, 
2010), others find insignificant effects instead (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Mahoney and 
Roberts, 2007). We argue a major source of inconsistency in results is the literature’s 
assumption that all institutional investors are homogenous in their investment decisions. In 
particular, we highlight that an important heterogeneous factor is the investment horizon of 
the institutional investor, which according to myopic institutional theory tends to be short-
sighted (Hansen and Hill, 1991). Further, Barnett (2007) emphasises the time required, 
arguing only firms with a genuine commitment to CSR are likely to realise the full long-term 
benefits of such an investment. Consequently there may be incompatibilities between an 
institutional owner’s time horizon and the time needed to fully realise the financial benefits of 
investment in this area (Graves and Waddock, 1994).  
In this regard we contribute to the literature via the analysis of two institutional ownership 
variables, neither of which have been used before in the CSR literature. The first is Investor 
Turnover – a weighted average measure of institutional churn rate based on the frequency of 
rotation of the stock held. Second is ∆ Institutional Ownership – a variable measuring 
changes in quarterly institutional ownership surrounding announcement of inclusion to the 
FTSE4Good Global Index.  
In our last empirical analysis of this chapter, we address the often-ignored endogeneity issue 
in the CSR literature. Specifically, we determine whether firms found to be adopting CSR 
practices, all else being equal, are influencing the investment decisions of their institutional 
investors. From our event study (Chapter 3) and cross-sectional analysis (this chapter), we 
provide results that seem to imply institutional investors sell down those firms included to the 
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FTSE4Good Global Index. This is evident in the significant and negative market reactions 
observed in our event study, given market reactions can largely be attributed to institutional 
movements; and greater cross-sectional associations with measures of institutional ownership 
trading behavior. However, for this proposition to be accurate, one very important assumption 
has been made – announcements of FTSE4Good inclusion is an exogenous firm-specific 
attribute hypothesised to affect institutional ownership.  
That being said, there is every reason to believe that CSR inclusion is in fact endogenously 
determined by many of the same firm-specific features that affect changes in institutional 
ownership. For instance, lower institutional ownership post the CSR event could simply 
reflect the regular institutional decisions of balancing portfolios, or other events unrelated to 
CSR.  
Therefore a fundamental evaluation problem arises in our previous empirical analysis: 
whether institutional movements are of a direct consequence of announcements of social 
index inclusion, or in fact determined by some other endogenous variable. In a recent review 
of the literature, Margolis et al. (2009, p. 27) note:  
Too many studies speculate about mechanisms that explain results or end with a call 
to investigate them. It is time to study mechanisms systematically.  
Thus towards this end, we control for endogeneity problems that may be inherent in our study 
via propensity score matching (PSM). In this section we answer whether institutional owners, 
all else being equal, are punishing firms found to be included in the FTSE4Good Global 
Index.  
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The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. In the second section, we provide a 
theoretical background and literature review concerning the influence of slack resources and 
institutional ownership to CSR. In the third section, we develop the hypotheses related to the 
previous section, and which then provide the predictions underlying our explanatory 
variables. The fourth section provides a summary of our data and methodology used to 
investigate abnormal returns. In the fifth section we present our empirical results and 
interpretation of findings. The sixth section concludes this chapter.   
4.1 Theoretical background and literature review  
4.1.1 CSR and the slack resources theory  
According to the slack resource theory, wealthier firms (financial or other) have greater 
freedoms to engage in socially responsible activities. Otherwise known as ‘slack resources’ or 
‘surplus funds’, these are defined as spare or uncommitted funds above the minimum to 
maintain the organisation’s operations (Arora and Henderson, 2007), or excess resources that 
are beyond those required to produce the required level of output (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). 
Under these circumstances, firms in more favorable financial positions will face fewer 
difficulties in undertaking CSR activities. Slack resources can allow firms greater ability to 
meet the interests of their key stakeholder groups, to abide with society’s moral standards, 
and the flexibility to invest and improve environmental ‘footprints’. Firms with high prior 
CFP have the surplus funds necessary to engage in CSR (McGuire et al., 1988; Ullmann, 
1985; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Garcia-Castro et al., 2010; Johnson and Greening, 1999), 
and thus attain high levels of CSP. Further by implication, despite a firm’s moral intentions to 
contribute to society as a valued corporate citizen, its engagement in such activities and 
ultimate success will depend on its previous or current financial performance. Thus firms that 
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choose to engage in CSR without the necessary level of surplus funds may be considered by 
the capital market and investors to be erroneously allocating scare resources.  
The availability or lack of slack resources can explain the results of a 2002 global survey 
among 1000 firms: while 94 % believe CSR leads to higher financial performance, only 11 % 
of firms reported to engage in CSR activities.37 This result is consistent with corporate 
managers citing high costs, insufficient resources and long pay-back periods as factors 
preventing the successful implementation of socially responsible initiatives (Christie et al., 
1995; Zhuang and Synodinos, 1997). 
While we emphasise the importance of slack resources in providing the ability to engage in 
CSR, there is nevertheless a core argument against such activities. Barnett states:  
… even if a firm has slack resources but no favorable investment opportunities, and 
even if the costs of CSR are not ample enough to put the firm at a competitive 
disadvantage, the firm should still refrain from CSR. Devoting corporate resources to 
social welfare is tantamount to an involuntary redistribution of wealth, from 
shareholders, as rightful owners of the corporation, to others in society who have no 
rightful claim (2007, p. 95).  
Thus despite the availability of slack resources, CSR can still be viewed as a “wasteful 
discretionary act of management” (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), and a value-destroying 
exercise that should be austerely avoided.  
                                                            
37 For survey details refer to Keinert (2008).  
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In the next section we provide a brief literature review of studies investigating the 
implications of slack resource theory for CSR. We note although studies are not abundant in 
this area, they seem to support a positive correlation between slack resources and abilities to 
engage in CSR.  
Waddock and Graves (1997) provides one of the first supports for the role of slack resources, 
finding CSP is positively related to prior financial performance indicators (such as return on 
sales, return on equity, and return on assets). In a similar vein, Hammond and Slocum Jr 
(1996) find the Fortune’s most admired firms are able to generate in the prior period more 
slack (in the form of return on sales) than their less-admired counterparts, and thus 
subsequently could attain higher social reputations. Judge and Douglas (1998) report that 
firms with greater sufficient resources (in the form of return on investment, earnings growth, 
sales growth) are better positioned to integrate environmental issues into their strategic 
planning process.  
Seifert et al. (2004) ask a simple question: “does having lead to giving, and does giving, in 
turn, lead to getting?” They find slack resources in the form of cash flow to precipitate the 
level of cash donations to charitable causes. Although the authors control for firm size, they 
find slack resources continue to be the driving influence behind a firm’s ability to give.  
Departing from the general linear consensus that higher financial performance leads to higher 
CSP, Stanwick and Stanwick (2000) find a non-linear relationship between environmental 
responsiveness and financial performance (based on return on assets). In particular, they find 
that while high-performing firms experience high levels of environmental policies, and low-
performing firms experience the lowest levels of environmental policies (as expected due the 
availability of funds), the highest incidence of environmental polices was recorded by firms 
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with moderate levels of financial performance. They attribute this non-linear relationship to 
high-performing firms believing they have obtained all the potential benefits of 
environmental responsiveness, while median financial firms may engage in more 
environmental policies in their efforts to generate greater financial performance.38 In a recent 
study, Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) find high prior discretionary slack, in the form of cash 
and accounts receivables, is significantly related to higher CSP ratings. They conclude slack 
resources to provide the decision-making latitude in order to enable higher positive CSR.  
Summary and contribution 
Upon examining the literature investigating the slack resource effect on firms’ CSR 
engagement, it is clear the majority of studies use broad financial performance measures 
(such as return on equity, return on assets, sales growth) as proxy for slack. As Arora and 
Dharwadkar (2011) highlights, this can create investigative problems due to the still unclear 
relationship between slack and financial performance. For instance, while some studies find a 
positive relationship between slack and financial performance (for a review see Nohria and 
Gulati, 1996), other studies report a curvilinear relationship instead, where too much slack 
after a certain point becomes wasted through managerial self-interest and incompetence 
(Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Moreover, the use of broad financial performance measures does 
not distinguish between high discretionary slack – defined as uncommitted liquid assets (such 
as cash, cash equivalents, credit lines, low skilled labour etc.) or low discretionary slack – 
defined as absorbed costs (such as processed inventory and skilled labour).  
                                                            
38 Implying a virtuous cycle to exist. See section 4.4 for a discussion.  
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Therefore in order to advance the current literature, future studies need to assess the varying 
discretionary nature of slack. As a first prudent step, we use variables of financial constraint 
not yet considered to a great extent in the CSR literature, but which can represent important 
measures of corporate financing abilities, given the variables’ importance to the capital 
structure of the firm. Moreover while we do not strictly define our variables in this section as 
low or high discretionary slack, for the purposes of this thesis (and as part of this first prudent 
step) we argue these variables have some form of ‘discretion’ – whether high or low. This is 
particularly the case when compared with the broader financial performance measures such as 
return on equity and return on assets previously used as proxies for slack. Herein we measure 
prior levels of financial constraints captured via dividend payout, capital expenditure and 
cash holdings.  
4.1.2 CSR and institutional ownership  
4.1.2.1 Introduction 
In this section we explore how institutional ownership can have an association with the 
market reaction of announcements of social index inclusion. In particular, we review three 
core theories: institutional long-term motivations, short-term motivations (myopic behaviour), 
and the risk-adverse behaviour of institutional investors. In the last part of this section, we 
also provide a theoretical background underlying institutional trading and its cross-sectional 
impact on stock prices.  
4.1.2.2 Institutional theory: long-term motivations 
Institutional investors tend to be motivated to make long-term oriented investments for a 
number of reasons. Foremost begins with their significant resources and economies of scale 
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in their evaluation practices. This allows institutional investors to process greater knowledge 
about the market (Bernard, 1992), and make profitable investment decisions as a result (Aoki, 
1984). The higher sophistication of their investment practices suggests that institutional 
investors are more rational shareholders and will not necessarily disapprove of expenditures 
that are likely to increase the long-term value of the firm. By the same token, large 
shareholders are more likely to invest for the long term, rather than gain from short-term 
movements in prices (Kochhar and David, 1996). Indeed institutional investors may attempt 
to influence top management to focus on the long-term interest of the shareholders, 
suggesting “… block-holders do not merely monitor management teams, they lead them” 
(Holderness and Sheehan, 1988).  
This is in contrast to ‘shuffling’ stocks which can be destabilising due to the large 
shareholdings of the institutional investor (Kochhar and David, 1996; Pound, 1988). Further, 
new alternative investments may be difficult to come by, as the institutional investor may 
already own large stakes in many of the firms in the market (David et al., 1998). Given the 
costly nature of moving quickly in and out of stocks, the limited nature of alternative 
investments, and the level of involvement many institutional investors are now in the stock 
they own, simply exiting becomes problematic (Hirschman, 1970). It seems that overall, 
institutional investors have now become long-term holders by necessity (Graves and 
Waddock, 1994).  
As board managers recognise the long-term motivations of institutional owners, they are less 
fearful of making business decisions that may cause investors to abandon the stock on 
transient changes in share prices (Mahoney and Roberts, 2007). Researchers have indeed 
argued that institutional investors with short-term motivations are systematically 
undervaluing expected earnings (Jarrell and Lehn, 1985; Jensen, 1986a). Some studies find 
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that institutional investors with high portfolio turnover (indicative of short-term horizons) 
underinvest in long-term projects such as research and development in order to reverse an 
earnings decline (Bushee, 1998b). Particularly from a CSR standpoint, genuine earnings can 
come in the form of higher employee productivity, lower litigation risks and the ability to 
provide better marketing of products and services. Through this understanding, corporate 
managers have the confidence to invest in CSR, while institutional investors have the 
fortitude to recognise the long-term benefits. Against this backdrop, a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and corporate social performance is predicted. 
4.1.2.3 Institutional theory – myopic short-term motivations  
Over the years the level of institutional ownership has increased dramatically, causing what 
researchers have argued is a deterioration in the long-term competiveness and financial 
performance of US firms (Graves and Waddock, 1994). These arguments claim that this is 
due to myopic institutional behaviour – managers pursuing short-term gains because their 
compensation, job security and advancement are tied to the need to continually show 
improved results, often based on quarterly performance (Magnet and Labate, 1993; Graves 
and Waddock, 1994). Moreover by acting as ‘traders’ rather than ‘owners’, institutional 
investors can place excessive focus on short-term goals (Bushee, 1998a). Thus any market 
information that suggests corporate earnings are threatened will translate to the divestment of 
that stock. In particular, as many CSR initiatives are of a long-term nature and have uncertain 
outcomes (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Klein and Zur, 2009), it is more likely CSR 
participation will impact short-term earnings in a negative rather than positive way. Thus 
short-term institutional investors may view participation in CSR as increasing the risk of their 
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short-term earnings. To be responsive, corporate managers will avoid investment in CSR, and 
those found to be committed to such will be sold down accordingly.  
4.1.2.4 Institutional theory, risk and CSR 
Institutional investors, like most market participants, are said to be risk-adverse. Certainly, 
Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) do find a negative association between institutional 
ownership and firms’ debt to capital ratios. Consequently, in order to consider the influences 
of institutional ownership, one must consider the potential relationship that may exist 
between risk and CSP. Spicer (1978) argues that institutional investors view firms with low 
social performance as riskier investments. This risk can come in the form of greater 
compliance costs, higher exposure to environmental litigation, poor employee productivity, 
mismanaged boards, and a lack of ability to remain competitive in current markets. Empirical 
studies do find that portfolios with high social ratings have lower total risk (Herremans et al., 
1993; McGuire et al., 1988) and/or lower unsystematic risk (Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria, 
2004; Lee and Faff, 2009). 
If socially responsible firms are exposed to lower risk, then according to the efficient market 
theory, investment in socially responsible firms can be considered efficient, as investors can 
make selections based on maximising risk-adjusted returns. For instance, firms that are 
socially responsible can achieve the same return as their otherwise conventional counterparts, 
but with lower risk. Thus managers have an incentive to reduce risk by investing in CSR 
(Graves and Waddock, 1994). However, the notion that CSR is risk reducing is not universal. 
Scholars have argued that factors such as high costs, long payback periods, and uncertainty in 
outcomes can prevent successful engagement in CSR (Christie et al., 1995; Zhuang and 
Synodinos, 1997). In fact, these factors imply CSR may generate increasing risk. From a 
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portfolio investment perspective, Schröder (2007) and Collison et al. (2008) find that social 
indices are on average taking on constituents with higher risk as a result of their strict socially 
responsible criteria. 
Expanding on the efficient market theory, Graves and Waddock (1994) argue that when 
institutional investors determine the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate,39 they need to 
consider both the influence of their myopic behaviours and any risk changes (reductions or 
increases) pertaining to the CSR initiative. In particular, myopic institutional behaviour is 
associated with the discount rate (they preference current income over future income), while 
any risk changes will affect their risk adjustment. Accordingly, both influences must be 
considered simultaneously.  
Reiterating Graves and Waddock (1994), if a firm undertakes a significant investment in 
social performance – for instance in pollution control – this will cause an immediate 
reduction to current cash flows, but it will not necessarily translate to the same risk 
reductions. This scenario can eventuate when either risk reductions are not high enough to 
offset the fall in cash flows or alternatively the impact of risk is unknown or unobservable as 
it occurs in the long run. In either case, myopic institutional behaviour predicts that the stock 
will be sold down accordingly. Conversely, if the fall in risk is foreseeable and therefore the 
risk-adjusted discount decreases, this can more than compensate for the fall in cash flows – 
and in such a scenario the stock now becomes more attractive.  
                                                            
39 Following Graves and Waddock (1994), we define institutional discount rate as the rate at which future 
income is discounted in preference to current income.  
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In summary, in order to predict the influence of CSR engagement on changes to institutional 
ownership, one must consider the effect on cash flows and the changes to risk pertaining to 
these activities. To the degree that CSR reduces risk while simultaneously offsetting the 
decrease in cash flows, and if these effects are foreseeable, risk-averse institutional investors 
will tend to choose firms with high social performance. Consequently, it can be expected that 
institutional investors will invest more heavily in firms actively involved in CSR, as this will 
translate to a greater optimal risk-adjusted return investment.  
4.1.2.5 The price impact of institutional trading 
There exist studies that show changes in institutional ownership have a strong positive cross-
sectional relationship with changes in stock returns. For instance, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) 
find that the decile of stocks experiencing the largest annual increase in total institutional 
ownership outperform – by about 28 % per year – the decile of stocks that experience the 
largest decrease in institutional ownership. Similarly, Wermers (1999) find institutional 
investors, particularly those characterised as mutual funds, display comparable behavior; that 
is, stocks that were bought by mutual funds experienced significantly higher subsequent 
abnormal returns compared with stocks that were sold by mutual funds. The sources of this 
positive correlation can be attributed to three hypotheses: (1) momentum investors (positive 
feedback trading), (2) informed trading (forecasting), and (3) contemporaneous price 
pressure.  
The first hypothesis occurs when the institutional investor trades based on yesterday’s prices, 
a trading behavior otherwise known as momentum, positive feedback or trend chasing. 
Models of investor behavior often attribute this to uninformed individuals (for example, De 
Long et al., 1990), while others in contrast (for example, Long et al., 1990) allow for rational 
          130 
 
speculators. Other models show managers may trade with the trend due to slowly diffusing 
private information (Froot et al., 1992; Hirshleifer et al., 1994; Hong and Stein, 1999), career 
considerations (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990), or the information inferred by other traders 
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Indeed, Griffen et al. (2003) provide evidence that institutional 
trading follows short-term past returns, finding that stocks with the most extreme returns were 
23.9 % more likely to be bought by institutions than those in the bottom decile of return 
performance.  
The information-trading hypothesis explains positive correlations can arise if institutional 
investors are successfully forecasting intra-period returns. Thus, if these investors can make 
better and more informed trades (for example, due to economies of scale), stock purchases 
should outperform those of the stocks sold. Recent studies report results in line with this 
rationale, revealing measures of institutional buying positively correlate with subsequent 
stock returns (for example, Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Daniel et al., 1997; Wermers, 1999; 
Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Chen et al., 2002)– thus showing that positive correlations between 
changes in institutional ownership and future stock returns can to an extent be explained by 
the forecasting abilities of the institutional investor.  
The price pressure hypothesis asserts institutional buying generates a price pressure that will 
increase stock prices. This hypothesis is quite intuitive, as it seems reasonable to expect 
buying activity from large institutional owners will apply positive price pressure to the 
affected stock. If institutional trading causes price pressure, we should observe a systematic 
correlation between changes in institutional ownership and contemporaneous returns (Sias et 
al., 2001). Sias et al. (2001) use a covariance decomposition method to find the relationship 
between changes in quarterly institutional ownership and daily returns are predominately 
explained by the price pressure hypothesis.  
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In the next section, we review the empirical studies investigating changes to institutional 
ownership and the CSR event. Note that due to the lack of empirics and data in this thesis, 
and like previous authors cited in the literature review, we do not explicitly explain sources of 
the observed correlation (that is, momentum, informed trading or contemporaneous price 
pressure) between institutional ownership and CSR. Extensions to this research field will be 
left for future studies.   
4.1.2.6 CSR factors and their relationship with institutional ownership 
Coffey and Fryxell (1991) emphasises the need to understand how social performances can 
“lure or inhibit capital infusions” (p. 437) in relation to their institutional investors. This is 
particularly the case as social forces gain greater traction in influencing corporate policies, 
and a growing number of institutional investors now incorporate non-economic as well as 
economic criteria in their investment decisions. One of the first studies to address this 
relationship empirically is by Coffey and Fryxell (1991), who find mixed results. For 
instance, while a positive relationship between corporate social responsiveness (measured by 
the presence of woman directors) and institutional ownership is found (in which for every 
additional woman on the board, institutional ownership will increase by an average 5.5 %), a 
contrasting negative relationship emerged in relation to a corporation’s level of compliance 
with the Sullivan Principles,40 in which low compliance is related to an 11 % increase in 
institutional ownership. Lastly they find no significant relationship between institutional 
ownership and charitable giving. While their results are certainly mixed depending on CSP 
proxy selected, at best it may be an indication of institutional investors’ preferences 
                                                            
40 At the time of the studies investigation, the Sullivan Principles provides a three-point scale on the level 
compliance to a set of corporate codes designed to eliminate racial oppression in South Africa.  
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depending on specific social criteria. At worst their results may be confounded because they 
do not control for firm level profit, size, and industry.  
Graves and Waddock (1994) ask a simple question: “does a high level of CSP lead to an 
increase in institutional ownership?” They construct a new CSP index by aggregating eight 
different dimensions of CSP, and find mostly positive associations with institutional 
ownership. A significant and positive relation exists between social performance and number 
of institutional investors, and a non-significant but positive relation exists between social 
performance and percentage of shares held by institutional investors. They conclude that 
overall improvements in CSP invoke no penalty in ability to attract institutional investment, 
with at least one proxy (number of institutional investors) showing significant and favourable 
outcomes for higher social performances. The authors explain their results using efficient 
market theory and institutional risk-aversion behaviour. For instance, firms that are socially 
responsible can obtain the same return as their otherwise conventional counterparts, but with 
lower risk (through such benefits as avoiding customer retaliation and adverse regulatory 
actions). Indeed, controlling for size, financial performance and industry finds a negative link 
between debt-to-asset ratio (a proxy for risk) and institutional ownership. Thus through their 
risk-reducing initiatives, institutional investors will show greater preference for higher CSP, 
and ultimately create an incentive for managers to invest and spend more in CSR (Graves and 
Waddock, 1994).  
Mahoney and Roberts (2007) provide one of the first large-scale studies to examine the 
relationship between institutional ownership and CSP. Using a measure of CSP to test both 
the composite and individual dimensions of the CSP rating, they find varying results 
depending on the component of CSP analysed, and, more interestingly, the proxy of 
institutional ownership selected. For instance, firms with high composite CSP ratings were 
          133 
 
found to have higher percentage of shares owned by institutions. Examining the individual 
dimensions of CSP, they find the ‘international’ and ‘product’ dimensions to be driving this 
effect. In contrast, the number of institutional investors was found to have a negative 
association with the ‘environmental’ dimension, suggesting institutional investors avoid firms 
with high environmental performance. Overall their results support the notion that 
institutional investors care about the way firms manage their CSP, and with the exception of 
environmental performance, these investors did not penalise firms engaging in such activities.   
While previous studies have assumed institutional investors trade in a similar way, Johnson 
and Greening (1999) find distinct differences in trading behaviour between ‘pension fund 
equity’ and ‘investment management funds’ (that is, mutual funds and investment banks). 
The authors report while a positive relationship exists between pension fund equity for both 
the CSP dimensions of the ‘people construct’ and the ‘product quality construct’, they find no 
such relationship is evident for institutional investors classified as investment management 
funds. They conclude pension fund managers are able to recognise the long-term benefits of 
CSR investment. Moreover, their results are consistent with parallel findings showing 91 % 
of institutional activism involves social issues raised by pension fund equity.  
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) analyse the impact of CSR based on a different approach, 
theorising a social norm against investing in ‘sin’ (stocks in the production of alcohol, 
tobacco and gambling). They find evidence consistent with an institutional discrimination 
against these stocks. ‘Sin’ stocks are found to comprise significantly lower institutional 
ownership – of about 18 % – and in turn lower analyst coverage (as analysts tend to cater for 
institutions) – of about 16 % compared with the mean.  
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One of the most recent studies in this field is Barnea and Rubin (2010), who find high levels 
of insider ownership, defined as holdings by corporate managers, directors and block holders 
to have a negative relationship with CSP ratings. As higher CSP ratings can be a proxy for 
higher CSR expenses,41 the authors propose this is evidence that insiders are avoiding CSR 
due to the activities’ higher expenses and consequently imposing lower firm value. As 
insiders are largely entrenched at relatively low levels of ownership (Morck et al., 1988), 
ownership past this entrenchment level can begin to better align the interest of the insiders 
with the objectives of maximising firm value. Thus as insider ownership increases, they avoid 
greater amounts of CSR, as further participation in these type of activities must be harming 
firm value. However, while insider ownership is found to have a significant relationship with 
CSR, the variable of total percentage of institutional ownership has no such association.  
4.1.2.7 Summary and contribution 
The extant research so far has provided mixed results for the relationship between 
institutional ownership and CSP. For instance, while some research finds institutional owners 
have lower levels of investment in firms with a socially responsible mandate (Coffey and 
Fryxell, 1991; Barnea and Rubin, 2010), others find no such penalty applies (Graves and 
Waddock, 1994; Mahoney and Roberts, 2007). Interestingly, one study finds a social norm 
against ‘sin’ stocks, in which lower institutional ownership was found (Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009). We argue a major a basis for the inconsistency in results so far is due to 
the majority of studies in this field having assumed all institutional investors are homogenous 
                                                            
41 For instance KLD ratings define high CSR ratings as those participating in charitable giving, support for 
education, support for housing, retirement benefits etc., all of which can be argued to require a significant 
commitment of firm resources.   
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in their investment decisions. However, as the studies by Barnea and Rubin (2010) and 
Johnson and Greening (1999) reveal, there can be differences between institutional investors’ 
styles and goals that can dictate differences in their reaction to CSR.  
We believe an important dimension of heterogeneity is the investment horizon of the 
institutional shareholder. While Johnson and Greening (1999) employ a classification of 
institutional investors into long-term or short-term horizons (investment managers versus 
pension fund equity), and Barnea and Rubin (2010) hypothesise that public pension funds are 
more likely to pursue CSR agendas compared with managed investment funds (who 
presumably have shorter term horizons), both authors use fairly limited measures to actually 
distinguish between short-term or long-term investment horizons. Instead, the authors use 
broad category labels or assumptions to indicate differences in this heterogeneity behaviour. 
Further, while the literature in this area suggests changes to social performance are 
responsible for changes to institutional ownership, their joint failure to examine transient 
changes in institutional ownership fails to directly test for this possibility. In so far, the 
literature has used ‘stagnant’ (or one-point-in-time - often yearly) measures of institutional 
ownership, either being ‘the number of institutional investors’ (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; 
Graves and Waddock, 1994; Mahoney and Roberts, 2007), or the ‘total percentage of 
institutional shareholdings’ (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Mahoney and Roberts, 2007; Barnea and Rubin, 2010). 
Thus we contribute to the literature via the introduction of two institutional ownership 
variables that can address the aforementioned limitations. To the best of our knowledge 
neither institutional variable has yet been considered in the CSR literature. The first is 
Investor Turnover – defined as the weighted average measure of a firm’s institutional investor 
churn rate one year prior (or four quarters) to announcement of social index inclusion. 
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Through this variable, we are able to distinguish long-term holders from short-term holders 
more accurately using an empirical measure of actual holding periods. Second, we analyse 
changes in institutional ownership by observing differences in current and post quarterly 
holdings surrounding announcement of inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index. Through 
∆ Institutional Ownership we isolate transient changes in institutional ownership as close as 
possible to the CSR signalling event.  
Through the examination of these variables, we contribute to the literature by investigating 
whether announcements of social index inclusion and the market reaction that follows, can be 
explained in part by either the buying activity of new or existing shareholders after the CSR 
event, and/or to differences in institutional investment horizons, particularly their willingness 
to hold long-term stocks. Consequently by using both institutional ownership variables, we 
hope to alleviate the ambiguity in previous findings regarding institutional investors and their 
impact to CSR. Moreover we control for endogeneity to these latter results via propensity 
score matching (PSM) in our robustness section.  
4.2 Hypothesis development  
In this section we review our hypotheses concerning both our measures of financial constraint 
and institutional ownership. These hypotheses are employed to investigate the firm-specific 
conditions necessary for either positive or negative market reactions to announcements of 
inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index.  
Our measures of financial constraints are dividend payout, capital expenditure and cash 
holdings; and our measures of institutional ownership are changes in quarterly ownership and 
investor turnover. We review the hypothesis of these variables in turn.  
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4.2.1 Financial constraints  
One of the most important policy decisions a corporate manager faces is the dividend policy 
of the firm. Indeed dividends are important to investors for a few reasons: they provide 
signals about a firm’s financial well-being; are attractive to investors looking for secure 
income; and help maintain the market price of the firm (Gill et al., 2010). When it comes to 
increasing or decreasing dividends, Lintner (1956) observes corporate managers are more 
willing to raise dividends compared with decreasing dividends, as the latter decision can 
potentially provide negative signals to the market on the future prospects of the firm. The 
negative consequences inherent in this relationship are the focus of numerous studies 
(Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985; Ambarish et al., 
1987).  
Moreover, while much of the literature considers firms that pay high dividends are less 
financially constrained42 (and thus in theory more able to engage in CSR activities), the 
opposite conclusions have been found in empirical studies including US evidence by Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999), and international evidence by Kadapakkam et al. 
(1998). More recently, Cleary (2006) finds firms with high dividend payouts are more 
sensitive to investment cash flow (that is, investment outlays with greater sensitivity to 
availability of internal funds) than firms with lower dividend payouts, despite their attempts 
to control for size and financial strength.  
                                                            
42 While the exact definition remains unclear, we follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and define a firm as being 
high financially constrained if: “… the cost or availability of external funds precludes the company from making 
investment it would have chosen to make had internal funds been available”.  
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Further, from an agency theory perspective, dividend policies can address the agency 
problems between the corporate managers (the insiders) and the shareholders (the outsiders). 
Accordingly (and supported by Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986b; Gomes, 1997), unless 
profits are paid out in dividends, they may be diverted for the discretionary use of the 
corporate insider, or similarly committed to unprofitable projects for private benefits (La 
Porta et al., 2000). As a consequence, shareholders will prefer dividend income as opposed to 
retained earnings, which may be subject to the discretionary use of the corporate manager.  
In relation to CSR, scholars have indeed argued corporate philanthropy (one of many 
branches of CSR) is likely to benefit only managers’ self-interest rather than maximise 
shareholder value (Atkinson and Galaskiewicz, 1988; Friedman, 1970). For instance, 
corporate philanthropy can be used to advance managers’ reputation, self-image or personal 
prestige (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Haley, 1991). Against this backdrop, the diversion of retained 
earnings to compensate for CSR activities (or managerial self-interest) can be seen as a 
subtraction from future dividend income, and therefore to the detriment of shareholders’ 
interests.  
Our search of the literature reveals only two studies that investigate the consequences of such 
commitments to current dividend policy.  
The first study by Rakotomavo (2012) finds CSR commitment has no effect on dividend 
income. This is attributed to two reasons. First, corporate managers are reluctant to decrease 
dividends (consistent with Lintner, 1956), and second, firms that engage in CSR may have 
the accumulated resources necessary to not require changes to dividend policy.  
The second study by Surroca and Tribó (2009) finds CSR ratings have a negative effect on 
dividend income, a finding which implies generous dividend policies to impede the 
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engagement in socially responsible activities. Further as there is a reluctance to decrease 
dividends (as per Lintner, 1956 and consistent with Rakotomavo, 2012), we argue by 
extension implies firms with high dividend yields will face greater pressure to maintain 
current dividend yields - a task that has become considerably more difficult given the 
announcement of CSR inclusion, and the significant commitment of resources required if the 
firm wishes to remain eligible in the social index.  
Considering the arguments and previous results presented, we hypothesise that 
announcements of social index inclusion provide signals of CSR commitment, and 
consequently a diversion of funds that may have otherwise been earmarked for future 
dividend income. Moreover the diversion of funds is hypothesised to be more sensitive 
depending on a firm’s ability to maintain current dividend yields, with generous dividend 
policies more difficult to maintain compared with less-generous policies (that is, low 
dividend payout). Thus we hypothesise dividend payout will have a negative association with 
announcements of CSR inclusion. 
H1: Firm dividend payout is negatively associated with CSR engagement (as measured 
by market reaction). 
 
Capital expenditure represents one of the most significant long-term investments of a 
company, often key to a firm’s ability to generate important cash flows. Firms in the US, for 
example, were found in 2012 to spend about 7.2 % of their annual revenue on capital 
expenditure (Fitch Ratings, 2013).   
          140 
 
From a financial constraint perspective, high capital intensity can tend to create rigidity in 
organisations as fixed costs are high and deviations from strategies become costly 
(Ghemawat, 1991). This is consistent with Korajczyk and Levy (2003) who find that firms 
that are financially constrained tend to have greater capital intensity. Thus similar to Skinner 
(1993) we consider capital expenditure intensity to be proxy for ‘assets-in-place’. Moreover, 
as capital intensive industries will likely be leveraging investments, cost and efficiency 
factors will take on greater importance (Datta et al., 2005), consequently reducing the range 
of strategic options available and the potential for uncertainty in outcomes (Rajagopalan and 
Finkelstein, 1992).  
As decisions to engage in CSR can require a significant commitment of resources (for 
example, GE was reported to spend about 15 % of the company’s profits on CSR-related 
expenses), while the outcomes of these activities remain uncertain until the longer term 
(Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Klein and Zur, 2009), we predict there is a negative relationship 
between capital intensity and market reaction to CSR.   
Moreover, announcements of social index inclusion can be seen as a subtraction of important 
cash flows from future capital expenditure decisions. Indeed previous studies have 
established operating cash flows to be an important determinant of capital expenditure (see 
for example, Griner and Gordon, 1995; Fazzari et al., 1988). Thus if CSR engagement is 
perceived to risk the available funds for capital investment, the consequences of such 
announcements will be negative market reactions. Indeed, through extension, McConnell and 
Muscarella (1985) find announcements of decreases in capital expenditure lead to significant 
negative returns for industrial firms. In addition, Hung and Wang (2014) find stock markets 
react negatively to mandatory CSR reporting, and firms had lower capital expenditure post 
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CSR mandate, which is consistent with higher imposed costs and greater burden to 
operations. 
H2: Firm capital expenditure is negatively associated with CSR engagement (as 
measured by market reaction). 
 
According to the US Federal Reserve, by the end of 2012 US non-financial corporate 
businesses held a record $1.79 trillion of cash and marketable securities (Federal Reserve, 
2013). To put this value in perspective, the sum of these liquid assets represented 
approximately 11 % of the annual US GDP in the same period.43 The motivation to hold these 
large reserves of cash can be explained by the trade-off model, and in particular the 
transaction-cost motive.  
According to the transaction-cost motive, firms hold more cash when the cost of raising 
funds, and the opportunity cost of shortfalls in funds, are high (Dittmar et al., 2003). For 
instance, substantial fixed costs may exist when raising external equity, where small firms are 
likely to face more-costly prospects compared with larger firms. Moreover, firms with better 
investment opportunities are expected to hold more cash, as the opportunity cost of lost 
investment is greater for these types of firms. Likewise, firms with unstable cash flows hold 
more cash to safeguard against the higher likelihood, and subsequently greater costs, of cash 
shortfalls (Dittmar et al., 2003).  
                                                            
43 In 2012 the total US GDP was $15.684 trillion.  
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Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar et al. (2003) find substantial support for the tradeoff model. 
Firms with more cash holdings have higher investment and research and development 
expenditures, greater growth opportunities (as proxy by market-to-book) (Opler et al., 1999; 
Dittmar et al., 2003), are smaller in size and tend to have more volatile cash flows (Opler et 
al., 1999). These characteristics will either increase the cost of raising external funds (for 
example, volatile cost flows represents greater risk), or increase the cost of cash shortfalls 
(the costs in missed opportunity).   
Moreover, Almeida et al. (2002) focus on the importance of financial constraints, particularly 
for those firms that may not be able to raise sufficient funds for future expected needs, and 
thus may decide to hold more cash now to fund potential investment opportunities. According 
to the authors: “If a firm has unrestricted access to external capital – i.e. if a firm is 
financially unconstrained – there is no need to safeguard against future investment needs and 
corporate liquidity becomes irrelevant” (p. 1777). Indeed recent evidence by Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) shows that constrained firms place 
higher value on cash holdings than unconstrained firms.  
In summary, high cash holdings can indicate that firms have either costly external financing, 
higher investment expenditure, greater investment opportunities, more volatile cash flows, or 
simply higher financial constraints, and thus the choice to engage in CSR under these 
circumstances is hypothesised to have a negative relationship with market reaction. That is, if 
these underlying characteristics are in place, the market does not price the announcement of 
social index inclusion as value adding.  
H3: Firm cash holdings are negatively associated with CSR engagement (as measured 
by market reaction). 
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4.2.2 Mediating role of institutional investors 
If CSR is interpreted as a value-enhancing exercise, we anticipate institutional investors will 
demonstrate buying activity, shown by an increase in institutional ownership after the CSR 
announcement. Thus we hypothesise positive changes in quarterly institutional ownership are 
related to higher market reactions to CSR. Alternatively, if CSR is interpreted as a value-
destroying activity, then announcements of social index inclusion, all else being equal, will 
see a fall in institutional ownership (that is, institutional selling), and thus lower market 
reactions will result. 
Whichever the final outcome, both results are consistent with studies that document a strong 
positive relationship between changes to institutional ownership and changes to stock prices 
(see section 5.2: The price impact of institutional trading). Moreover, the information effects 
that lead to institutional selling (buying) can lead to further price depressions (appreciations) 
if other investors view the change in ownership structure to indicate future returns. Brown et 
al. (1993) provide evidence of price pressure resulting from institutional selling, while 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) develop a model in which institutional investors infer information 
from each other’s trades.  
Nevertheless, while movements in institutional ownership are subsequently found to explain 
the cross-sectional determinants of abnormal returns related to our study, this result does not 
preclude the possibility that a certain type of institutional investor may be driving this 
observed effect. In particular, we propose an important heterogeneous factor is the investment 
horizon of the institutional investor, which according to myopic institutional theory tends to 
be short-sighted (Hansen and Hill, 1991). This has important implications for our study, as 
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CSR is generally considered to be a long-term commitment – and thus can have significant 
implications for the willingness of certain institutional investors to hold CSR stocks.  
For instance, if the adoption of CSR practices reduces firm value in the short run, then one 
would expect myopic institutional investors to avoid this type of activity. However, if the 
institutional investor is more inclined to invest for the long term, they may be more able to 
recognise the long-term value of CSR, and thus be comfortable to bear any short-term burden. 
Under this scenario, we expect long-term institutional investors to be more heavily involved 
in CSR stocks, while short-term investors motivated by myopic behaviour will divest away 
from such firms.  
In order to distinguish between differences in investment horizons, we propose that short-
term investors will buy and sell their investments more frequently compared with their long-
term counterparts, who may hold their positions unchanged for the long term. The underlying 
proposition is that short-term shareholders are driven by short-run profits, which tend to 
translate to more frequent trades to exploit price differentials based on the intrinsic value of 
the stock. In addition, short-term shareholders have been linked to pressuring managers to 
focus on short-term goals, often at the expense of long-term value. Indeed Lang and 
McNichols (1997) find significant differences in portfolio turnover and earnings-based 
trading when institutional investors are classified into their varying types (for example, 
investment advisors, bank trust, pension funds). Moreover, firms characterised by institutions 
with high portfolio turnover are found to underinvest in long-term projects such as research 
and development in order to reverse an earnings decline (Bushee, 1998b), while more 
recently high institutional turnover have been found to encourage greater short-term price 
manipulation by corporate managers (Goldman and Strobl, 2013).  
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Empirically we define the frequency of a corporation’s institutional turnover as the weighted 
average measure of the institutional investor’s churn rate one year prior (or four quarters) to 
the announcement of social index inclusion. Thus we propose firms characterised by high 
investor turnover (that is, characteristic of firms with short-term institutional shareholders), 
will perceive announcement of social index inclusion to be counterintuitive to their short-term 
goals.  
Indeed many social initiatives require an immediate and often significant investment of 
corporate resources (for example, initiatives to minimise environmental footprints), while 
their future benefits remain unknown until the long term (for example, greener reputation, 
lower compliance costs). Consequently, firms characterised by high investor turnover will see 
their institutional investors divest away from their stock upon announcement of the CSR 
event.  
Formally, we express both hypotheses related to our institutional variables as follows:  
H4A: Negative market reactions are related to a decrease in institutional ownership post 
event.  
H4B: Negative market reactions are related to higher institutional turnover (short term 
shareholders).   
4.3 Data and methodology  
4.3.1 Data sources 
As well as re-using our previous data sources of firm inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global 
Index and various accounting data and market price data from Worldscope (see section 3.3.1), 
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in this chapter we also employ Bureau van Dijk-Orbis for our collection of institutional 
ownership data. The following is a brief description.  
4.3.1.1 Bureau van Dijk-Orbis  
Bureau van Dijk-Orbis contains both private and public data for over 120 million companies 
across the globe. Working with numerous information providers (IPs), Bureau van Dijk-Orbis 
has created a unique and aggregated dataset for researchers and industry users alike. In 
particular, their focus is on providing associated news and independent research, corporate 
ownership structures, original filed documents, information on important corporate 
individuals (for example, CEOs), and global mergers and acquisitions deals and rumors. Most 
relevant to our research is their ownership database, which has over 30 million shareholder 
subsidiary links. Bureau van Dijk-Orbis collects this information from a variety of sources 
including: official registers (for example, SEC filings and stock exchanges), annual reports, 
private correspondence, telephone research, company websites and news wires. This dataset 
is evaluated for accuracy and timeliness on a monthly basis, and consequently is well 
regarded for its scope and precision.  
Alternative sources of institutional ownership data 
Past studies analysing the impact of institutional ownership to CSR activities focus only on 
US firms, and thus have used databases catering only to this country context. Common 
databases include: Standard and Poor's Stock Guide (most used), Compact Disclosure, CDA 
Spectrum Database, or the use of primary data extracted directly from proxy statements and 
13F schedules. Clearly these databases are unsuitable for our global sample.  
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4.3.2 Sample of interest  
The objective of our second empirical chapter follows the findings of our first, in which we 
find negative abnormal returns are associated with announcements of social index inclusion. 
Thus we seek to explain this negative market reaction using firm-specific characteristics 
(measures of financial constraints plus control variables), as well a measure of changes in 
institutional ownership and their trading behaviour. We achieve this analysis through OLS 
cross-sectional regression. We use the following data and steps:  
‐ We begin by assembling the 651 firms and their corresponding abnormal returns 
calculated in our earlier analysis in Chapter 3. From here, we construct our dependent 
variable as the five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surrounding 
announcements of inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index.  
‐ To form our regression and construct our first set of variables, firms included must 
have accounting data (control variables plus financial constraint variables) available 
from the Worldscope database. Using firm ISIN codes, we collect a history of all 
relevant accounting variables according to the period required. Further, all accounting 
variables refer to the last full fiscal year before inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global 
Index. This leaves us with a sample size of 450 firms based on a ‘common’ sample 
count.  
‐ Our final set of variables for this chapter involves institutional ownership data sourced 
from Bureau van Dijk-Orbis. As institutional ownership data is only consistently 
available post March 2008, the inclusion of ownership variables will restrict our 
sample period to only March 2008 to March 2012. This is as opposed to our full 
sample period covering September 2003 to March 2012. Consequently our sample 
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size is reduced significantly to 96 firms. To account for this large change in sample 
size, we provide three altered equations as part of this analysis. Equations 1 and 2 use 
a sample size of 450 firms (all explanatory variables, but excluding our institutional 
variables), while Equation 3 employs a sample size of 96 (all explanatory variables 
plus our institutional variables).  
In section 4.5 we also provide robustness assessment of our institutional ownership results. In 
particular, we address the endogeneity issue between changes in institutional ownership and 
the market reaction (negative or positive abnormal returns) to announcements of inclusion to 
the FTSE4Good Global Index.  
We achieve this analysis by employing propensity score matching (PSM). The basic principle 
of this methodology rests on the construction of a control group (non-CSR firms) and 
treatment group (CSR firms). Thus the data required for this section is as follows:  
‐ Data for our CSR group (the treatment group) are sourced from our earlier empirical 
analysis. Further we restrict this sample to US firms only. This is to ensure country-
specific consistency in our results and greater robustness in the matching procedure.  
‐ To construct our non-CSR group (the control group) we source a random sample of 
5000 US firms. Using Worldscope, we collect the appropriate data required to provide 
analysis for this group of control firms. Based on the aforementioned specifications 
(institutional ownership data plus US firms plus control variables), our sample size for 
this analysis decreases to 56 firms.  
For a summary of the steps involved in data construction and the ultimate arrival of our final 
sample size please refer to Appendix 2: Flow Chart 2.   
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4.3.3 Construction of variables  
The second and third objectives of this thesis are to explain sources of abnormal returns 
related to our first empirical chapter. Specifically, we use a number of firm-specific 
characteristics to examine sources of abnormal returns, as well as institutional ownership 
variables, to capture the mediating role of institutional investors.  
Consequently, in this section we examine our explanatory variables divided into three areas: 
our financial constraint variables, institutional ownership variables and our set of control 
variables.  
4.3.3.1 Financial constraint variables 
Capital expenditure is defined as capital expenditure over total assets (CAPEX). Dividend 
payout is measured as net dividends over operating income (Payout). Holdings of cash are 
defined as total cash and marketable securities over total assets (Cash). 
4.3.3.2 Institutional ownership variables  
We construct two measures of institutional ownership. They are post quarterly institutional 
ownership versus current quarterly institutional ownership (∆ܫ݊ݏ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌). 
Formally:  
∆ܫ݊ݏ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌
ൌ 	ܲ݋ݏݐ	ݍݑܽݎݐ݁ݎ	݅݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	݄݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ	– 	ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ	ݍݑܽݎݐ݁ݎ	݅݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	݄݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ 
and institutional turnover, defined as the weighted average measure of a firm’s institutional 
investor churn rate one year prior (or four quarters) in relation to announcement of index 
inclusion. To formally arrive at this calculation, we first calculate for each institutional 
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investor a measure of how frequently the investor rotates his/her position in the invested 
stock. In the same spirit as Gaspar et al. (2005), Carhart (1997) and Barber and Odean (2000), 
we define the churn rate of investor ݅ holding stock ݆ at quarter ݐ via the following function:  
ܥܴ௜,௧	 ൌ 	 ห ௝ܰ,௜,௧ ௝ܲ,௧	 െ 	 ௝ܰ,௜,௧	ି	ଵ ௝ܲ,௧	ି	ଵ	 െ 	 ௝ܰ,௜,௧	ି	ଵ∆ ௝ܲ,௧	ห௝ܰ,௜,௧ ௝ܲ,௧	 ൅ 	 ௝ܰ,௜,௧	ି	ଵ ௝ܲ,௧	ି	ଵ
2
 
Where ௝ܲ,௧ and 	 ௝ܰ,௜,௧  measure price and the number of shares, respectively, of stock ݆ held by 
investor ݅ at quarter ݐ. Calculating the churn rate for each institutional investor is necessary to 
then construct the overall measure of investor turnover, which is an empirical measure of the 
investment horizon of institutional shareholders in the stock prior to the social event of 
interest.  
We measure investor turnover of stock ݇ as the weighted average of the total portfolio churn 
rate of its institutional investors over the last four quarters prior to announcement of CSR 
index inclusion. Where the set of shareholders in stock ݇ is denoted by ܵ, while the weight of 
investor ݅ as a total percentage held by institutional investors at quarter ݐ is ௞ܹ,௜,௧.  
Investor	turnover	of	stock	݇	 ൌ 	෍ݓ௞,௜,௧
௜	∈	ௌ
൭14 ෍ ܥܴ௜,௧	–	௥	ା	ଵ
ସ
௥	ୀ	ଵ
൱ 
Overall the construction of investor turnover is based on a one-year history of investor 
trading behavior. Note, those investors without a one-year history are excluded from our 
analysis.  
Unless otherwise specified, all variables collected refer to the last full fiscal year before 
announcement of inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index. A one-year lag is commonly 
used in prior research and seems to represent a reasonable amount of time to capture the 
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influence of the dependent variable, without permitting too many confounding variables to 
influence the hypothesised relationship.   
4.3.3.3 Control variables 
We also include a number of firm-level control variables. To capture firm size, we use the 
natural logarithm of market value (Size). Firm profitability is measured via return on equity 
(ROE) and asset turnover (Asset Turnover), with the latter defined as sales over total assets. 
Leverage (Leverage) is defined as total debt over total assets. In addition, following Clacher 
and Hagendorff (2012) we control for firm growth, defined as the geometric asset growth rate 
of total assets three years prior to the CSR event. We use geometric average as opposed to 
arithmetic average as it can represent a more accurate measure of ‘true growth’, especially 
when year-to-year growth is erratic (Damodaran, 2009). Moreover, Cooper et al. (2008) 
report for large capitalised firms, asset growth predicts the cross-section more pronouncedly 
compared with other growth variables such as book-to-market.  
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Table 12: Variable definitions and summary statistics  
Unless otherwise specified all variables collected refer to the last full fiscal year before inclusion to the 
FTSE4Good Global Index. Accounting data are from Worldscope, and institutional shareholding data are from 
Bureau van Dijk-Orbis. Due to the inclusion of the institutional ownership variables, sample size for those 
related variables is 96 (common sample count). All variables are winsorized at the 2% level.  
Variables Definition N VIF Mean SD Min Max 
Size Natural logarithm of market value 450 3.4 9.544 2.856 3.900 14.369 
Leverage Total debt over total assets 450 1.6 0.267 0.185 0.001 0.715 
ROE Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) over the 
book value of common equity 
450 1.6 10.925 15.282 -45.437 56.863 
Capex Capital expenditure over total assets 450 1.4 0.043 0.027 0.003 0.090 
Payout Net dividends over operating income 450 1.2 0.243 0.293 -0.355 1.323 
Cash Cash and marketable securities over total assets 450 1.4 0.109 0.112 0.004 0.570 
Growth Geometric growth in total assets over the three 
years before FTSE4Good Inclusion 
450 1.6 0.102 0.174 -0.158 0.686 
Asset 
Turnover 
Sales over total asset 450 1.5 0.891 0.584 0.027 2.771 
∆ Institutional 
Ownership 
Post quarter institutional shareholdings less 
current quarter institutional shareholdings (% 
change)  
96 1.3 0.030 0.188 -0.428 0.695 
Investor 
Turnover 
Average institutional churn rate over the previous 
4 quarters before FTSE4Good inclusion 
96 1.7 0.116 0.142 0.001 0.768 
 
Complete variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Table 12. From Table 
12, we report the following key descriptive statistics and make comparisons to an 
international average where appropriate: CSR firms on average employ a leverage ratio of 
26.7 %, a figure similar to their international peers of 29 % (see Fan et al., 2012, study of 39 
countries), mean ROE and asset utilisation indicate positive profitability prior to the year of 
announcement of inclusion (indicating prior wealth to allow firms greater abilities to engage 
in CSR); and which runs in line with an average 10.2 % geometric growth in total asset over 
the last three years; CSR firms on average commit more resources to capital expenditure 
compared to a recent global CAPEX study (see Standard & Poor, 2015, in which they report a 
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global average capital intensity over sales of 9.15 % versus our sample equivalent 13.67 %)44; 
CSR firms on average pay lower dividends of 24.3 % compared to the MSCI World average 
of 39.0 % (see Glenning et al., 2014, extensive report on dividend growth); mean cash 
holdings including marketable securities is 10.9 %, and is similar to an international study of 
approximately 9 % of book assets (see Lins et al., 2010, survey of CFOs across 29 countries); 
and lastly quarterly institutional shareholdings show an average increase of 3.0 % 
surrounding announcement of social index inclusion. Examining variance inflation factors 
(VIF) reveals no multicolinearility issues between the explanatory variables, which includes 
our consideration of fix effects variables. Average VIF is 1.67, while all factors remain under 
the critical value of 10 (Neter et al., 1989).  
4.3.3.4 Fix-effects variables 
In the next section we review our fix-effects variables.  
Industry effects 
Industries can vary in a number of characteristics, which can have varying influences to their 
impact to CFP. For instance, some industries can be considered more vulnerable to higher 
CSR practices (and therefore higher implied expenses) such as heavy manufacturing or 
chemicals; while others could be experiencing a phase of growth or decline (Bowman and 
Haire, 1975; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Spencer and Taylor, 1987).  
To control for industry effects we use industry dummy variables. Dummy variables are 
constructed and are assigned a value 1 when denoting one of the following possible 
                                                            
44 Capital intensity for comparison purposes is defined as capital expenditure over sales. 
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industries: basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care, industrials, oil 
and gas, utilities, technology, telecommunications, and financials (classifications following 
ICB). Note our set of industry classifications is complete and mutually exclusive.  
Country effects 
As our sample of firms spans 24 countries, we incorporate country dummy variables to 
control for regional and political effects. For example, it is possible that differences in 
governing regulations (such as environmental protection policies) can lead to differences in 
levels of corporate sustainability (and thus final impact to CFP). The countries in our sample 
are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.  
In our original analysis we attempted to include all 23 countries (with the omission of one 
dummy), however this led to estimation issues due to some countries recording low numbers 
of observations. Therefore following a similar process to Ziegler and Schröder (2010), we 
categorise the dummy variables for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea (all these 
countries recorded four or fewer firms) as omitted category. For the remaining countries, we 
include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, and USA as dummy variables. The inclusion of the country dummy 
variables for this latter group represents 94.03 % of our sample, and thus we are able to 
control for most country effects in our study. Moreover we note the majority of firms are 
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situated in the UK (104), US (44), and Japan (173),45 which combined represent 71.33 % of 
our sample. Table 13 provides a summary of our country numbers, divided into two lists. 
Sample 1 (N1) is the full sample as used in our earlier event study, and sample 2 (N2) is the 
‘common sample’ based on subsequent regression analysis (less the inclusion of institutional 
ownership variables). Note all samples are less confounding effects.  
                                                            
45 These numbers are based on a ‘common sample’ count of equation one (control variables plus financial 
constraint variables) less confounding effects.  
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Table 13: Full sample by country   
Country numbers and corresponding percentages divided into two samples. The first sample (N1) is the full 
sample as used in our earlier event study, and the second sample (N2) – is the ‘common sample’ based on 
subsequent regression analysis(less the inclusion of institutional ownership variables).  
Country N(1) N(1) % N(2) N(2) % 
Australia 30 4.61 23 5.11 
Austria 1 0.15 0 0.00 
Belgium 3 0.46 1 0.22 
Canada 5 0.77 5 1.11 
Denmark 3 0.46 1 0.22 
Finland 3 0.46 3 0.67 
France 33 5.07 28 6.22 
Germany 15 2.30 13 2.89 
Greece 1 0.15 1 0.22 
Hong Kong 4 0.61 4 0.89 
Ireland 1 0.15 0 0.00 
Italy 6 0.92 4 0.89 
Japan 216 33.18 173 38.44 
Luxemburg 2 0.31 1 0.22 
Netherlands 3 0.46 3 0.67 
New Zealand 7 1.08 6 1.33 
Portugal 4 0.61 4 0.89 
Singapore 6 0.92 3 0.67 
South Korea 4 0.61 2 0.44 
Spain 16 2.46 8 1.78 
Sweden 12 1.84 11 2.44 
Switzerland 9 1.38 8 1.78 
UK 166 25.50 104 23.11 
USA 101 15.51 44 9.78 
  
Total 651  450 100 
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Time effects 
We include time dummy variables to capture time effects such as changes in market 
sentiment. Our construction of time dummy variables however is dependent on the specified 
sample period. For instance, in Equation 1, we use the full sample of firms from 2003 to 
2012, and therefore consequently employ all time dummy variables for each required year 
(with 2012 as the omitted dummy). In Equation 3, since the inclusion of our institutional 
variables restrict our sample period to March 2008 to March 2012, our time dummy variables 
will be restricted in a similar way.  
4.3.4 Construction of equations  
Each equation presented in this next section combines different combinations of explanatory, 
control and fix-effects variables:  
4.3.4.1 Equation 1 
Equation 1 includes all our explanatory variables (Size, Leverage, ROE, Asset Turnover, 
CAPEX, Payout, Cash, and Growth), but excludes our institutional ownership variables 
(Investor Turnover and ∆ Institutional Ownership). In addition, only fix effects for country 
and year are included in this equation.  
ܥܣܴ ൌ∝ ൅ߚଵܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଶܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ൅ ߚଷܲܽݕ݋ݑݐ ൅ ߚସܥܽݏ݄ ൅ ߚହܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܶݑ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܱܧ
൅ ߚ଻ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൅ ߚ଼ܥܣܲܧܺ ൅෍ߜ௝ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ
ଵ଴
௞ୀଵ
൅෍ߛ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ
ଽ
௧ୀଵ
																	ሾ1ሿ 
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4.3.4.2 Equation 2 
Equation 2 has the same specifications as Equation 1, but in addition includes fix effects for 
Industry.  
ܥܣܴ	 ൌ 	 ∝ 	 ൅ 	ߚଵܵ݅ݖ݁	 ൅ 	ߚଶܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	 ൅ 	ߚଷܲܽݕ݋ݑݐ	 ൅ 	ߚସܥܽݏ݄	 ൅ 	ߚହܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ		
൅ 	ߚ଺ܴܱܧ ൅ 	ߚ଻ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄	 ൅ 	ߚ଼ܥܣܲܧܺ	 ൅ 	 ෍ ߜ௝ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ
ଵ଴
௞	ୀ	ଵ
൅ ෍ ߛ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ
ଽ
௧		ୀ	ଵ
	 ൅෍ ௝߲ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ
ଵ଴
௝ୀଵ
																																																											ሾ2ሿ 
4.3.4.3 Equation 3 
Equation 3 includes all aforementioned explanatory variables, as well as our institutional 
variables which were initially excluded. This equation however only includes fix effects for 
country and year, but not industry effects due to restrictions on sample size.46 
ܥܣܴ	 ൌ 	 ∝ 	 ൅ 	ߚଵܵ݅ݖ݁	 ൅ 	ߚଶܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	 ൅ 	ߚଷܲܽݕ݋ݑݐ	 ൅ 	ߚସܥܽݏ݄	 ൅ 	ߚହܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܶݑ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ	
൅ 	ߚ଺ܴܱܧ ൅ 	ߚ଻ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄	 ൅ 	ߚ଼ܥܣܲܧܺ	 ൅ 	ߚଽ∆	ܫ݊ݏ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌
൅ 	ߚଵ଴ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݋ݎ	ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ	 ൅ 	 ෍ ߜ௝ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ
ଵ଴
௞	ୀ	ଵ
൅ 	 ෍ ߛ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ
ସ
௧	ୀ	ଵ
				ሾ3ሿ 
 
 
                                                            
46 Moreover past research has shown large firms undertake more social activities than smaller firms, regardless 
of industry classification (Krishna, 1992).  
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Equations 1, 2 and 3 results  
Table 14: Equations 1, 2 and 3 OLS regression results  
This table presents the results of Equations 1, 2 and 3 on the 5-DAY CAR surrounding announcement of 
inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index. Equations 1 and 2 cover all firms included in the social index over 
September 2003 to March 2012, while Equation 3, due to the inclusion of our institutional ownership variables, 
is restricted to March 2008 to March 2012. To avoid including outliers that may heavily influence our results, all 
explanatory variables are winsorised at the 2 % level. All equations control for country and time-series effects 
(year) and where appropriate industry effects. CARS are calculated using a market model based on the relevant 
country index for each firm sourced from MSCI. Complete variable definitions are found in Table 12. 
 Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 0.0003 0.0156  -0.0010 -0.0480  0.0074 0.2625 
Size 0.0017 1.1644  0.0017 1.1698  -0.0005 -0.2242 
Leverage -0.0141 -1.3348  -0.0176 -1.5922  0.0234 1.1451 
Payout -0.0016 -2.0730**  -0.0016 -2.0925**  -0.0025 -2.7298*** 
Cash -0.0328 -1.8992*  -0.0332 -1.8855*  -0.0330 -1.3423 
Asset Turnover -0.0019 -0.5761  -0.0003 -0.0702  0.0122 2.0539** 
ROE 0.0003 2.3584**  0.0003 2.2907**  0.0003 1.2936 
Growth -0.0201 -1.9200*  -0.0236 -2.2153**  -0.0258 -1.2467 
Capex -0.1252 -1.9128*  -0.0893 -1.3283  -0.1966 -1.8394* 
∆ Insti. Ownership       0.0390 2.0238** 
Investor Turnover       -0.0346 -1.9831** 
         
Country-fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Time-fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry-fixed effects No   Yes   No  
N 450   450   96  
F-statistic 2.543***   2.232***   1.888**  
Adj. R2 0.082   0.087   0.177  
*Significant at the 10% level **Significant at the 5% level ***Significant at the 1% level  
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The results presented in this section are robust for country and time-series effects, and where 
appropriate industry effects (for Equation 2 only). In addition, the f-statistic for all equations 
presented is statistically significant – thus indicating all models and their collective variables 
are appropriate in explaining the cross-sectional determinants of CAR. 
We note only two studies (to the best of our knowledge) use firm-specific variables to explain 
sources of abnormal returns related to the ‘social index effect’: Clacher and Hagendorff 
(2012), who employ size (natural logarithm of total assets), return on equity, leverage, 
employee productivity (EBIT/number of employees), and ‘visible’ (the number of times the 
firm is mentioned in press); and Doh et al. (2010) who employ sales growth (which we use as 
a reference for our asset growth variable) and size (the natural logarithm of the market value 
of equity). We quote these studies and note comparisons to specific variables where 
appropriate.  
We find lower abnormal returns are significantly related to our lagged measures of financial 
constraint. In particular, we find that firms characterised by high prior dividend payments 
(Payout), high prior cash holdings (Cash), and high prior capital intensity (CAPEX) have 
greater associations with lower CAR. These results are reviewed in turn.  
Firm dividend payout is found to be negative and significant for market reaction to social 
index inclusion. In other words, we find firms with high dividend payout have greater 
associations with lower market reactions. According to Equation 1, a 1 % increase in 
dividend payout is associated with an estimated 0.2 % decrease in abnormal returns.47  
                                                            
47 The coefficient of our continuous (but unlogged) explanatory variable shows the estimated percentage effect 
(after multiplying by 100) of a one-unit change in the explanatory variable. 
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This is consistent with the view that investors care about dividend yields, as CSR can be 
perceived as a subtraction from future dividend income. Indeed corporate managers are more 
willing to increase dividends than decrease dividends, as the latter decision can provide 
negative signals about the future prospects of the firm (Lintner, 1956). In addition, as our 
coefficient for this variable is negative in sign, we provide results consistent with the notion 
that high-dividend firms (traditionally considered less financially constrained) represent 
greater financial constraints (as per Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999; Kadapakkam et 
al., 1998). Thus like Surroca and Tribó (2009) we find firms with high-dividend polices to 
impede the successful engagement of CSR (as proxy by the greater association with lower 
CAR values).  
High cash holdings are found to be negative and significant in relation to market reaction. 
According to Equation 1, a 1 % increase in cash holdings is associated with an estimated 3.3 
% decrease in abnormal returns. As past studies show, high cash holdings can indicate firms 
have either costly external financing (Dittmar et al., 2003), higher commitments to 
investment expenditure (for example, R&D expenses), greater investment opportunities, more 
volatile cash flows (Opler et al., 1999), or simply higher financial constraints (Almeida et al., 
2002); thus announcements of CSR expenditure given indications of stress to financial 
positions, or investment opportunities have resulted – perhaps unsurprisingly – in negative 
market reactions.48  
                                                            
48 Note, despite having the correct sign, our cash variable in Equation 3 is statistically insignificant. As Equation 
3 is considerably smaller in sample size to both Equations 1 and 2 (450 versus 96), we believe differences in our 
cash coefficient are mostly due to a sample size issue. 
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Our last measure of financial constraint is CAPEX intensity. We find CAPEX to be 
significant and negatively associated with market reaction. According to Equation 1, a 1 % 
increase in capital expenditure is associated with an estimated 12.5 % decrease in abnormal 
returns. The magnitude and direction of the CAPEX coefficient is consistent with our original 
hypothesis.  
That is as the resources required for capital expenditure can be substantial – for example, in 
2012, firms in the US were found to spend about 7.2 % of their annual revenue to capital 
expenditure (Fitch Ratings, 2013) – announcements of social index inclusion can be 
perceived as inappropriate due to the higher financial constraints faced by these firms 
(Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). Thus CAPEX intensity can limit the scope for other 
opportunities of investment (Datta et al., 2005; Ghemawat, 1991; Rajagopalan and 
Finkelstein, 1992) – including the possible range of CSR activities. Moreover, negative 
market reactions can indicate the perception that valuable resources are being diverted from 
future capital expenditure. Extending the findings of McConnell and Muscarella (1985), 
announcements of social index inclusion can become a precursor to future announcements of 
capital expenditure decreases, and therefore associated with significant and negative market 
reactions. This association is indeed possible, given the recent findings of Hung and Wang 
(2014) that show negative market reactions to mandatory CSR reporting in China. Moreover, 
they find lower capital expenditure post mandate, consistent with higher imposed costs and 
burden on operations. 
Our next set of discussions concern the results of our control variables relating to size, 
leverage, profitability and asset growth. Our measures of size and leverage are found in all 
regressions to be insignificant; profitability is significant across all three regressions 
(interchanging between ROE and asset turnover), while asset growth is significant and 
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negative across most regressions.49 In the following paragraphs, we examine in detail the 
results of each control variable in turn.  
We find firm size is insignificant in explaining abnormal returns related to announcements of 
CSR inclusion. Our result thus is in contrast to studies by Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) and 
Doh et al. (2010), who find firm size to be significant and positive. The lack of significance 
found in this variable may be due to the diminishing marginal influence of firm size. For 
instance, size as a positive increasing attribute can become less prominent after surpassing a 
certain level of size. 
As our sample of firms is larger on average compared with previous aforementioned studies 
(9.53 versus 8.496 [Doh et al., 2010] based on the natural logarithm of market value, and 
16.86 versus 13.293 [Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012] based on the natural logarithm of total 
assets),50 it is possible to find the influence of firm size in our sample is less important. 
Interestingly in relation to our measures of financial constraint, like previous scholars, we 
find that while size has no significant relationship in our investigation, the relationship 
between available resources and CSR continues to be consistently significant (for example, 
Judge and Douglas, 1998; Waddock and Graves, 1997).  
We find our measure of corporate leverage is insignificant. This outcome is possible if 
announcements of social index inclusion are perceived on average to not affect the firm’s 
ability to service their debt commitments – despite their newfound signal of additional 
                                                            
49 With the exception of our growth variable which lost its significance in Equation 3.   
50 These figures are based on Equation 1. Similar figures are also reported for Equation 3 (9.301 versus 8.496 – 
natural logarithm of market value and 16.663 versus 13.293 – natural logarithm of total assets).  
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expenses related to CSR (that is, announcement of social index inclusion). Moreover, 
according to the slack resource theory, funds directed to CSR can only be considered ‘slack’ 
once all operational commitments are met – commitments that of course must include debt 
obligations.51 Nevertheless, our measure of corporate leverage is in contrast to Clacher and 
Hagendorff (2012), who find leverage to be significant and negative to market reaction to 
social index inclusion.  
In contrast, the remaining control variables of profitability and asset growth are found to be 
mostly significant in their coefficients.  
Firm profitability is found to be significant and positive; significant for return on equity in 
Equation 1 and 2, and significant for asset turnover in Equation 3. This result is thus 
consistent with the notion wealthier firms have greater abilities to engage in CSR (Ullmann, 
1985; McGuire et al., 1988; Adams and Hardwick, 1998) – and thus are able to enact higher 
positive market reactions. Notably while our results are consistent with Clacher and 
Hagendorff (2012) in direction, our results in contrast (in particular in return on equity) is 
statistically significant. 
Further, although our study cannot distinguish the direction of causality52 – that is, do 
companies that are more profitable engage in CSP, or do companies that engage in CSP 
become more profitable? – we argue that perhaps CSP and CFP mutually affect each other 
                                                            
51 In the event of liquidation debt holders have first claim on any proceeds, while equity holders’ claims are 
residual. That is, equity holders only receive capital in excess of the claims by the debt holders.  
52 Note: although we use lagged measures of financial performance to CSP announcement, it is likely these firms 
have been actively engaging in sustainable practices for a period of time before announcement of social index 
inclusion. Therefore whether financial performance preceded or followed as a consequence CSP activities is 
difficult to determine.  
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through a virtuous cycle. As Orlitzky et al. (2003) put it: “financially successful companies 
spend more because they can afford it, but CSP also helps them become a bit more 
successful” (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Thus our results can also be considered consistent with 
Roberts (1992) who states “... the better the economic performance of a company, the greater 
its social responsibility activity and disclosures”. On the other hand, Alexander and Buchholz 
(1978) argue firms that engage in CSR are better run relative to their counterparts that choose 
not to engage in CSR.  
Our estimate of firm growth proxied by the three-year growth in total assets is significant and 
negative (with exception to equation 3). This indicates in other words that firms with slower 
growth have greater associations with higher market reactions. This is consistent with the 
notion that investment in CSR is expected to be found in more established and mature 
industries (McWilliams et al., 2006) due to the greater need for product differentiation (see 
for example, Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984; Chih et al., 2010; Fernández‐Kranz and Santaló, 
2010), and the stricter focus on achieving stability, growth and efficiency (Grojean et al., 
2004). Moreover as growth slows, and firms begin to depart further from their embryonic 
stages, there is likely a greater need for product differentiation (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001). Thus from an organisational lifecycle perspective, CSR engagement can be considered 
more appropriate for firms in a slow-growth stage of the lifecycle. Indeed the introduction of 
socially responsible activities will most likely occur when environmental conditions are stable 
(Dickson et al., 2001).  
Moreover, as high-growth firms tend to reinvest profits in expansion or acquisition (Penrose, 
1995), or to other endeavours such as capital expenditure and research and development, 
announcements of social index inclusion can be perceived to impede these traditionally ‘high 
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growth’ activities. Further, if we consider CSR as a value-destroying exercise, then our 
results are consistent with Basu (1977) and Dreman and Berry (1995) who find high-growth 
firms tend to experience more pronounced market reactions to negative earnings surprises. 
Note, despite the interpretation of our coefficient, we provide results in contrast to Clacher 
and Hagendorff (2012), who find significant and positive effects instead, but do not offer an 
interpretation of this effect.  
In the next section we examine the mediating role of institutional ownership. In particular, we 
review the results of our variables ∆ institutional ownership and investor turnover. First, 
based on a comparison of quarterly institutional ownership surrounding the CSR event, we 
find lower abnormal returns are significantly related to decreases in institutional ownership. 
According to Equation 3, a 1 % decrease in institutional ownership will lead to an estimated 
3.5 % decrease in abnormal returns.  
Our results thus indicate institutional investors (on the selling side) view CSR engagement as 
a value-destroying exercise and therefore a “wasteful discretionary act of management” 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Moreover, if engaging in CSR requires an immediate 
reduction to cash flows, but does not necessarily translate to the same risk reductions (either 
risk reductions are not high enough to offset the fall in cash flows or alternatively the impact 
to risk is unknown or unobservable) risk-averse institutional investors will be expected to sell 
down the stock.53 
                                                            
53 Moreover, in additional analysis (not presented) we find 15 per cent of our sample experiences significant 
changes in beta. Of these, 54.62 per cent experience a significant increase in risk, while 45.53 per cent 
experience a significant decrease in risk. We use a chow test and compare each firm beta in the estimation 
period (–260, –12) to the beta calculated in the event period (0, 30).  
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Out last institutional ownership variable is investor turnover. We find lower market reactions 
are significantly related to firms characterised by high investor turnover. As firms with high 
investor turnover are indicative of institutional investors who tend to buy and sell their 
investments more frequently due to their greater focus on short-term goals, our result is 
consistent with institutional myopic behavior. This is particularly pronounced when we 
consider many social initiatives require an immediate reduction in cash flows, while their 
future financial benefits can remain unknown until the longer term (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; 
Klein and Zur, 2009). Indeed managers cite high costs, long payback periods, and uncertainty 
in outcomes as factors that prevent them from engaging in CSR (Christie et al., 1995; Zhuang 
and Synodinos, 1997). Certainly under this scenario, CSR engagement is likely to impact 
short-term earnings in a negative rather than positive way. Thus as CSR activities may not 
perfectly align with the short-term goals of their myopic institutional investors, firms 
characterised by high investor turnover are on average associated with lower market reactions 
to the CSR event. 
4.5 Robustness  
In this section of the thesis we address the often ignored or ‘passed on’ problem regarding 
endogeneity in the CSR literature. Specifically, we determine whether firms found to be 
adopting CSR practices – all else being equal – are influencing the investment decisions of 
their institutional investor.  
Indeed the results from Chapters 3 and 4 are consistent with this proposition. From our event 
study (Chapter 3), we find negative abnormal returns are associated with announcements of 
inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index. As market reactions are largely based on the 
trading decisions of institutional investors (given they are the largest investor group in the 
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market), sources of negative abnormal returns can reasonably be attributed to this trading 
behavior. Moreover, in cross-sectional analysis (section 4.4.1), we find evidence supporting 
this proposition: negative abnormal returns are found to be significantly associated with lower 
institutional ownership post announcement.  
From this current and previous chapter, our results seem to indicate firms that adopt CSR 
practices do indeed influence the investment decisions of institutional investors. However, for 
this proposition to be accurate, one very important assumption is been made – announcements 
of FTSE4Good inclusion is an exogenous firm-specific attribute hypothesised to affect 
institutional ownership.  
That being said, there is every reason to believe CSR inclusion is in fact endogenously 
determined by many of the same firm-specific features that affect changes in institutional 
ownership. For instance, institutional movements could simply reflect the regular decisions of 
balancing portfolios, or alternatively other events unrelated to CSR. Therefore a fundamental 
evaluation problem arises, through a question of causality – whether changes in institutional 
ownership are a direct consequence of CSR inclusion, or are in fact determined by some other 
endogenous variable.  
Thus, the crux of this section is to determine whether differences between movements in 
institutional ownership with the CSR effect (the treatment group) and without the CSR effect 
(the control group), can be attributed to a CSR factor. As we cannot practically observe both 
the treated and untreated outcome for the same individual at the same time, and taking the 
mean outcome of non-participants is problematic as this group can often differ in many ways, 
we use propensity score matching as one possible solution.  
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The basic premise is to find in a large group of non-participants, firms that are similar in all 
relevant pre-treatment characteristics. That is to say, each firm characteristic in the treatment 
group is mirrored by an observation in the control group. Once an adequate control group is 
formed, differences in the outcomes of each matched pair will be due to the ‘treatment 
effect’, and consequently not to observable differences between the pairs. In other words, 
differences in changes to institutional ownership can be attributed to the unique contribution 
of the announcement effect of the FTSE4Good Global Index.  
The methodology behind this matching outcome relies on two important underlying 
assumptions. The first, confoundedness, assumes that given a set of observable covariates X, 
the outcomes of both the treated and control group are independent of the treated effect. The 
second, overlap, assumes that participants with the same X values have a positive probability 
of being both participants and nonparticipants (Heckman et al., 1999). For the rest of this 
chapter we implicitly assume both these assumptions hold.  
4.5.1 Propensity score matching (PSM) analysis 
We implement a propensity score matching methodology to construct a group of control 
firms that resemble as closely as possible our group of CSR firms (the treatment group) – 
defined as firms announced for inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index. Further, we 
restrict our analysis in this section to only US firms and a sample period from March 2008 to 
March 2012 (as periods earlier do not offer consistency in ownership data). Based on the 
aforementioned specifications and adjusting for available covariate variables (as discussed in 
the next paragraph) our sample size for the treatment group is 56 firms. Please refer to 
Appendix 2: Flow Chart 2 for a summary of the steps to arrive at this final sample size. To 
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construct our non-CSR group (the control group) we source a random sample of 5000 US 
firms to represent our pool of unmatched firms.  
To estimate the propensity score we employ a logit regression as follows:  
Prሺܦ஼ௌோ	 ൌ 	1ሻ 	 ൌ 	ܨሺߚᇱܺሻ 
Where ܦ஼ௌோ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a CSR firm and 0 otherwise, ܨሺ∙ሻ is 
the cumulative probability density function of normal distribution, ߚ is a vector of marginal 
impact coefficients and ܺ is the vector representing our covariate variables.  
We use covariate variables of firm characteristics that have been well established in the 
literature as important to CSR (see for example: Shen and Chang, 2009; Ziegler and 
Schröder, 2010; Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Eccles et al., 2013). The covariate variables 
employed are Size (natural logarithm of total asset), ROA (operating income over total 
assets), Leverage (total liability over total asset), MTB (market value of equity over book 
value to equity), and Asset Turnover (sales over total assets). The variables respectively 
represent our proxies for size, income, capital structure (or financial risk), growth opportunity 
and management ability. Without replacement, we perform an exact match on industry 
classification, followed by year of event, then lastly a partial match on propensity scores 
based on the closest neighbor matching principal.  
As we match 53 CSR firms based on a large pool of 5000 unmatched firms, the nearest 
neighbor approach was appropriately suitable in achieving very close matches. 
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4.5.2 Propensity score results 
Table 15: Estimation of propensity score  
Binary logit regression, Pr൫ܦ஼ௌோ	 ൌ 	1൯ 	 ൌ 	ܨሺߚᇱܺሻ 
MTB is defined as market value of equity over book value to equity. ROA is defined as net income over total 
assets. For all remaining variables, complete variable definitions are found in Table 12. The binary logit 
regression is restricted to only US firms and a sample period from 2008–2012. We restrict the time period to 
2008–2012, as institutional data before 2008 are not consistently available. The Z-statics are shown alongside 
their level of significance.   
Variable Estimated coefficient z-statistic 
Constant –9.3612 (–6.1644)*** 
Size 0.6935 (3.3841)*** 
ROA 2.8054 (1.8135)* 
Leverage –1.7338 (–3.1693)*** 
MTB 0.0020 (0.3601) 
Asset Turnover 0.0626 (0.3156) 
No. of observation       4471  
McFadden R-squared 0.0403  
* Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
 
Table 15 shows the binary logit result of the first stage of the PSM analysis – estimating 
propensity scores to perform firm matches and create our control group. Of the five 
covariates shown to be important in the CSR literature, we find three of these show statistical 
significance in explaining the probability (or propensity) of firm inclusion to the FTSE4Good 
Global Index. Large firms, low leverage (both significant at the 1 % level), as well as high 
profitability (significant at the 5 % level) are found to be important in determining the 
propensity of social index inclusion. In addition, all five signs of our covariates, including 
those that are insignificant, are consistent with previous studies. For instance, positive 
correlations are related to size (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Shen and Chang, 2009; Eccles 
et al., 2013), ROA (Ziegler and Schröder, 2010), MTB (Eccles et al., 2013), and asset 
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turnover (Eccles et al., 2013; Shen and Chang, 2009), while a negative correlation was 
reported for leverage (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Ziegler and Schröder, 2010).  
As previously mentioned, the objective of the PSM methodology is to construct a group of 
non-CSR firms (using propensity scores and other matching criteria) that resemble as closely 
as possible our group of CSR firms (the treatment group). We match 53 CSR firms based on a 
large pool of 5000 unmatched firms.  
After the matching process is accomplished (that is, match based on exact industry, year, and 
partial match on propensity score), we present a summary of the basic statistics between the 
CSR group and its matched non-CSR group in Table 16.  
Table 16: Basic statistics of CSR-firms and non-CSR firms  
MTB is defined as market value of equity over book value to equity. ROA is defined as net income over total 
assets. See table 12 (chapter four) for all remaining variable definitions.  
 CSR firms (n = 53) Non-CSR firms (n = 53) 
Variables Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Size 7.039 0.700 6.120 8.732 7.033 0.825 5.398 9.355 
ROA 0.082 0.078 –0.15 0.340 0.071 0.076 –0.14 0.281 
Leverage 0.008 0.287 –0.60 0.710 -0.008 0.258 –0.61 0.702 
MTB 4.037 4.784 0.628 24.765 5.514 18.312 0.613 134.563 
Asset Turnover  0.859 0.917 0.048 5.400 0.855 0.865 0.049 4.075 
 
4.5.3 Verification of matching results  
We verify our matching process by comparing the average characteristic of each covariate 
variable between the CSR group (treatment group) and its matched group (control group or 
non-CSR firms). We employ a test of the difference of the means between our two groups 
vis-à-vis total assets, ROA, leverage, MTB and asset turnover. If there are no significant 
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differences in means between each covariate across each group, we can conclude the 
treatment group and control group are statistically identical according to industry, year, size, 
income, capital structure, growth opportunities and management ability.  
From Table 17, it can be observed that the CSR group have on average total assets of 7.039 
(natural logarithm), 0.082 ROA, 0.008 leverage, 4.037 MTB, and 0.859 asset turnover. 
Similarly the matched non-CSR group were found to have on average total assets of 7.033 
(natural logarithm), 0.071 ROA, ––0.008 leverage, 0.568 MTB, and 0.855 asset turnover. 
Testing the differences of the averages between both groups reveals no significant 
differences. As our two groups are statistically identical according to industry, year, size, 
profitability, capital structure, manager ability and growth opportunities, we conclude our 
matching process is successful.  
Table 17: Results of verifying the matching process  
Displays the average figure for each covariate variable for each group, and the results of a test of the difference 
between these variables. Matching was achieved via the closest neighbor principal approach. See Table 12 for 
complete variable definitions.  
Covariates variables CSR-firms 
(treatment group) 
Non-CSR firms 
(control group) 
Test of difference 
(t-value) 
Size 7.039 7.033 –0.037 
ROA 0.082 0.071 –0.759 
Leverage 0.008 –0.008 –0.294 
MTB 4.037 5.514 0.568 
Asset Turnover 0.859 0.855 –0.020 
* Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
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As our treatment group and control group are found to be statistically identical according to our 
covariate variables, anticipated differences in changes to institutional ownership between our two 
groups can be attributed to the treatment effect, all else being equal.    
4.5.4 Treatment effect results  
We implement two approaches to determine whether institutional changes are affected by 
announcement of firm inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index. The first compares the 
mean differences in changes to institutional ownership between the treatment and control 
group. In this, both a test of the average and test of the median are performed.  
The second approach employs cross-sectional regression analysis with a CSR dummy to 
examine differences in changes to institutional ownership between the treatment and control 
group. This regression equation is as follows. 
4.5.4.1 Equation 4 
∆	ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌	 ൌ 	ߙ	 ൅ 	ߚଵܵ݅ݖ݁	 ൅ 	ߚଶܴܱܣ	 ൅ 	ߚଷܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	 ൅ 	ߚସܯܶܤ		
൅ 	ߣܦ஼ௌோ ൅ 	ߝ																																																																																																							ሾ4ሿ 
Where ∆	ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ is defined as post quarterly institutional holdings less 
current quarterly institutional holdings (thus a negative value would indicate institutional 
selling), ߚ represents our control variables (size, ROA, leverage and MTB respectively), ߣ	is 
the coefficient of the CSR dummy variable, and lastly ߝ is the error term.  
Note: A significant negative ߣ suggests the treatment effect (that is, announcement of CSR 
inclusion) is significantly associated with lower institutional ownership (that is, institutional 
owners are selling).  
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The results of both analysis are presented respectively in Table 18 and Table 19.  
4.5.5 Test of equality  
Table 18: Test of equality of average and median – changes in institutional ownership between 
treatment and control group 
Panel A: change in institutional ownership is defined as the difference between post and current quarterly 
institutional holdings surrounding the announcement event. Panel B: change in institutional ownership when we 
partition the treatment group into only those whom experienced an initial negative CAR to the announcement 
event. For both panels, the average change in institutional ownership are shown for each group, alongside with 
their appropriate t-statistic (to test the average) and z-statistic (to test the median). The p-value is presented in 
parentheses.  
 Variable Average  
 
(treat group) 
Average 
 
(control 
group) 
t-statistic of 
difference 
(average) 
Z-statistic of 
difference 
(median) 
A Change in institutional ownership –0.0175 0.0232 2.3436** (0.0212) (0.0887)* 
B Change in institutional ownership 
– subset: negative CAR  
–0.0283 0.0170 1.8197*  (0.0741) (0.0975)* 
* Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
 
Based on Table 18, we report average institutional changes for the treatment group are 
negative 1.75 %. In other words, institutional investors are on average decreasing their 
shareholdings surrounding announcement of social index inclusion by about 1.75 %.  
The non-CSR group, which operates in the same year and industry, and which exhibit 
statistically identical size, profitability, capital structure, and growth opportunities, shows in 
contrast an average positive increase in institutional ownership of about 2.32 %. A test of the 
equivalence reveals differences in the changes in institutional ownership between both groups 
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to be significant at the 5 % level based on average changes, and at less than the 10 % level 
based on median changes.   
Moreover, when we partition the treatment group into only those that experienced a negative 
market reaction (as opposed to the full sample comprising a mix of negative and positive 
market reactions to the CSR event), we find similar results, albeit at lower levels of 
significance. The partitioned treatment group experiences on average decreases in 
institutional ownership of about 2.83 % (a figure larger than the CSR full sample as 
expected), while its matched control group experiences a contrasting increase in institutional 
ownership of about 1.7 %. Similarly a test of the equivalence reveals differences to be 
significant at the 10 % level for both average and median changes.  
4.5.6 Institutional ownership regression analysis results   
Table 19: Results of institutional ownership regression – Equation 4 
OLS method: 
	∆	ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌		 ൌ 	 ∝ 	 ൅ 	ߚଵܵ݅ݖ݁	 ൅ 	ߚଶܴܱܣ	 ൅ 	ߚଷܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	 ൅ 	ߚ4ܯܶܤ	 ൅ 	ߚହܦ஼ௌோ 
Full variables definitions are found in Table 12. We use pooled estimation without considering fixed and 
random effects. T-statistics for each covariate are presented.  
Variable Estimated coefficient t-statistic 
Constant –0.0170 –0.1673 
Size 0.0041 0.2979 
ROA 0.1884 1.2629 
Leverage 0.0176 0.4394 
MTB –0.0002 –0.2581 
ܦ஼ௌோ –0.0435 –2.4389** 
No. of observation          106  
R-square 0.0694  
* Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
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Table 19 presents the results of employing regression analysis with a CSR dummy to examine 
the impact of the treatment effect (that is, the CSR factor) to changes in institutional 
ownership between our two groups. Further, we add control variables size, ROA, leverage, 
and MTB to proxy respectively for scale, profitability, capital structure and growth.  
Our results show ܦ஼ௌோ is significant and negatively associated with lower institutional 
ownership. The estimated coefficient of ܦ஼ௌோ is negative 2.43, implying the treatment effect 
(that is, the CSR factor) reduces institutional ownership by about 2.43 % on average. This is 
significant at the 5 % level.  
Together the results presented in Table 18 and Table 19 confirm the underlying hypothesis 
for this section. Institutional shareholders, all else being equal, will decrease their 
shareholdings in a firm upon announcement of its inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index. 
In other words, we find institutional shareholders are punishing firms shown to be adhering to 
CSR.   
Our empirical results are thus consistent with Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and Barnea and 
Rubin (2010) who find institutional ownership is negatively related to CSR. Our results 
however are not in accordance with Graves and Waddock (1994) and Mahoney and Roberts 
(2007) who find institutional owners are indifferent to these activities, that is, firms engaging 
in CSR are no less attractive to institutional investors.  
Thus while we provide results inconsistent with some previous findings, we note the 
following key differences in our study to explain this inconsistency: (1) we directly measure 
transient changes in quarterly institutional ownership surrounding the CSR event (where 
previous studies have used only one-point-in-time measures of institutional ownership – often 
yearly); (2) we empirically define differences in institutional investment horizons (where 
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previous studies have used labels or assumptions); and (3) we address the endogeneity issue 
between institutional ownership and CSR (where previous studies have either ignored this 
issue, or end with a call to investigate further). Due to these key differences in our study, our 
findings can be considered to provide greater breadth and robustness compared with the 
previous literature – be it consistent or inconsistent with our reported findings.  
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, matching methods, particularly the use of propensity 
score matching (PSM), have only been employed once in the CSR literature.54 This study by 
Shen and Chang (2009) finds, all else being equal, Taiwanese firms that engage in CSR tend 
to obtain higher values on pre-tax income to net sales and profit margin. As this study differs 
both in sample and methodology, as well as the analysis of treatment effect (changes in 
quarterly institutional ownership versus measures of annual accounting performance), our 
study and the use of PSM can nevertheless still be considered unique in its conclusions.  
4.6 Discussion and conclusion  
The main goal of this chapter is to explain sources of abnormal returns related to the market 
reaction of announcements of inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index. In this chapter, we 
hypothesised abnormal returns are contingent on prior measures of financial constraint and 
the influences related to their institutional investors – principally movements in trading 
activity (overall buying or selling), and their willingness to hold long-term stock.  
Thus drawing upon the body of literature regarding slack resource theory and institutional 
trading behaviour, this chapter sought to resolve the ambiguity in previous findings by using 
                                                            
54 As well as the Shen and Chang (2009) study, we find Eccles et al. (2013) to also use the PSM methodology, 
however this paper is still yet unpublished.   
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variables not yet considered in the short-term CSR literature before. First, we improve on 
previous studies’ attempts to explain abnormal returns by employing measures of financial 
constraint outside the more generally used proxies of financial slack (such as ROA, ROE and 
sales), and thus our study has greater abilities to capture the discretionary nature of this 
measure. Second, we employ two dimensions of institutional ownership better able to capture 
the intricate effect of this important mediating factor. We measure changes in institutional 
ownership as close as possible to the CSR event using quarterly data; and we consider 
institutional myopic behaviour, via an empirical measure of their institutional investment 
horizon. 
Using these variables of financial constraint and institutional ownership (as well as our set of 
control variables), we explain sources of abnormal returns related to Chapter 3. The findings 
from our cross-sectional analysis reveal low abnormal returns are significantly associated 
with the following firm-level characteristics: firms with high dividend payments, as CSR may 
impose additional risk to future income (Surroca and Tribó, 2009); firms with high cash 
holdings, as CSR may be inappropriate to firms with costly external financing (Dittmar et al., 
2003), volatile cash flows (Opler et al., 1999) or greater financial constraints (Almeida et al., 
2002); firms with high capital expenditure, as these firms tend to have high fix costs and 
rigidity in organisations (Ghemawat, 1991) and greater limitations on managerial discretion 
(Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998)55; firms with low profitability, as the economic success of CSR 
                                                            
55 In particular McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find announcements of decreases in capital expenditures lead 
to significant negative stock returns for industrial firms. While they do not link decreases in capital expenditure 
to CSR expenses, in principle (and according to our findings) this extension is possible. Similarly, while there 
are no studies directly linking high cash holdings to CSR, we argue due to the inherent characteristic of this 
variable (for example, volatile cash flows, high financial constraints), the extension to CSR and subsequent 
market reaction in principle is possible.   
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activities is contingent on abilities (managerial, financial or other) characteristic of wealthier 
firms (Roberts, 1992); and firms with high asset growth, as CSR may impede firms that tend 
to reinvest profits through expansion or acquisition (Penrose, 1995).  
We then examine the mediating role of institutional ownership. Our analysis reveals low 
abnormal returns are significantly associated with institutional selling and significantly 
related to high investor turnover. Particularly in relation to the latter result, we provide 
evidence of the existence of short-term or myopic institutional behaviour.  
While our results so far are consistent with the proposition that institutional investors punish 
firms found to engage in CSR, there is every reason to believe CSR inclusion is in fact 
endogenously determined by many of the same firm-specific features that affect changes to 
institutional ownership. Thus we control for the endogeneity problem inherent in our study by 
employing propensity score matching (PSM). Our analysis finds institutional owners – all 
else being equal – are punishing firms included in the FTSE4Good Global Index. 
If we consider announcements of inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index to be an 
appropriate indicator of CSP, our results thus suggest institutional ownership plays an 
important role. However, while our study provides evidence consistent with the underlying 
literature regarding institutional price pressures, we still do not understand clearly the sources 
of this positive correlation. For instance, movements in institutional ownership may be a 
consequence of momentum trading (or positive feedback trading), forecasting abilities, or 
contemporaneous price pressures. Therefore despite the evidence of the important moderating 
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influence of institutional myopic behavior, this trading outcome cannot (under the scope of 
this thesis) be attributed to any of the aforementioned trading behaviors.  
Moreover, while we provide evidence consistent with the value-destroying hypothesis, our 
analysis is inherently limited to only a short-term perspective. It is quite possible for CSR 
activities to generate many value-enhancing benefits (for example, higher reputation and 
brand loyalty, greater employee morale and productivity etc.), however as our results imply, 
these are (1) only obtainable in the long term, and thus not relevant for short-term holders, or 
(2) even if these benefits do exists, our short term results imply the market perceives the costs 
of these activities to outweigh their long-term benefits. Thus one of the limitations of our 
study is the exclusive focus on only the short-term effects. Definitive conclusions regarding 
the long-term outcome of CSR, however, will require a longer-term analysis.  
Finally, despite the negative conclusions of this chapter regarding CSR, it is clear some firms 
will nevertheless continue to apportion a significant amount of their capital budget to CSR 
activities. Consequently, we argue an underlying strategic motive must exist, allowing firms 
to generate important economic value from CSR. In fact, as López et al. (2007) argue: “for 
CSR policies to endure, they should be strategic … [and only then] will they enable the 
management and control of inherent risks and achieve lasting positive consequences”. Thus 
in our next chapter, we ask, ‘Who does well by doing good?’, and hypothesise that industry 
sensitivity to the individual consumer is an important mediating factor.  
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Chapter 5: The strategic motivations of CSR across industries 
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5.0 Introduction 
After more than 40 years of research and numerous meta-analyses, an overall positive 
relationship is said to exist between CSP and CFP (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 
2009; Peloza, 2009). While these studies have provided invaluable insights to the relationship 
between CSP and financial performance, at least from a practical and normative perspective 
important issues still remain. For instance, Margolis et al. (2009) state “it is time to consider 
systematically the normative grounds that, respectively, prohibit, permit, and sometimes even 
require companies to engage in CSP”. Before such an analysis can occur, however, we need 
to establish a prerequisite understanding of the mediation process underlying the CSP–CFP 
relationship. Understanding the mediation effects will allow firms to proactively manage the 
CSR process and provide an opportunity to adjust their strategy and inputs as required 
(Peloza, 2009). Only then can firms accurately evaluate the CSR effects and decide how to 
optimally apply this relationship on a normative or practical perspective. This prerequisite, 
according to the academic studies so far, is lacking. For instance, only 13 of the 131 articles 
analysed among the 17 journals evaluated in content analysis was found to examine the 
mediation effects (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). Consequently, this knowledge gap in the 
literature can limit the practical applications of academic work and leave the question of 
causality unaddressed (Peloza, 2009).  
In this chapter, we address one such knowledge gap – in that, while managers believe CSR 
may be beneficial to financial performance, the academic literature has provided little 
guidance to managers on how and what conditions can social activities achieve this intended 
goal. This understanding is particularly lacking across differences in industry contexts, and 
consequently of the mechanisms that may allow CSR to best align with the unique 
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characteristics afforded to each industry (Barnett, 2007; Godfrey and Hatch, 2007; Hoepner et 
al., 2010). Thus its unsurprising to observe, as one meta-analysis reviewer notes, “managers 
have been left to fend for themselves when it comes to tracking financial impacts from their 
own CSP” (Peloza, 2009).  
Moreover, analysis of differences in industry contexts is particularly motivating, as it 
provides an opportunity to test the implicit assumption that the CSP–CFP relationship is 
homogenous across industries (Hoepner et al., 2010). This is despite numerous calls of a 
potential heterogeneity effect across industries (Barnett, 2007; Godfrey and Hatch, 2007; 
Hart, 1995), and relatively unsurprising given that even accounting-based measures of 
financial performance are inept over multiple-industry evaluations (Davidson and Worrel, 
1988).56 Heterogeneity across industries can be characterised by a number of unique 
pressures, that can create a ‘specialisation’ of social interest (Holmes, 1977; Ingram, 1978), 
such as government regulations, consumer orientation, public visibility, patterns of 
stakeholder behaviour, and differences in environmental concerns (Arlow and Gannon, 1982; 
Griffin and Mahon, 1997). As the overwhelming number of  studies have only assessed CSP 
value based on cross-industry analysis – with 77% of studies reported to be this way (Peloza, 
2009) – any industry-specific mechanism underlying the CSP-CFP relationship has been 
assumed to remain constant, without further justification or enquiry (Griffin and Mahon, 
1997).   
In addition, multiple industry analysis that attempts to apply one type of relationship between 
CSP and financial performance fail to recognise the contextual nature of the CSR construct, a 
failing emphasized despite the literatures varying definitions of CSR (see Dahlsrud, 2008 
                                                            
56 Due mainly to differences in regulations, life cycles, and accounting procedures (Davidson and Worrel, 1988).  
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study of 37 definitions). For instance, low emission initiatives by the energy sector or 
community involvement programs by the consumer and finance industry, are all expected to 
yield the same effects on financial performance, simply because these activities are classified 
as CSR. Thus multiple industry analyses can confound relationships between CSR and CFP 
that are unique to each industry context (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Simpson and Kohers, 
2002). Therefore similarly to Hoepner et al. (2010) we see “no theoretical reason to justify 
the a priori assumption that there is one type of relationship between CSP and CFP across 
industries and other analytical contexts.” (pg. 6).   
Furthermore, while previous studies have controlled for ‘industry – either by the use of 
industry control variables, matched based on industry, or sampled from within one industry 
(Margolis et al., 2009) – the large majority of these have only controlled for the industry 
effects on CFP, and not for the potentially distinct industry effects between CSR and CFP 
(Hoepner et al., 2010). Moreover to date only a handful of studies have investigated the CSP 
and CFP relationship based on specific industries (Ogden and Watson, 1999; Simpson and 
Kohers, 2002), while even fewer have investigated the mediation/and or moderation effects of 
a specific industry characteristic (Baron et al., 2011; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008). With the 
exception of one working paper by Hoepner et al. (2010), no studies have yet analysed 
differences in the effects of CSP and CFP across industries.  
Because “the issues change and they differ for different industries” (Carroll, 1979), this 
chapter focuses on addressing this knowledge gap via two empirical perspectives. First, in 
order to assess the heterogeneity across industries, we employ an event-study methodology 
partitioned across 10 industry groups and then further across 19 super-sectors. In this initial 
stage of analysis we find a mosaic of differences in the CSP–CFP relationship between 
industries and their underling super-sectors.  
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In our second empirical analysis we test a specific mechanism that may underline the 
heterogeneity in our industry results. We hypothesise industry sensitivity to the end consumer 
to be an important mediating factor between CSP and CFP. In other words we hypothesise 
distinct differences in the buying behaviour between industries primarily serving the end 
consumer, and industries primarily serving other industries or businesses. Indeed a recent 
Fobes article cites customer engagement as one of the key motivations to why companies 
should embrace CSR (Fobes, 2012) – thus making analysis of consumer-oriented industries a 
sound starting point. Constructing an Industry Sector Group dummy variable, defined as 
firms with low consumer orientation or sensitivity, reveals a negative mediating effect 
underlying the CSP–CFP relationship. In subsequent stepwise regressions, we show the 
mediation effect of consumer sensitivity to continue to remain statistically significant, despite 
all other explanatory variables – which are generally well documented – ceasing to be 
important.   
Overall in this chapter we present results contrary to the meta-analysis conclusion “that there 
is a positive association between CSP and CFP across industries and across study contexts” 
(Orlitzky et al., 2003). Instead we find this relationship to be consequential to key industry 
characteristics. Consequently we highlight a potential research caveat, especially for studies 
that use multiple industry samples; in that while they control for the industry effect on CFP, 
they fail to control for the industry effect on the CSP–CFP relationship.  
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. In the second section we review the 
literature and hypothesis development regarding consumer sensitivity. The third section 
identifies the data required to achieve this analysis. In the fourth section we briefly 
summarise our event study methodology, and in addition detail the methodology underlying 
our consumer sensitivity classification: that is, the process of identifying firms primarily 
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serving the end consumer. In the fifth section we present our empirical results and 
interpretation, while the last section provides a discussion and conclusion to this chapter.  
5.1 Literature review and hypothesis development  
The heterogeneity within industries is hypothesised to be a key factor in mediating the 
relationship between CSP and CFP (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). For instance, industries 
can operate with distinctive behaviours according to governmental regulations, consumer 
orientation, public visibility, patterns of stakeholder behaviour, and environmental concerns 
(Arlow and Gannon, 1982; Griffin and Mahon, 1997). Moreover, CSR activities such as 
carbon neutrality, countering bribery, or charitable donations can have varying relevance 
according to differences in industry context; for example, we would expect carbon neutrality 
to be more relevant to the oil and coal industries57; while the pharmaceuticals and media 
industries often rank highest (and therefore by relation relevance) in their activities of 
charitable contributions (CECP, 2015).   
Another highlighted heterogeneity factor mediating the relationship between CSP and CFP is 
an industry’s potential to cause environmental or social damage; from an environmental 
perspective, positive effects to CFP were found to be less pronounced in environmentally 
problematic industries, attributed to the higher cost underlying environmental performance 
(Derwall et al., 2005; Semenova and Hassel, 2008). Similarly but from a different 
perspective, Hung and Wang (2014) argue that while investment in green technologies can be 
beneficial to the environment, such actions beyond regulatory requirements tend to be 
                                                            
57 For instance Chevron, Exxon and BP were recently identified as the most responsible for climate change since 
the beginning of the industrial age (Guardian, 2013).  
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expensive and do little to provide value to financial performance. While from a social 
perspective CSP effects on CFP were found to be more pronounced in socially problematic 
industries such as mining, forest products and chemicals (Herremans et al., 1993; Lee et al., 
2009).  
Based on the presented arguments and academic findings, it is clear that varying forms of 
CSR activities across differences in industry contexts can be expected to have non-identical 
effects on firm value. Thus industry-level CSR can play an important role in driving the CSP–
CFP relationship. Consequently without the adequate controls in multiple industry analyses, 
studies that attempt an investigation otherwise may not be able to capture the distinct 
heterogeneity effects underlying the relationship between CSR and CFP. 
In this chapter, we argue one important heterogeneity effect sensitive to CSR is an industry’s 
proximity to the end consumer (or to the ‘ultimate’ consumer, as opposed to industries 
primarily serving other industries or businesses). In fact, related market research show 
consumers prefer products and to invest in firms with ‘greener’ environmental reputations, 
and to those firms that portray leading corporate citizenship (Gildia, 1995; Quazi and 
O'Brien, 2000; Zaman et al., 1996). Consumer surveys indicate a similar line of consequence; 
for instance, 84 % of Americans state that given the same price and quality, will switch 
brands to a product associated with a good cause58; while 79 % of Americans consider 
corporate citizenship an important factor to purchase a company’s products.59  
Under experimental settings CSR has been shown to lead to positive effects on consumer 
attitudes (for example, Brown and Dacin, 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001) and 
                                                            
58 Cone Corporate Citizenship Study, 2002. See: www.coneinc.com. 
59 Hill & Knowlton/Harris Interactive survey, 2001. See: www.bsr.org.   
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consequently generate higher revenues and sales margins by increasing consumer purchasing 
intentions (Sen et al., 2006). Overall CSR products can invoke increased desires on part of the 
consumer to purchase the company’s products. In reverse consumers have been found to be 
more sensitive to negative CSR information, and thus provide the underlying motivation to 
engage in CSR to minimise the costly nature of social transgressions (Sen and Bhattacharya, 
2001).  
One of the main drivers of CSR is the notion that it influences consumer loyalty, particularly 
in environments of high competition and growing customer expectations (Han et al., 2011). In 
an attempt to increase their loyalty base, firms will develop long term relationships and fulfil 
the various needs and wants of their customer (Han and Back, 2008). Recently the CSR 
variable has been used in studies to investigate effects on customer loyalty, in which a 
positive relationship between CSR and customer loyalty has been empirically demonstrated 
(de los Salmones et al., 2005; He and Li, 2011; Pérez et al., 2013). 
Overall the literature has presented evidence consistent with the theoretical model of 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001), in which investment in CSR tend to be in industries with 
highly differentiated products, such as food, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, financial services 
and automobiles. Moreover, these findings are corroborated by a growing body of academic 
research that find CSR in industries characterised by greater competition, or those with high 
advertising intensity. For instance, in the face of decreasing product differentiation and 
heightened competition, CSR activities are an innovative and less-likely replicable means of 
strengthening consumer relationships (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2004). Similarly, Fernández‐
Kranz and Santaló (2010) report firms with greater competition (as measured by Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index) demonstrate higher investment in CSP. A result the authors interpret as 
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symptomatic of firms engaging in CSR as consumers, employees or investors were rewarding 
firms for such activities. Finally, Fisman et al. (2005) find CSR to be more prevalent in 
industries with high advertising intensity, reasoning this is an appropriate proxy for higher 
consumer perception. They conclude CSR increases “as the importance of consumers – and 
hence of brand awareness and community giving – increases” (p. 16).   
Collectively these studies support the preposition that an industry’s sensitivity to the end 
consumer mediates the relationship between CSR and CFP. This proposition is based on two 
underlying features surrounding consumer buying behaviour. 
The first is that end consumers are more concerned with their consumption of goods and 
services compared with their industrial counterparts. This argument is not new, with Useem 
(1988) asserting firms with high levels of public contact such as retailing, insurance, or 
banking to typically give more compared to low public contact industries such as mining or 
primary metals. Indeed a growing number of companies are now incorporating CSR to appeal 
to key market segments such baby boomers and ‘generation X’ shoppers (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001).  
Moreover by using these products, consumers gain access to socially responsible attributes 
such as ‘eco-friendliness’ and the assurance of higher standards in labour rights (for example, 
eschewing sweat-shop conditions). The consumption of such products can appeal to 
consumers as indirectly supporting a cause, while rewarding firms that choose to engage in 
such activities (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). In addition, end consumers can also be 
influenced significantly by social group forces, psychological factors (for example, sense of 
duty and justice) and consumer situational effects (Corey, 1991). In contrast, the buying 
behaviour of their industrial counterparts can be highly formalised based on predefined 
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procurement practices and strict economic evaluations. Distinct from individual consumers, 
industrial buyers are often specifically targeted with personal selling (Corey, 1991).  
The second is that public image can serve a more prominent role for firms that rely on the 
majority of their demand from the buying behaviour of the end consumer. This is in contrast 
with industrial firms that will typically sell to only a few large customers and thus less reliant 
on public image tools such as advertising or product marketing. The role of public image 
relies on the assumption that firms that engage in CSR provide products and services that are 
more dependable and of a higher quality (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Therefore firms that 
primarily serve the end consumer may find it more advantageous to engage in ‘publicly 
visible’ CSR, such as generous charitable giving or the assistance in community development 
projects. These activities can attract greater public attention and in turn signal more reliable 
and honest firms (Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007).  
In sum, CSR should have greater demand in industries primarily serving the end consumer, as 
there exists a greater motivation for consumers to increase demand for products and services 
under this trading environment. In particular due to these underlying features of consumer 
behaviour, we argue industries that primarily serve the end consumer will tend to benefit 
positively from their engagement in CSR activities. In fact by extension, the allocation of 
resources under the context of their industrial counterparts can be perceived to be a 
misallocation of scarce resources – as these firms will unlikely attain the same consumer-
related benefits.  
Following Lev et al. (2010), we specifically hypothesise firms with high consumer sensitivity 
to experience positive market reactions to CSR. This is in contrast to firms with low 
consumer sensitivity (that is, serving industrial consumers), and which will experience 
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negative market reactions to CSR. The hypothesised link between CSR and CFP and the 
mediating effects of consumer sensitivity are depicted in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The link between CSR and market reaction 
Our hypothesised link is empirically supported by several studies. Curcio and Wolf (1996) 
separate firms into two categories: those that receive the majority of revenue from the 
ultimate consumer and those that receive the majority of revenues from industrial customers. 
The authors find the adoption of CSR strategies appears to only significantly increase the 
financial performance of firms dependent on the buying behaviour of the ultimate consumer, 
with the latter category (that is, those primarily serving industrial customers) seemingly 
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High consumer sensitivity 
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benefiting most from the contrary choice of environmental indifference or irresponsibility 
(Curcio and Wolf, 1996).  
In a study across 10 industry sectors, Hoepner et al. (2010) find only consumer discretionary 
and healthcare sectors to experience significant and positive CSR effects on CFP. As both 
industries have relatively high proximity to the end consumer, the authors argue, anecdotally, 
to evidence that consumer trust is an important variable between the CSP–CFP link across 
industries. Moreover their study highlights an important premise; in that end consumers will 
place greater emphasis to social concerns in their consumption of goods and services, relative 
to other businesses in their procurement practices.   
Lev et al. (2010) report corporate philanthropy leads to significant and subsequent sales 
growth. Investigating possible underlying mechanisms reveal positive associations are 
particularly pronounced in relation to firms exposed to high consumer perception – defined 
by the author as those producing goods or services primarily for the individual consumer. All 
other industries are categorised as low consumer sensitive (that is, industrial customers) and 
consequently are found to have insignificant effects. Overall the authors conclude corporate 
managers can justify philanthropic programs as long as they can explain to their sceptical 
shareholders how corporate giving can increase customer satisfaction and, as a consequence, 
sales growth. Further analysis finds an important factor; institutional investment to be 
positively related with charitable giving for high consumer sensitive firms, and negatively 
related with giving for low consumer sensitive firms.  
Employing cross-sectional analysis and analysing mandatory CSR disclosures, Hung and 
Wang (2014) report negative effects to CFP are more pronounced among firms providing 
non-consumer related products (defined by the author as products sold mainly to other firms). 
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Overall, they explain this category of firms to be less likely to enjoy the consumer related 
benefits of CSR, such as brand recognition and firm reputational enhancements. Without the 
realisation of the aforementioned benefits, the authors conclude non-consumer firms will only 
impose social burdens on business operations.  
Following the results of these studies, we formally present our two key contrasting 
hypotheses: the first predicts consumer orientated industries (that is, those primarily serving 
the end consumer) will have a positive mediation effect to the CSP–CFP relationship.  
H1: Consumer-orientated industries have a positive influence on the CSP-CFP 
relationship. 
 
The second hypothesis examines the counterpart to this story, in which we predict non-
consumer industries (that is, those primarily serving industrial consumers or businesses) will 
have a negative mediation effect on the CSP–CFP relationship. A relationship consequence 
due to the lack of CSR benefits attained under this trading environment.  
H2: Non–consumer orientated industries have a negative influence on the CSP–CFP 
relationship. 
 
5.2 Data 
5.2.1 Sample of interest  
Our investigation in this chapter is focused on analysing differences in the CSP–CFP 
relationship across industries. To enable analysis under this context requires a CSP proxy 
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measured over a variety of different industries. Therefore, similar to our previous empirical 
chapters, we employ analysis of social index inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global Index (for 
information on this data source see section 3.3). However, unlike our previous chapters, 
instead of aggregate analysis at the global level, we undertake this CSP proxy partitioned 
across 10 industrials, 19 super-sectors, 41 sectors and over 100 sub-sector classifications 
where appropriate. We extract the dates of announcements of social index inclusion from the 
semi-annual reviews published on the FTSE4Good website over the period from September 
2003 to March 2012. From this initial examination we collect 729 firms. 
To qualify for our analysis, firms must have accounting data available on the Worldscope 
database. This leaves us with a sample of 699 index inclusions. Similar to our previous 
empirical chapters, we check for confounding effects during the three days preceding and the 
three days immediately following the event at t = 0. Our investigation identifies 48 firms that 
meet these criteria.60 These are eliminated leaving a final sample of 651 firms.  
Using this sample of firms, our analysis in this chapter is threefold: first we conduct an event 
study analysis partitioned across 10 industry groups, and then in order to gain wider insight 
partitioned further across their underlying 19 super-sectors. Second, we classify out sample 
into either ‘consumer sector group’ or ‘industry sector’ and perform a univariate test to 
compare abnormal returns. Third we employ stepwise cross-sectional regression to 
investigate the mediating effects of consumer sensitivity, captured via our Industry Sector 
Group dummy variable (refer to the methodology in section 5.3 for construction details). This 
                                                            
60 For example, we find the following confounding events: Premier Oil’s announcement of net profit up 188 per 
cent, the Laird Group’s announcement of acquisition of Home Doors limited and Houseproud, and SES’s global 
announcement of a new state-of-the-art DVB-RCS platform.  
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section of the analysis also includes our explanatory variables used in Chapter 4, namely our 
control variables and measures of financial constraints. Due to the inclusion of these 
explanatory variables our sample size falls to a ‘common sample’ count of 453 firms. 
Appendix 2 provides a summary of the data construction breakdown as presently detailed.  
5.2.2 Accounting data 
The accounting data employed in this chapter, and which underlie the majority of the 
explanatory variables used in this thesis are sourced from Worldscope (for more information 
on this data source see section 3.3.1). From this database we construct the following 
explanatory variables: to capture firm size, we use the natural logarithm of market value 
(Size); firm profitability is measured by return on equity (ROE) and asset turnover (Asset 
Turnover), with the latter defined as sales over total assets; leverage is defined as total debt 
over total assets (Leverage); dividend payout is measured as net dividends over operating 
income (Payout); holdings of cash is defined as total cash and marketable securities over total 
assets (Cash); capital expenditure is defined as capital expenditure over total assets (CAPEX); 
and future growth is captured by market value of equity over book value to equity (MTB).  
In addition, we also exclude our institutional ownership variables (namely institutional 
turnover and changes in institutional ownership), as these variables will significantly reduce 
our sample size.61 Notwithstanding this exclusion, the remaining explanatory variables 
included in this section are consistent with our previous empirical chapters. Complete 
                                                            
61 As institutional ownership data is not consistently available before March 2008, the inclusion of institutional 
ownership variables will restrict our sample size from 453 to 96 firms. Given the purpose of this chapter is to 
analyse the CSP-CFP link across various industries, a sample size of 96 will not be appropriate for this purpose.  
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variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Table 20 and pair-wise 
correlations are provided in Table 21. 
Table 20: Variable definitions of summary statistics with industry group variable 
Unless otherwise specified all variables collected refer to the last full fiscal year before inclusion to the 
FTSE4Good Global Index. Accounting data are from Worldscope, while industry classification data are sourced 
from ICB. 
Variables Definition N VIF Mean SD Min Max 
CAR-5 Day 5 DAY cumulative abnormal 453 - -0.001 0.037 -0.118 0.151 
Size Natural logarithm of market value 453 6.6 9.522 2.924 2.328 17.174 
Leverage Total debt over total assets 453 1.4 0.269 0.191 0.000 0.923 
ROE Earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) over the book value of 
common equity 
453 1.5 14.863 54.150 -83.880 988.370 
Asset Turnover  Sales over total assets  453 1.2 0.930 0.749 0.018 8.870 
MTB Market value of equity over book 
value to equity 
453 1.5 83.832 550.596 -3515.15 7863.636 
CAPEX  Capital expenditure over total 453 1.2 0.050 0.049 0.000 0.411 
Payout Net dividends over operating 453 1.0 0.377 2.206 -5.506 38.682 
Cash Cash and marketable securities 
over total assets 
453 1.4 0.109 0.121 0.000 0.909 
Industry Sector 
Group 
Dummy variable = 1 if firms are 
categorized as low consumer 
sensitive, and zero otherwise (that 
is, categorized as high consumer 
sensitive) 
      
 
 
    
 
From Table 20, we report the following key descriptive statistics: The mean 5 DAY 
cumulative abnormal return is -0.01 %, ranging from -11.8 % to 15.1 %; mean natural 
logarithm of market value is 9.52; mean leverage is 26.9 %, reaching as high as 92.3 %; mean 
ROE is 14.86; mean asset turnover is 93 % of total assets; mean market-to-book ratio is 83.83 
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(median 2.28)62; mean dividend Payout is 37.7 % of operating income; mean capital 
expenditure as a proportion of total assets is 5 %; and mean cash holdings including 
marketable securities is 10.9 %. Examining variance inflation factors (VIF) reveals no 
multicolinearility issues between the explanatory variables, which includes our consideration 
of fix effects variables. Average VIF is 1.98, while all factors remain under the critical value 
of 10 (Neter et al., 1989).  
Table 21: Pairwise correlations of firm characteristics 
This table presents pairwise correlations between variables (unbalanced sample). CARs are abnormal returns 
over the -2,+2 days surrounding announcements of inclusion to the FTSE4GOOD Social Global Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) CAR – 5 DAY          
(2) Size 0.08**         
(3) Leverage 0.00 0.00        
(4) ROE -0.03 0.00 0.06       
(5) Asset Turnover -0.05 -0.10** -0.18*** 0.03      
(6) MTB 0.35*** -0.12*** 0.00 0.02 -0.02     
(7) CAPEX -0.01 0.01 0.13*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.02    
(8) Payout -0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01   
(9) Cash 0.01 -0.03 -0.38*** 0.05 0.03 0.10*** -0.17*** 0.00  
(10) INDUSTRY GROUP -0.12*** -0.13*** 0.08** -0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.07* 0.00 -0.03 
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
                                                            
62 While standard errors (particularly MTB) can indicate potential issues relating to heteroscedasticity, based on 
White’s (White, 1980; White, 1982) specification test no heteroscedasticity is present (at the 1% level). For 
brevity however we present standard errors (and their associated p-values) corrected for heteroscedasticity. See 
OLS regression results.  
          199 
 
From Table 21, pairwise correlations reveal no real concern. The highest correlation is 
experienced between cash holdings and leverage (–0.38), followed by the correlation between 
MTB and CAR - 5 DAY (0.35). All remaining correlations fall below +/– 0.18. 
5.2.3 ICB industry classifications 
The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) provides a systematic categorisation of 70,000 
companies and 75,000 securities worldwide. Through four levels of classification (level 1 – 
10 industries, level 2 – 19 super-sectors, level 3 – 41 sectors, level 4 – 114 sub-sectors), ICB 
allows rigorous and transparent analyst across detailed levels of classification, and one that is 
achieved across a global scale. Figure 4 illustrates the ICB structure according to each 
classification level.  
ICB was originally developed by Dow Jones and FTSE, but now is maintained solely by 
FTSE International Limited. ICB has been adopted by stock exchanges representing over 65 
% of the world’s market capitalisation, including NYSE Euronext, NASDAQ OMX, London 
Stock Exchange, Taiwan Stock Exchange, Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Borsa Italiana, 
Singapore Stock Exchange, Athens Exchange, Cyprus Stock Exchange and Kuwait Stock 
Exchange (ICB, 2014). 
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Figure 4: The ICB structure according to each classification level 
We use ICB to classify our sample into industry and sector groups. In our first empirical 
analysis we use level 1 and 2 and where appropriate for suitable analysis level 3 given 
available sample sizes. According to these partitions, we perform event studies to investigate 
differences in CSR effects across industries and their underlying super-sectors.   
In our second empirical analysis we categorise our sample as belonging to either ‘consumer 
sector group’ or ‘industry sector group’. To achieve this classification, we employ a mixture 
of level 1 classifications (to make general categorisations following Lev et al., 2010) and 
level 4 classifications to access ICB definitions (that is, ICB  sub-sector definitions) and make 
more specific categorisations as required.  
The industry composition of our sample based on ICB level 1 and level 2 are detailed in 
Table 22.  
10 industries 
19 super‐sectors 
41 sectors 
114 sub‐sectors 
Level 1
Level 2 
Level 3 
Level 4 
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According to Table 22, partitions according to industry classifications (ICB level 1 – Panel 
A) reveal Industrials (21.35 %) and Financials (19.20 %) to be the dominant industries in our 
sample. All other remaining industries range between 1.54 % and 12.60 %. Similarly when 
our sample is further partitioned into super-sector classifications (ICB level 2 – Panel B), 
Industrial Goods & Services (17.67 %) and Technology (12.60 %) are the largest super-
sectors in our sample. All other remaining super-sectors displayed proportions ranging from 
1.54 % to 7.07 %.  
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Table 22: Sample by industry compositions 
Industry compositions according to ICB classifications level 1 (Panel A) and according to ICB classifications 
level 2 (Panel B).  
A B 
ICB Industry Level 1 N % ICB Super-Sector Level 2 N % 
Basic Materials 55 8.45 Automobiles & Parts 19 2.92 
Consumer Goods 78 11.98 Banks 31 4.76 
Consumer Services 82 12.60 Basic Resources 22 3.38 
Financials 125 19.20 Chemicals 33 5.07 
Health Care 46 7.07 Construction & Material 24 3.69 
Industrials 139 21.35 Financial Services 34 5.22 
Oil & Gas 10 1.54 Food & Beverage 20 3.07 
Technology 82 12.60 Healthcare 46 7.07 
Telecommunications 16 2.46 Industrial Goods & Services 115 17.67 
Utilities 18 2.76 Insurance 20 3.07 
   Media 41 6.30 
Total 651 100 Oil & Gas 10 1.54 
   Personal & Household Goods 39 5.99 
   Real Estate 40 6.14 
   Retail 17 2.61 
   Technology 82 12.60 
   Telecommunications 16 2.46 
   Travel & Leisure 24 3.69 
   Utilities 18 2.76 
      
   Total 651 100 
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5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Estimation of event study  
We use standard event-study methodology to estimate the stock market reaction (partitioned 
according to industry and underlying super-sector) to announcements of firms’ inclusion in 
the FTSE4Good Global Index. Our estimation period to calculate ‘normal’ returns is 249 days 
preceding the event (from ݐ ൌ 0), with an additional 12 days buffer to ensure our calculation 
of normal returns are not contaminated with the event of interest (effectively –260 to –12, see 
Figure 5), for example due to insider trading.  
Our event window is defined as two days preceding and following the announcement date (–2 
to +2) which is similar to studies such as (Faccio et al., 2006). We select a short event 
window to ensure abnormal returns captured are focused on the impact of the event, while 
minimising the influence of other noise. Moreover, our event window length is particularly 
suitable for our multi-country sample, given that different time zones can impact the date on 
which information is reflected in stock prices (Campbell et al., 2010).  
 
Figure 5: Illustration of the time frame of our event study 
  
 –260                              –12          –2              0            +2
Estimation window
Buffer
Event window 
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In addition, our event window is within the period in which all confounding events (with an 
additional one day extra on either side) were eliminated to the best of our abilities, giving the 
study further legitimacy with regards to any abnormal returns detected (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Illustration of removal of confounding event period relative to the event window 
period 
To calculate abnormal returns, we employ the market model as our basis of ‘normal returns’. 
While there are more complex models available in determining this return (for instance,     
Fama and French, 1992 three factor model; and Carhart, 1997 four factor model), the gains 
from employing additional explanatory variables beyond the market factor are small 
(Campbell and Andrew, 1997). 
Thus using the market model, we define abnormal returns as the difference between the 
observed return of firm ݅ and the expected return predicted by the benchmark model. 
Formally: 
ܴ௜௧ 	ൌ 	 ∝௜	൅	ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ 	൅	ߝ௜௧						ݐ	 ൌ 	െ260… . . , െ12 
and 
ܣܴ௜௧ 	ൌ 	ܴ௜௧ 	െ 	∝௜	െ 	ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ 
 –3    –2    –1        0        +1         +2          +3
Event window 
Removal of confounding 
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Where 
ܣܴ௜௧ = abnormal return of firm  ݅ on day ݐ 
ܴ௜௧ = observed return of firm ݅ on day ݐ 
∝௜ = market model intercept, estimated by OLS based on the estimation period 
(–260 to –12) 
ߚ௜ = slope, estimated by OLS based on the estimation period (–260 to –12) 
ܴ௠௧ = observed return on the appropriate MSCI country market index on day  ݐ 
As our sample of firms spans 24 countries, we apply the appropriate country index from the 
family of MSCI country indices. This is to ensure our calculation of ‘normal returns’ is 
controlled for on a country-by-country basis. By the same token our results are robust to more 
than one benchmark index, while avoiding the bias that may result from using one single 
global or otherwise benchmark.  
5.3.2 Test statistics  
To test the significance of abnormal returns, we follow Patell (1976) and standardise 
abnormal returns on the event day ܧ by the square root of the estimation period return 
variance ߪො௜, with an additional adjustment for forecasting error.  
ܵܣܴ௜ா 	ൌ 	ܣܴ௜ா	 	቎ߪො௜	ඨ1	 ൅	 1௜ܶ 	൅ 	
ሺܴ௠ா 	െ 	 തܴ௠ሻଶ
∑ ሺܴ௠௧ 	െ 	 തܴ௠ሻଶ௅௜௠	ୀ	ଵ ቏൘  
Where: 
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 ܵܣܴ௜ா = standardised abnormal return of firm ݅ on event day ܧ 
௜ܶ = number of days in firm ݅‘s estimation period (249 days) 
തܴ௠ = average market return during the estimation period 
 
Cumulative standardised abnormal returns (CSAR) are averaged across five different event 
windows as follows: (0), (0, +1), (–1, +1), (–2, +2), and lastly (–5, +5).  
To test the significance of CSAR we use three standard test statistics commonly found in the 
event study literature. Each test statistic is chosen based on their econometric advantages: the 
Patell (1976) t-test accounts for the event period residuals being calculated based on an out-
of-sample prediction, and in addition controls for heteroscedasticity; the Boehmer et al. 
(1991) t-test is unaffected by event clustering and allows for event-induced variance; and the 
Wilcoxon signed rank z-test is robust to the effects of outliers.  
5.3.3 Consumer sensitivity classification  
As discussed in the previous section, a firm’s ability to gain positive benefits from CSR 
engagement is likely affected by the purchasing decisions of their ultimate consumer. Thus 
we partition our sample into two categories: firms where the principal customer is the end 
consumer and firms where the principal customer is industry.  
Due to the aggregate nature of industry classifications (that is, classifications based on ICB – 
level 1) attempts to accurately categorise firms at the industry level become problematic, as 
industry groups may be too noisy to permit a thorough analysis of the ‘consumer effect’. One 
example of this aggregate issue is of the Financial industry (ICB code 8000) which is the sub-
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sector aggregate of 22 possible other sub-sectors: Banks (ICB code 8355), Life Insurance 
(ICB code 8575), Consumer Finance (ICB code 8773), Asset Managers (ICB code 8771), 
Real Estate Services (ICB code 8367), and Retail REITS (ICB code 8672) to only name a 
few. Each sub-sector can have varying sensitivity to the end consumer; for instance Banks - 
defined by ICB as “providing a broad range of financial services, including retail banking, 
loans and money transmissions” - will have greater sensitivity to the end consumer; while in 
contrast the products and services of the Asset Manager - defined by ICB as “provid[ing] 
custodial, trustee and other related fiduciary services, including mutual fund management 
companies” - are largely orientated to industries serving other industries.  
Thus we classify our sample further into their sub-sector group – ICB level 4. This last step 
results in over 100 sub-sector classifications. To categorise these into ‘consumer sector 
group’ or ‘industry sector group’ we undertake the following steps:  
Step 1:   
Following the same rationale as Lev et al. (2010) we automatically categorise all sub-sectors 
under the Consumer Goods industry (ICB code 3000), Consumer Services industry (ICB code 
5000) and Health Care industry (ICB code 4000)63 into the ‘consumer sector group’. In 
addition, we classify all sub-sectors under the Industrials industry (ICB code 2000), Utilities 
industry (ICB code 7000), Basic Materials industry (ICB code 1000), and Technology 
                                                            
63 Specifically Lev (2010) classifies all firms under Finance and Consumer Goods into the ‘high customer 
sensitive’ category, while all other industries (namely Basic Industrials, Capital Goods, Construction, Energy, 
Transportation, and Utilities) are categorised as ‘low customer sensitive’. In addition, we consider Hoepner et al. 
(2010) findings that only two industries (out of the 10 investigated) - Consumer Discretionary and Health Care - 
was found to experience positive CSR effects to CFP; an outcome concluded to be associated with the industries 
high proximity to the end consumer.  
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Industry (ICB code 9000) as low consumer sensitive64, and therefore belong to the ‘industry 
sector group’. The first step in this process automatically categorises 454 firms, leaving 197 
firms (or 47 sub-sectors) remaining.  
Step 2:   
For all remaining sub-sectors, we use ICB definitions to gain information on the primary 
goods or services provided. ICB categorises companies according to their primary source of 
revenue, which ensures accurate classification and definition. Using these definitions we 
classify the remaining sub-sectors into their appropriate groups.  
Step 3:   
For robustness, we randomly check 10 firms from each of the 10 possible industry groups 
(ICB level 1), and evaluate the accuracy of our classification process using financial reports 
then websites in that order. For instance, financial reports can reveal the source of the 
majority of sales (either to the end consumer or to largely businesses/wholesalers), while the 
company’s website can indicate the principal target consumer.  
                                                            
64 From this automatic categorisation in step 1, the following sub-sectors are instead classified to the ‘consumer 
sector group’: Paper (many products from this sub-sector are consumer related; for instance newsprint, wrapping 
paper, facial tissue, etc.), Delivery Services (including Deutsche Post and United Parcel), and Business and 
Training Employment (companies primarily providing services for job seekers i.e. end consumers). In addition 
due to their positive associations with enhancing the environment and sustainable consumption, we further 
classify Alternative Electricity (defined by ICB as “companies generating and distributing electricity from a 
renewable source, [including] companies that produce solar, water, wind and geothermal electricity”) and 
Renewable Energy Equipment (defined by ICB as “companies that develop or manufacture renewable energy 
equipment utilizing sources such as solar, wind, tidal, geothermal, hydro and waves”) to the ‘consumer sector 
group’.  
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Table 23 provides a sample of ICB definitions used in step 3, Appendix 4 provides the full 
list of ICB sub-sector definitions, while Figure 7 summarises our consumer sensitivity 
methodology.    
Table 23: Sample of ICB definitions and classification outcome  
Provides a sample of ICB definitions and the corresponding classification outcome.  
Sub-sector               
(ICB level 4) 
ICB definition  
 
Classification 
decision 
Commodity 
Chemicals (Basic 
Materials)  
Producers and distributors of simple chemical products that are primarily 
used to formulate more complex chemicals or products, including plastics 
and rubber in their raw form, fiberglass and synthetic fibres. 
Industry sector 
group 
Business Support 
Services 
(Industrials) 
Providers of nonfinancial services to a wide range of industrial enterprises 
and governments. Includes providers of printing services, management 
consultants, office cleaning services, and companies that install, service and 
monitor alarm and security systems. 
Industry sector 
group 
Asset Manager 
(Financials)  
Companies that provide custodial, trustee and other related fiduciary 
services. Includes mutual fund management companies. 
Industry sector 
group 
Banks (Financials) Banks providing a broad range of financial services, including retail banking, 
loans and money transmissions. 
Consumer 
sector group 
Health Care 
Providers (Health 
Care) 
Owners and operators of health maintenance organizations, hospitals, clinics, 
dentists, opticians, nursing homes, rehabilitation and retirement centres. 
Excludes veterinary services, which are classified under Specialised 
Consumer Services. 
Consumer 
sector group 
 
          210 
 
 
Figure 7: Summary of classification process 
We categorise our sample into ‘consumer sector group’ or ‘industry sector group’ via steps 1 and 2. Step 1 
automatically categorises our sub-sectors under the industry headings of Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, 
Health Care, Industrials, Utilities, Basic Materials and Technology. Step 2 categorises the remaining sub-sectors 
according to ICB sub-sector definitions. Step 3 is the robustness check of our classification process, achieved 
first through an evaluation of the company’s financial reports and then an examination of its website.   
 
Following this classification methodology results in 298 firms in the ‘consumer sector group’ 
and 353 firms in the ‘industry sector group’. Based on this methodology, and for our 
subsequent regression analysis, we construct the ‘industry sector group’ dummy variable 
defined as equal to one if firms are categorised as ‘industry sector group’, or otherwise zero 
for all remaining firms (that is, categorised as ‘consumer sector group’). Tables 33 and 34 
(reported under Appendix 4) provides the full list of sub-sectors plus definitions according to 
each aforementioned key group, while Table 24 provides this same list according to sub-
sector heading only.   
  
Consumer Goods, 
Consumer Services 
and Health Care 
Industrials, Utilities, 
Basic Materials and 
Technology  
Remaining 
subsectors use ICB 
definitions 
Consumer Sector Group 
Industry Sector Group 
Following Lev (2010) 
Following Lev (2010) 
Robustness 
Check Step 1 
Step 2 
 Step 3
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Table 24: List of subsectors under the ‘consumer sector group’ or ‘industry sector group’ 
This table presents our subsectors (ICB level 4) divided into either ‘consumer sector group’ – those primarily 
serving individual consumers, or ‘industry sector group’ – those primarily serving industry customers.  
Consumer group – ICB level 4 Industry group – ICB level 4 
Airlines Aerospace 
Alternative Electricity Asset Managers 
Apparel Retailers Auto Parts 
Automobiles Building Materials & Fixtures 
Auto Parts  Business Support Services 
Banks Commercial Vehicles & Trucks 
Biotechnology Commodity Chemicals 
Brewers Computer Hardware 
Broadcasting & Entertainment Computer Services 
Broadline Retailers Containers & Packaging 
Business Training & Employment Agencies Conventional Electricity 
Clothing & Accessories Diversified Industrials 
Consumer Electronics Diversified REITs 
Consumer Finance Electrical Components & Equipment 
Delivery Services Electronic Equipment 
Drug Retailers Electronic Office Equipment 
Durable Household Products Equity Investment Instruments 
Farming, Fishing & Plantations Exploration & Production 
Food Products Financial Administration 
Food Retailers & Wholesalers Fixed Line Telecommunications 
Footwear Gas Distribution 
Full Line Insurance General Mining 
Furnishings Heavy Construction 
Gambling Industrial & Office REITs 
Health Care Providers Industrial Machinery 
Home Construction Industrial Suppliers 
Internet Integrated Oil & Gas 
Investment Services Iron & Steel 
Life Insurance Marine Transportation 
Media Agencies Mobile Telecommunications 
Medical Equipment Multi-utilities 
Medical Supplies Nonferrous Metals 
Nondurable Household Products Oil Equipment & Services 
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Paper Pipelines 
Personal Products Railroads 
Pharmaceuticals Residential REITs 
Property & Casualty Insurance Retail REITs 
Publishing Semiconductors 
Real Estate Holding & Development Software 
Real Estate Services Specialty Chemicals 
Recreational Products Specialty Finance 
Recreational Services Specialty REITs 
Renewable Energy Equipment Telecommunications Equipment 
Restaurants & Bars Transportation Services 
Soft Drinks Trucking 
Specialized Consumer Services Water 
Specialty Retailers 
Tires 
Toys  
Travel & Tourism 
  
 
5.3.4 Empirical model 
For our subsequent regression analysis, we construct the Industry Sector Group dummy 
variable equal to 1 if firms are categorised as ‘low consumer sensitive’, otherwise zero for all 
remaining firms (that is, firms that are categorised as ‘high consumer sensitive’).   
Our hypothesis for this chapter is empirically tested by running stepwise OLS regression on 
various sets of control variables. Each control variable provides additional robustness to the 
Industry Sector Group dummy variable effect. The following equations via stepwise 
regression were performed: 
Equation 1 is a univariate regression of consumer sensitivity (Industry Sector Group) and the 
abnormal returns derived from the announcement effect of social index inclusion (5 DAY 
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CAR); Equation 2 includes firm level control variables of (Size), return on equity (ROE), 
asset turnover (Asset Turnover), leverage (Leverage), and to control for future growth 
opportunities the market-to-book ratio (MTB); Equation 3 includes our financial slack 
variables of capital expenditure (CAPEX), dividend payout (Payout), and cash holdings 
(Cash). All equations control for both country and year fix effects. Formally we estimate the 
following regression equations:  
5.3.4.1 Equation 5 
ܥܣܴ ൌ	∝ ൅	ߚଵܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܵ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ	ܩݎ݋ݑ݌	 ൅ ෍ ߜ௝ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ
ଵଷ
௝	ୀ	ଵ
൅ ෍ ߛ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ
ଽ
௧	ୀ	ଵ
														ሾ5ሿ	
       
5.3.4.2 Equation 6  
  
ܥܣܴ ൌ	∝ ൅	ߚଵܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܵ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ	ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅	ߚଶܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଷܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ൅ ߚସܴܱܧ
൅ ߚହܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ ൅ ߚ଺ܯܶܤ ൅ ෍ ߜ௝ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ
ଵଷ
௝	ୀ	ଵ
൅ ෍ ߛ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ
ଽ
௧	ୀ	ଵ
	ሾ6ሿ 
  
5.3.4.3 Equation 7  
ܥܣܴ ൌ	∝ ൅	ߚଵܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܵ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ	ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅	ߚଶܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଷܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ൅ ߚସܴܱܧ
൅ ߚହܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ ൅ ߚ଺ܯܶܤ ൅ ߚ଻ܥܣܲܧܺ ൅ ߚ଼ܲܽݕ݋ݑݐ
൅ ߚଽܥܽݏ݄	ܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ ൅ ෍ ߜ௝ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ
ଵଷ
௝	ୀ	ଵ
൅ ෍ ߛ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ
ଽ
௧	ୀ	ଵ
																							ሾ7ሿ 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Results across industries  
In this section we examine the results of employing event study analysis partitioned into 
industry group (ICB level 1), and then to achieve analysis of their underlying performances 
partitioned further at the super-sector level (ICB level 2).  
Our first analysis divides our sample into 10 industry groups; Basic Materials, Consumer 
Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, Oil and Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, and Utilities. The event study results partitioned accordingly are 
presented in Table 25.  
According to Table 25, the Health Care and Oil & Gas industries experience positive market 
reactions, albeit their level of significance can be considered weak; both industries only 
significant under the Boehmer t-test, and to only one event window each; the (–1,+1) and (–5, 
+5) respectively. In contrast, we find the Industrials, Technology, Telecommunications and 
Utilities Industries to experience negative market reactions. For similar reasons the Industries 
and Telecommunications industries can be considered ‘weak’, while the Technology and 
Utilities industries is significant across most event windows, as well as all three standard test-
statistics. Interpreting the economic significance of the latter two industries reveal 
Technology and Utilities, in the 2 days preceding and following the announcement date, to 
experience a market movement of -0.467 % and -0.930 % respectively. This represents a lost 
in market value of approximately USD $28.9 million and USD $89.0 million on average per 
firm in each respective industry.  
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Table 25: Event study results partitioned into industry classifications – ICB level 1 
This table presents event study results partitioned into industry classifications (ICB classifications – level 1). N represents the number of firms for each industry. CAR is cumulative abnormal 
return over 5 days. Three standard test of significance were applied; the t-statistics of (Patell, 1976) and (Boehmer et al., 1991), and the z-statistic of the Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
   Patell t-test Boehmer t-test Wilcoxon z-test 
Industry N CAR 
(%) 
0 0, +1 –1, +1 –2, +2 –5, +5 0 0, +1 –1, +1 –2, +2 –5, +5 0 0, +1 –1, +1 –2, +2 –5, +5 
Basic 
Materials 
55 0.656 0.38 1.26 0.89 –0.42 0.07 0.43 1.46 1.06 –0.42 0.07 0.44 1.47 0.83 –0.93 –0.07 
Consumer 
Goods 
78 0.515 0.40 1.28 1.46 0.16 1.41 0.39 1.31 1.34 0.16 1.45 0.16 1.15 1.17 –0.05 1.22 
Consumer 
Services 
82 -0.371 -0.31 -0.08 -0.56 -0.91 -0.87 -0.42 -0.09 -0.62 -0.98 -0.88 -1.20 -0.34 -1.29 -1.06 -1.02 
Financials 125 -0.013 0.29 -1.16 -0.81 -0.31 1.59 0.30 -1.34 -0.80 -0.32 1.49 0.24 -0.94 -0.95 -0.48 1.52 
Health Care 46 0.457 1.39 1.25 1.43 0.48 0.90 1.39 1.38 1.85* 0.63 0.97 0.69 1.31 1.60 0.28 0.69 
Industrials 139 -0.294 –0.70 –2.76*** –1.26 –1.83* –1.72* –0.74 –1.32 –0.69 –0.90 –1.13 –0.77 –0.95 0.21 0.43 –0.54 
Oil & Gas 10 0.816 0.53 0.03 0.34 0.25 1.63 0.72 0.07 0.67 0.41 1.83* 0.46 0.25 1.58 –0.25 0.97 
Technology 82 -0.467 -1.34 -1.34 -1.25 -2.07** -2.67*** -1.76* -1.64 -1.58 -2.66*** -2.85*** -2.26** -2.20** -2.16** -2.85*** -2.91*** 
Telecommu
nications 
16 -0.527 –1.34 –0.75 –0.12 –0.58 0.51 –2.32** –0.94 –0.11 –0.49 0.60 –2.33** –1.45 –0.16 –1.09 0.00 
Utilities 18 -0.930 –1.65* –0.96 –1.42 –2.01** –1.53 –3.56*** –1.43 –2.04** –2.87* –1.80* –2.50** –1.55 –2.20** –2.37** –1.85** 
Total 651                 
* Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level 
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Table 26: Event study results (via Patell t-test) partitioned into super sectors – ICB level 2  
This table presents event study results partitioned into super sectors – ICB level 2. N represents the number of 
firms for each industry. The t-statistic of (Patell, 1976) is reported in this table.  
  Patell t-test 
Industry classification N 0 0, +1 –1, +1 –2, +2 –5, +5 
Automobiles & Parts 19 -0.32 0.21 0.73 -0.18 1.18 
Banks 31 2.17** 0.62 0.65 1.02 1.75* 
Basic Resources 22 -0.22 1.12 1.17 0.08 1.05 
Chemicals 33 0.67 0.71 0.20 -0.60 -0.77 
Construct. & Material 24 -1.52 -1.02 -0.18 0.27 -0.68 
Financial Services 34 -2.55** -1.59 -1.44 -1.21 0.51 
Food & Beverage 20 0.46 1.70* 1.71* 1.17 0.39 
Healthcare 46 1.39 1.25 1.43 0.48 0.90 
Industrial Goods & 115 -0.08 -2.56** -1.31 -2.14** -1.57 
Insurance 20 -1.08 -1.17 0.36 -0.34 -1.00 
Media 41 0.22 0.15 -0.58 -0.63 -0.48 
Oil & Gas 10 0.53 0.03 0.34 0.25 1.63 
Personal & Household 39 0.45 0.46 0.34 -0.48 0.89 
Real Estate 40 1.72* -0.31 -0.94 -0.09 1.51 
Retail 17 -1.31 -1.33 -0.42 -1.05 -0.84 
Technology 82 -1.34 -1.34 -1.25 -2.07** -2.67*** 
Telecommunications 16 -1.34 -0.75 -0.12 -0.58 0.51 
Travel & Leisure 24 0.24 0.77 0.08 0.02 -0.28 
Utilities 18 -1.65* -0.96 -1.42 -2.01** -1.53 
       
Total  651      
* Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level 
 
As these results are largely aggregate in nature, and in order to understand further the 
underlying drivers of these results, we partition further our sample to their super-sector group 
(ICB level 2). This level of classification partitions our sample into 19 super-sectors; 
Automobiles & Parts, Banks, Basic Resources, Chemicals, Construction & Materials, 
Financial Services, Food & Beverage, Healthcare, Industrial Goods & Services, Insurance, 
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Media, Oil & Gas, Personal & Household Goods, Real Estate, Retail, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Travel & Leisure, and Utilities.  
Due to the obviously greater number of sector groups involved in this analysis, we present the 
event study results for this next section according to each of the three standard test statistics 
used in this chapter: the t-statistic of Patell (1976) in Table 26 and Boehmer et al. (1991) in 
Table 27; and the z-statistic of the Wilcoxon sign-rank test in Table 28. 
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Table 27: Event study results (via Boehmer t-test) partitioned into super sectors – ICB level 2 
This table presents event study results partitioned into super sectors – ICB level 2.  N represents the number of 
firms for each industry. The t-statistic of Boehmer et al. (1991) is reported in this table.  
  Boehmer t-test 
Industry classification N 0 0, +1 –1, +1 –2, +2 –5, +5 
Automobiles & Parts 19 -0.25 0.20 0.57 -0.15 1.07 
Banks 31 2.40** 0.68 0.65 1.05 1.37 
Basic Resources 22 -0.26 1.57 1.39 0.07 0.97 
Chemicals 33 0.73 0.74 0.24 -0.64 -0.88 
Construct. & Material 24 -1.14 -1.00 -0.15 0.24 -0.63 
Financial Services 34 -3.11*** -2.22** -1.69* -1.41 0.47 
Food & Beverage 20 0.69 1.80* 1.80* 1.44 0.45 
Healthcare 46 1.39 1.38 1.85* 0.63 0.97 
Industrial Goods & 115 -0.09 -1.13 -0.68 -0.98 -0.98 
Insurance 20 -1.39 -1.22 0.33 -0.32 -0.92 
Media 41 0.37 0.22 -0.84 -0.76 -0.53 
Oil & Gas 10 0.72 0.07 0.67 0.41 1.83* 
Personal & Household 39 0.42 0.46 0.31 -0.52 0.91 
Real Estate 40 1.57 -0.35 -0.84 -0.10 1.85* 
Retail 17 -2.21** -1.47 -0.55 -1.20 -0.92 
Technology 82 -1.76* -1.64 -1.58 -2.66*** -2.85*** 
Telecommunications 16 -2.32** -0.94 -0.11 -0.49 0.60 
Travel & Leisure 24 0.24 0.64 0.06 0.02 -0.24 
Utilities 18 -3.56*** -1.43 -2.04** -2.87*** -1.80* 
       
Total 651      
* Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level 
 
From Table 26, 27 and 28, we report the following super-sector groups: Banks, Basic 
Resources, Food & Beverage, Health Care, and Real Estate to experience significant and 
positive market reactions. While in contrast the Financial Services, Industrial Goods & 
Services, Retail, and Technology super-sectors to experience significant negative market 
reactions. 
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Table 28: Event study results (via Wilcoxon sign rank test) partitioned into super sectors - ICB 
level 2 
This table presents event study results partitioned into super sectors – ICB level 2.  N represents the number of 
firms for each industry. The z-statistic of the Wilcoxon signed test is reported in this table.  
  Wilcoxon z-test 
Industry classification N 0 0, +1 –1, +1 –2, +2 –5, +5 
Automobiles & Parts 19 -0.68 -0.12 0.28 -0.16 0.56 
Banks 31 2.14** 0.74 -0.27 0.16 0.84 
Basic Resources 22 -1.06 1.67* 1.35 0.24 1.15 
Chemicals 33 1.26 0.54 -0.28 -1.38 -1.13 
Construct. & Material 24 -0.34 -0.77 -0.31 0.60 -0.60 
Financial Services 34 -2.69*** -1.58 -1.63 -1.12 0.52 
Food & Beverage 20 0.75 1.34 1.42 1.05 1.19 
Healthcare 46 0.69 1.31 1.60 0.28 0.69 
Industrial Goods & 115 -0.70 -0.65 0.35 0.21 -0.33 
Insurance 20 -1.31 -0.75 0.86 -0.15 -0.93 
Media 41 0.23 0.24 -0.84 -0.84 -0.65 
Oil & Gas 10 0.46 0.25 1.58 -0.25 0.97 
Personal & Household 39 0.35 0.66 0.42 -0.77 0.89 
Real Estate 40 1.87* -0.46 -0.66 0.27 2.00** 
Retail 17 -2.49** -1.44 -0.83 -1.25 -1.44 
Technology 82 -2.26** -2.20** -2.16** -2.85*** -2.91*** 
Telecommunications 16 -2.33** -1.45 -0.16 -1.09 0.00 
Travel & Leisure 24 0.06 0.49 -0.51 -0.06 -0.14 
Utilities 18 -2.50** -1.55 -2.20** -2.37** -1.85* 
       
Total 651      
* Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level 
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Table 29: Summary of event study results – across industry and super-sectors 
Where N denotes sample size employed in event study, ‘weak’ indicates two or less observations of significant test statistics, dashes (–) represent non-significant results, and CAR is the 
cumulative abnormal return over 5 days 
Industry – ICB level 1 N Direction and significance CAR % Super-sectors – ICB level 2 N Direction and significance  CAR % 
Basic Materials  55  – (0.656) Basic Resources 22 Positive and significant (weak) (0.948) 
   Chemicals 33 – (0.462) 
Consumer Goods 78 – (0.515) Automobiles & Parts 19 – (0.288) 
   Food & Beverage 20 Positive and significant  (0.981) 
   Personal & House hold Goods 39 – (0.386) 
Consumer Services  82 – (-0.371) Media 41 – (-0.439) 
   Retail 17 Negative and significant (weak)  (-0.504) 
   Travel & Leisure 24 – (-0.161) 
Financials  125 – (-0.013) Banks 31 Positive and significant (0.516) 
   Financial Services 34 Negative and significant (-0.379) 
   Insurance 20 – (-0.529) 
   Real Estate 40 Positive and significant  (0.145) 
Healthcare 46 Positive and significant (weak) (0.457) Healthcare 46 Positive and significant (weak) (0.457) 
    - Health Care Equipment & Services (level 3) [18] – (0.186) 
    - Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology (level 3) [28] Positive and significant (0.632) 
Industrials 139 Negative and significant (-0.294) Construction & Material 24 – (-0.401) 
   Industrial Goods & Services 115 Negative and significant (weak)  (-0.272) 
Oil & Gas  10 Positive and significant (weak) (0.816) Sample size too small for sector analysis 10   
Technology 82 Negative and significant (-0.467) Technology  82 Negative and significant  (-0.467) 
    - Software & Computer Services (level 3) [45] Negative and significant (-0.239) 
    -Technology Hardware & Equipment (level 3)  [37] Negative and significant (-0.746) 
Telecommunications  16 Negative and significant (weak) (-0.527) Sample size too small for sector analysis 16   
Utilities 18 Negative and significant (-0.930) Sample size too small for sector analysis 18   
        
Total 651   Total 651  
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Table 29 provides a summary of our results for this section. In particularly we contrast results at the 
industry level (ICB-level 1) with their underlying performances at the super-sector level (ICB - level 
2). Due to the varying degrees of statistical strength, we further identify industries/super-
sectors/or sectors with ‘weak’ significance as those with 2 or less observations of significant 
event windows. 
Table 29 reveals industry results are driven to some degree by their underlying super-sector 
performances. For instance, the significant and negative abnormal returns of Industrials (ICB 
2000 – level 1) can be explained in some part by the negative effects of Industrial Goods & 
Services – significant but weak –  (ICB 2700 – level 2), rather than the non-significant effects 
experienced by the Construction & Materials (ICB 2350 – level 2) super-sector. 
Analysing the super-sector level becomes particularly advantageous because it reveals 
underlying performances that may have been masked by their larger aggregate group. For 
instance, while Consumer Services (ICB 5000 – level 1) experienced non-significant 
abnormal returns, the underlying Retail (ICB 5300 – level 2) super-sector experienced 
significant (but weak) negative abnormal returns. All other underlying super-sectors of Media 
(ICB 5500 – level 2) and Travel and Leisure (ICB 5700 – level 2) was consistent with their 
aggregate industry group. Further, the non-significant abnormal returns of Financials (ICB 
8000 – level 1) can be explained by the mixed results experienced by their underlying super-
sectors; for instance the positive and significant abnormal returns of Banks (ICB 8300 – level 
2) and Real Estate (ICB 8600 – level 2), and the negative abnormal returns of Financial 
Services (ICB 8700 – level 2). Finally while Consumer Goods (ICB 3000 – level 1) 
experienced non-significant abnormal returns, the underlying Food & Beverage (ICB 3500 – 
level 2) experienced significant and positive abnormal returns. All other remaining 
underlying super-sectors to this industry group; Automobiles and Parts (ICB 3300 – level 2) 
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and Personal and Household Goods (ICB 3700 – level 2) was consistent with their aggregate 
performance.    
As the industry group of Technology (ICB 9000 – level 1) is ultimately the same group at 
their super-sector level (that is, ‘Technology’ at ICB level 1 is the same group of firms as 
‘Technology’ at ICB level 2), we partition their sector classifications one level further (ICB – 
level 3). This divides ‘Technology’ into smaller sectors groups, consequently revealing 
negative results at the aggregate level are driven by both Software & Computer Services (ICB 
9530 – level 3) and Technology Hardware & Equipment (ICB 9570 – level 3).  
Under a similar rationale, Health Care (ICB 4000 – level 1) is further partitioned into sector 
classifications. This reveals the positive abnormal performance at the aggregate level are 
attributed mostly to the Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology sector (ICB 4570 – level 3), 
despite the non-significant effects of Health Care Equipment & Services (ICB 4530 – level 
3).   
For all other industries where industry and super-sector groups are identical, an analysis at the 
higher sector level of classification is not undertaken due to the restrictions of sample sizes, 
namely the industries of Oil & Gas (n = 10), Telecommunications (n = 16) and the Utilities 
(n = 18).  
We end this section with a brief discussion on the economic interpretation of the underlying 
super-sectors/sectors. The largest significant movement in market value is experienced by 
Food & Beverage of 0.981 % (median 0.576 %), while the lowest market movement is 
experienced by Technology Hardware and Equipment of –0.746 % (median –0.532 %). These 
figures in their respective super-sectors/sectors represent a gain in market value of USD 
$126.2 million and a lost in market value of USD $58.6 million on average per firm. Given 
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that both industries can represent the varying extremes of consumer sensitivity (high 
consumer perception - Food & Beverage, and low consumer perception - Technology 
Hardware and Equipment), our results in this section can be treated as a prelude to the effects 
of consumer sensitivity. In the next section we formally test this hypothesis.  
5.4.2 Univariate test 
Table 30 provides the results of the univariate test based on the full sample (that is the 
uncategorised sample of firms) partitioned into either the ‘consumer sector group’ or 
‘industry sector group’. We report mean figures for 5-DAY CAR (cumulative abnormal 
returns over five days) and mean figures for firm-level characteristics across each group. 
Testing the differences of the means reveals the ‘consumer sector group’ relative to the 
‘industry sector group’ has significantly higher size, lower leverage, higher payout, and 
higher asset turnover65, and in particular relation to this chapter higher abnormal returns.  
This latter result is consistent with prior research (for example, Curcio and Wolf, 1996; 
Hoepner, 2010; Lev et al., 2010), and our earlier developed hypothesis; in which consumer 
orientated industries (consumer sector group) will have higher abnormal returns compared to 
their non-consumer orientated counterparts (that is the industry sector group). Further, while 
the mean abnormal return for the former group was positive (+0.4 %), the latter group 
recorded in contrast negative abnormal returns (–0.9 %). Differences in mean abnormal 
returns between the two sector groups are significant at the 1 % level.  
  
                                                            
65 Note: we do have hypotheses in relation to consumer sensitivity to confirm these results.  
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Table 30:  Results of univariate test of firm characteristics between the ‘consumer sector group’ 
and ‘industry sector group’ 
This table provides mean figures of firm-level characteristics, presented first at the full sample (n = 651) and 
then partitioned further into either the ‘consumer sector group’ (n = 298) or ‘industry sector group’ (n = 353) 
classification. 5-DAY CAR are cumulative abnormal returns surrounding market reaction to firm inclusion to 
the FTSE4Good Global index. Test of the differences are based on a two-tailed t-test and a Wilcoxon sign rank 
test. Please refer to table 20 for firm variable definitions.  
 
Full sample 
(n = 651)  
Consumer 
sector group 
(n = 298) 
Industry sector 
group 
(n = 353) 
 Test of the difference 
Mean Mean Mean 
 
t-stat 
Wilcoxon      
(p-value) 
5-DAY CAR –0.001 0.004 -0.009  2.925*** 0.009*** 
SIZE 9.171 9.687 8.919  3.291*** 0.001*** 
LEVERAGE 0.257 0.241 0.272  -1.987** 0.011** 
ROE 17.031 26.316 8.966  0.378 0.642 
PAYOUT 0.365 0.353 0.362  0.961 0.023** 
CASH  0.140 0.144 0.135  0.501 0.556 
ASSET TURNOVER  0.850 0.833 0.843  0.865 0.011** 
GROWTH 0.126 0.132 0.119  0.559 0.320 
*Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level.  
 
5.4.3 OLS regression results 
In this section we examine whether consumer sensitivity mediates the relationship between 
market reaction and announcements of CSR commitment. In particular we investigate the 
explanatory power of the Industry Sector Group dummy variable via stepwise OLS analysis, 
first as a univariate regression (Equation 1), and then with the inclusion of firm level control 
variables (Equation 2) and our measures of slack resources (Equation 3). All regressions 
presented are robust for country and time-series effects, while the f-statistic is statistically 
significant – thus indicating all equations and their collective variables are appropriate in 
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explaining the cross-sectional determinants of CAR. Finally we correct standard errors (and 
their associated p-values) for heteroskedasticity using the Newey and West (1987) 
adjustment. We note results are largely unchanged from their OLS estimates.  
Table 31: OLS regression results – Equation 1,2 and 3 
This table presents the results of our stepwise OLS estimates of Equations 5, 6 and 7 on 5-DAY CAR 
surrounding announcement of inclusion to the FTSE4Good Global index. Equation 5 is a univariate regression 
of the ‘industry sector group’ dummy variable; Equation 6 includes firm-level control variables of size, ROE, 
asset turnover, leverage and MTB; Equation 7 considers our financial slack variables of CAPEX, PAYOUT and 
cash holdings. All equations control for both country and year fix effects. We present t-statistics derived from 
standard OLS estimates, while corresponding p-values (in parenthesis) are derived from Newey and West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  
 Equation 5  Equation 6  Equation 7 
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
CONSTANT 0.021 1.682(***)  -0.011 -0.518  0.015 0.810 
SIZE    0.003 2.017(**)  0.000 0.261 
LEVERAGE    -0.003 -0.288  -0.015 -1.463 
ROE    0.000 0.042  0.000 0.820 
ASSET TURNOVER    0.000 -0.094  0.000 -0.202 
MTB    0.000 0.154  0.000 0.764 
CAPEX       0.002 0.060 
PAYOUT       -0.002 -2.012(***) 
CASH       -0.020 -1.264 
INDUSTRY 
SECTOR GROUP 
-0.009 -2.028(**)  -0.007 -1.722(**)  -0.007 -2.021(**) 
         
         
Country-fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Time-fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 655   586   453  
F-statistic 2.451   2.328   1.983  
Adj. R2 0.048   0.060   0.063  
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level  
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From Table 31 we report the Industry Sector Group dummy variable to be statistically 
significant across all stepwise cross-sectional regressions. Further our firm level control 
variables of Size and Payout are found to be statistically significant. All other firm-level 
explanatory variables, and measures of financial slack are – in contrast to previous findings 
and prepositions in the literature – reported to be non-significant. We report these results in 
turn.  
Our principal variable Industry Sector Group is found to have a significant and negative 
relationship with CSR commitment (about 0.7 % in Equation 6 and 7). In other words, firms 
classified as low sensitivity to the end consumer are punished by the market for their choice 
to commit to CSR. This result is consistent with our formalised hypothesis, in which CSR 
engaged in industries primarily serving other industries - including Industrials, Utilities, and 
Basic Materials - are not able to attain the same consumer related benefits, and thus are 
associated with negative market reactions to announcements of CSR commitment. 
Moreover our results are consistent with studies that show CSR effects to CFP are influenced 
to a significant degree by an industry’s high proximity to the end consumer (Hoepner et al., 
2010); industries primarily providing non-consumer products (Hung and Wang, 2014); or 
industries with high consumer perception, defined as producing goods or services primarily 
for the individual consumer (Lev et al., 2010). Further we lend evidence to CSR prevalence in 
industries with greater competition (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2004; Fernández‐Kranz and 
Santaló, 2010), or advertising intensity (Fisman et al., 2005) – both analogous to industries 
with high consumer contact. Overall our results can be interpreted as evidence industries with 
low consumer sensitivity to benefit most from the contrary choice of corporate social 
irresponsibility, or at least the absence of CSR.  
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We find Size in Equation 6 to be positive and significant. Thus we find consistent with the 
literature, shareholders in larger firms perceive CSR commitment as a value increasing 
activity (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; Doh et al., 2010). Our result is aligned with the 
notion that larger firms are better able to participate in CSR and thus maximise value from 
such an engagement (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012). Moreover due to their greater visibility 
and market presence, which is synonymous with greater political pressures and public 
scrutiny – all of which increases with firm size - can lead these firms to be more inclined to 
participate in CSR (Roberts, 1992; Doh et al., 2010). For instance larger firms who engage in 
social programs will face less risks related to costly government intervention, and non-
compliance cost and fines (Adams and Hardwick, 1998). We note, however, despite having 
the correct sign our Size variable in Equation 7 loses its statistical significance once we 
control for financial slack.   
From Equation 7, we report dividend Payout to be negative and significant to CSR 
commitment.  Our results thus support the premise that investors care about dividend yields, 
as CSR can be perceived as a subtraction from future dividend income. Indeed corporate 
managers are more willing to increase dividends than decrease dividends, as the latter 
decision can provide negative signals about the future prospects of the firm (Lintner, 1956). 
In addition, as our coefficient for this variable is negative in sign, we provide results 
consistent with the notion that high-dividend firms (traditionally considered less financially 
constrained) represent greater financial constraints (as per Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 
1999; Kadapakkam et al., 1998). Thus like Surroca and Tribó (2009) we find firms with high-
dividend polices to impede the successful engagement of CSR.  
Collectively our explanatory variables, including firm-level control variables, and measures 
of financial slack (with the exception of Payout) have continued to remain insignificant, and 
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in some cases have lost their original statistical significance altogether (as in the case of the 
Size variable).  We highlight further, results, contrary to the current literature’s standing that 
firm size (Roberts, 1992; Doh et al., 2010), leverage (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; 
McGuire et al., 1988), profitability (Ullmann, 1985; McGuire et al., 1988; Adams and 
Hardwick, 1998; Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012), growth (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012; 
Bird et al., 2007), and slack resources (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Waddock and Graves, 
1997) are important explanatory variables to the CSR effect. We report in contrast, the 
Industry Sector Group dummy variable continues to be significant and negative. Thus, it 
appears the effects of consumer sensitivity are responsible for the majority of market reaction 
to CSR commitment. In other words, this chapter provides evidence consumer sensitivity can 
mediate to a large, even overarching extent, the relationship between CSP and CFP. 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Given the increasing public pressure on firms to engage in CSR activities, it is critical for 
existing research to be able to equip managers with an understanding on how CSR activities 
can be undertaken strategically. Following this line of motivation, our findings indicate 
corporate managers should implement more CSR in Banks, Real Estate, Food and Beverage, 
and the Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology sub-sectors. And less CSR in the sub-sectors of 
Financial Services, Software & Computer Services, Technology Hardware & Equipment, 
Telecommunications and Utilities as – all else being equal – this decision will increase firm 
value. Moreover we find firms with low consumer sensitivity – that is those firms who 
primarily serve industry customers (including Iron & Steel, Building Materials & Fixtures, 
Commercial Vehicles & Trucks, Industrial Supplies, Pipelines, Heavy Construction, and Rail 
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Roads to name a few) – will, as a consequence of their trading environment be punished by 
the market for their CSR activities.  
While our results are intuitive for academics and corporate managers, we stress caution to 
their interpretation due to a number of methodological issues. The first relates to statistical 
inferences from studies of small sample sizes. For instance in our event study, the industries 
of Telecommunications (n = 16), Oil & Gas (n = 10) and Utilities (n = 18) are characterised 
by small samples. A similar caution can be extended to our super-sector groups; for instance, 
Retail (n = 17), Health Care Equipment & Services (n = 18), and Basic Resources (n = 22). 
Despite these issues in samples sizes, our results stress the importance of assessing CSR 
value based on the context of each industry or sub-sector group. Future research can extend 
our analysis to larger datasets. 
Second, although our construction of Industry Sector Group is based on the rationale of pre-
existing literature (that is, Lev et al., 2010), the basis of our classification methodology is still 
inherently qualitative in nature. Thus evaluations of firms’ consumer sensitivity can be 
exposed to the subjective judgement of the researcher. Indeed while the author has attempted 
to employ more quantitative measures of consumer sensitivity (for example, those based on 
market concentration/differentiation – Herfindahl–Hirschman Index), we find due to the 
extensive global nature of our study, and the wide range of industries and sectors 
investigated, these proxies to be inaccurate and too noisy to differentiate high consumer 
perception from low consumer perception. A fruitful avenue for future research would see 
more robust methods (preferably quantitative) in classifying consumer sensitivity.  
Our OLS cross-sectional regression reveals firms that primarily serve industrial consumers 
are adversely affected by their choice to engage in CSR. In fact, the mediation effect of 
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consumer sensitivity continues to remain statistically significant, despite all other explanatory 
variables reported to be insignificant. This result is especially provocative given our 
conclusions in Chapter 4 about the importance of firm-level considerations to the CSP–CFP 
link. Moreover, if we overlook the potential heterogeneity effect of CSR across industries, 
our thesis may have concluded based on our earlier event study (Chapter 3) and cross-
sectional analyses (Chapter 4) that CSR engagement is largely a value-destroying exercise. 
With this negative effect more pronounced depending on a firm’s ability to afford social 
activities (high financial constraints versus low financial constraints) and the movements and 
trading behaviour of their institutional investors. Therefore we go beyond reporting an 
association between CSR and CFP, by identifying consumer sensitivity as the overarching 
mediating variable underlying CSP-CFP relationship.66 
In addition, this chapter highlights that while previous studies may have controlled for 
‘industry effects’ – which is the most popular control variable according to Margolis and 
Walsh (2001) – the vast majority of studies have only controlled for the industry effect on 
CFP, and not for the industry effect on the CSP–CFP relationship.67 These studies have 
therefore made the implicit assumption that the CSP–CFP relationship is homogeneous across 
industries (Hoepner et al., 2010). As our analysis in this chapter reveals to the contrary, 
previous studies based on multiple industry samples may need to be re-examined, or at least 
                                                            
66 In this chapter, while we find evidence the ‘industry sector group’ effect to explain the majority of our 
previous results, we must note this chapter does not include consideration of our institutional ownership 
variables due to a lack of sample sizes.  
67 For instance, while stand-alone industry dummy variables (such as the ones used in our previous chapters) 
control for industry effects on CFP, unless for instance they are multiplied by the CSP variable, they do not 
explicitly control for the industry effects on the CSP–CFP relationship.  
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considered with greater caution. Although they have controlled for industry effects on CFP, 
they have failed to control for the distinctive industry effect on the CSP–CFP relationship.  
Finally this chapter provides evidence that CSR can be justified from a shareholder-
maximising perspective – on the condition that managers can associate these activities to 
higher customer satisfaction, and then in turn, higher corporate wealth.  
Considering the results of this chapter, it is perhaps unsurprising to observe why “the lure of 
greater consumer profits have contributed significantly in recent years to the strengthening of 
the business case of CSR activity” (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2004). That is, a firm’s ability to 
create financial value from their CSR investment is heavily dependent on the ability to gain 
the trust and satisfaction of the end consumer.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
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6.0 Introduction 
At the heart of the CSR literature is a fundamental question of credibility: does higher CSP 
lead to higher CFP?  Two key opposing hypotheses regarding this important credibility have 
emerged in the literature. 
In the first hypothesis, the Friedman (1970) view argues business has “… one and only one 
social responsibility … to use its resources and to engage in activities designed to increase 
profits”. Indeed firms that undertake CSR may face higher restrictions to profitability due to 
activities ranging from community and philanthropy programs, the provision of employee day 
care and paid parental leave, and the diversion of resources to improve environmental 
efficiencies. Moreover, the cost of pursuing social missions is further compounded if firms 
are avoiding lucrative business opportunities because of ‘social’ concerns or norms, as this by 
default must result in a lower economic performance.  
The second hypothesis, the stakeholder view, argues for a more optimistic scenario in which 
CSR can be a source of positive wealth effects. This is based on the condition that various 
stakeholders are managed with the overarching strategy of enhancing corporate value. For 
instance, investment in CSP can provide credible signals of higher reputation and brand 
loyalty, an ability to attract and retain the best managers and employees, and the aptitude to 
avoid costly disputes with surrounding communities. 
The empirical literature reveals mixed findings regarding the CSP–CFP relationship; some 
studies find a positive relationship (Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Galema et al., 2008; 
Fernandez-Izquierdo and Matallin-Saez, 2008; Gil-Bazo et al., 2010), others find a negative 
relationship (Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008; Brammer et al., 2006), while yet 
others find a non-linear relationship (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Wang et al., 2008). 
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Moreover, while meta-analysis reviews do generally indicate a positive relationship exists 
(Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2009; Peloza, 2009) “probably; it depends”  (Peloza, 
2009), many reviewers admit its actual contribution to CFP is small.  
The lack in ability to establish any strength or consistency in previous results can be 
attributed to “several important theoretical and empirical limitations” (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001). Common among them include ‘stakeholder mismatching’ (Wood and Jones, 
1995), neglect of ‘contingency factors’ (for example, Ullmann, 1985), existence of 
‘measurement errors’ (Waddock and Graves, 1997), bias from ‘omitted variables’ (Aupperle 
and Hatfield, 1985; Cochran and Wood, 1984; Ullmann, 1985) or as McWilliams and Siegel 
(2000) surmise an overall “flawed empirical analysis”. 
Further, while there are numerous studies that analyse the CSP–CFP relationship based on 
long-term evaluations (see aforementioned meta-analyses for a review), we argue this is not 
an accurate test of how the market evaluates CSR. This is particularly the case because any 
long-term evaluation can be affected by a number of confounding factors unrelated to CSR 
(for example, business cycles, competition movements etc.). Given the market is arguably the 
final arbiter of whether CSR is evaluated as value enhancing (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012), 
we focus our analysis on the market reaction to social activities strictly from a short-term 
perspective. In this we refer to the ‘social index effect’ – analysing how the underlying price 
of a firm changes upon its announcement of inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index. Such 
an analysis, if done correctly, can circumvent the common issues relating to confounding 
factors inherent in any long-term study. Thus in this thesis we begin our analysis with the 
underpinning of being able to isolate a reliable, validated, and significantly ‘clean’ measure 
of the CSR factor.  
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From here our thesis provides three empirical chapters; each investigates the wealth effects of 
social index inclusion based on differences in methodological perspectives. Before such an 
empirical analysis can proceed, however, our thesis must lay down the foundations necessary 
for this empirical undertaking. This is achieved in the first two chapters; Chapter 1 provides a 
background, key definitions, motivations and outlines our objectives; while Chapter 2 
provides the neo-classical arguments underlying the relationship between CSP and CFP, 
which is then followed by a brief literature review of the major findings. With these chapters 
in the foreground, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present our empirical analyses.   
In Chapter 3, via an event study, we determine the shareholder wealth effects of 
announcements of social index inclusion. Chapter 4 explains sources of abnormal returns 
using OLS regression, which is hypothesised to be influenced by measures of financial 
constraints, as well as changes in institutional ownership and their trading behaviour. In 
regards to the latter hypothesis, we also address the endogeneity issue inherent in our 
institutional results. This analysis is achieved though propensity score matching (PSM). In 
our last empirical chapter, Chapter 5, we test the current implicit assumption that the CSR–
CFP relationship is homogenous across industries. In this, our analysis is twofold. First, in 
order to identify differences across industries, we perform an event study partitioned at the 
industry level, and then we examine their performance at the super-sector level. In the second 
stage of our analysis, we test the mediating effects of consumer sensitivity. This is achieved 
by constructing the ‘industry sector group’ dummy variable. Our key results in this thesis 
according to each empirical chapter are summarised in the next section.  
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6.1 Summary of empirical findings 
In Chapter 3 we find announcements of inclusion in the FTSE4Good Global Index are 
associated with significant and negative abnormal returns. Thus if social index inclusion is a 
proxy for high CSR activities, our study indicates that, on average, undertaking CSR is a 
value-destroying exercise. This result is robust to variations to the estimation window, and is 
consistent with subsequent abnormal volume analyses. Partitioning our results to the three 
largest countries by total sample reveals further contrasting differences; firms in the US and 
UK experience significant and negative abnormal returns, while firms in Japan experience 
significant and positive abnormal returns.  
In Chapter 4 we explain the determinants of market reaction using firm-specific 
characteristics and other market-wide factors. Employing measures of financial constraint and 
a set of control variables reveals negative abnormal returns are significantly associated with 
the following: firms with high dividend payments, as CSR may impose additional risk to 
future income (Rakotomavo, 2012); firms with low financial performance, as CSR may incur 
additional resources that the firm cannot spare (Roberts, 1992); firms with high cash 
holdings, as CSR may be perceived to be inappropriate due to costly external financing 
(Dittmar et al., 2003),  volatile cash flows (Opler et al., 1999) or greater financial constraints 
(Almeida et al., 2002); firms with high asset growth, as CSR may impede firms who tend to 
reinvest profits through expansion or acquisition (Penrose, 1995); and firms with high 
commitment to capital expenditure, as these firms with high financial constraints (Korajczyk 
and Levy, 2003), have been punished by the market for showing additional commitment of 
scarce resources.  
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In parallel we also examine the mediating role of institutional investors, and subsequently 
reveal negative abnormal returns are significantly associated with institutional selling (current 
versus to post quarterly holdings) and firms with high investor turnover (indicative of 
institutional short-term or myopic behaviour). In robustness analysis we control for 
endogeneity problems inherent in our institutional results, and find – all else being equal – 
institutional owners are indeed punishing firms found to be engaged in CSR activities.  
In Chapter 5 we partition our results at the industry and sub-sector level, and find a mosaic of 
differences in the CSP–CFP relationship. For instance, while the Financials and Health Care 
industries are found to experience positive market reactions, the industries of Technology, 
Telecommunications and Utilities experience negative market reactions instead. Further 
analysis reveals the underlying performances of the aggregate industry group. For instance, 
while we find the Financials industry experiences positive abnormal returns, this is driven 
mostly by the underlying Banks and Real Estate super-sectors, and is persistent despite the 
negative influences of Financial Service.   
Moreover when we classify firms into ‘low consumer sensitive’ or ‘high consumer sensitive’, 
we find those classified as primarily serving industry consumers are adversely affected by 
their choice to engage in CSR. In fact, once the mediating effects of consumer sensitivity are 
controlled for (plus country and time-fix effects), we find all other explanatory variables 
cease to be statistically significant. This result is especially provocative given our conclusions 
in Chapter 4 regarding the importance of firm-level considerations of the CSP–CFP link. 
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Thus we go beyond reporting an association between CSR and CFP by identifying that 
consumer sensitivity is the overarching mechanism underlying most of our prior findings.68 
6.2 Research implications 
In the next section we outline the key research implications of our thesis.  
Overall, we report results contrary to the meta-analysis reviews that show a small but positive 
relationship between CSP and CFP. In other words, our evidence is consistent with the notion 
that CSR is a “wasteful discretionary act of management” (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006) and 
in its extreme tantamount to managers “approaching fraud” (Friedman, 1970). Thus from a 
practical and general perspective corporate managers should decrease their investment in 
CSR, as these activities will, on average, harm firm value. Moreover managers should 
carefully note the social criteria used by FTSE4Good or similar to assess social performance, 
as it’s clear the market reacts significantly to new information conveyed by these institutions.  
In follow up analysis, we find this negative outcome to be particularly pronounced under 
certain financial conditions and dependent on the trading behaviour of institutional owners. 
For instance, drawing upon the literature of slack resource theory, we find results revolve 
around a common theme – one of affordability and discretion. That is, when firms have little 
in the way of financial constraints and are comfortably (wealthily) positioned, shareholders 
seem to provide managers greater latitude to allocate resources to CSR. In addition, we draw 
on the literature of institutional behaviour to find evidence of the existence of a short-term or 
myopic motivation. That is, managers pursue short-term gains because their compensation, 
                                                            
68 Note out industry analysis did not include our institutional ownership variables due to the restrictions on 
sample size.  
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job security and advancement are tied to the need to continually show improved results. If the 
motivation of these institutional investors is accurate, we provide further evidence confirming 
that CSR is a long-term investment (assuming benefits are accrued in the long term), and thus 
more likely to impose costs that impact short-term earnings in a negative rather than positive 
way. Managers evaluating consequences of CSR decisions can thus use these contingent 
conditions of financial constraint and institutional behaviours as important precursors to the 
expected market reaction to CSR.  
Our evidence also lends support to the notion that if managers want their stock to remain 
attractive to institutional shareholders, they must take into consideration the concerns of their 
institutional owners (Graves and Waddock, 1994). This line of rationale can be extended to 
the strategic viewpoint of CSR advocates. For instance, if managers are avoiding CSR 
investment because they are afraid stock prices will fall, advocates wishing to increase CSR 
activity at the firm level should then prioritise their focus on the trading behaviour of 
institutional investors. By convincing institutional investors of the likely positive wealth 
effects, they may able to alleviate this important CSR constraint, and thus encourage business 
environments more prone to increases in CSR investment.  
Moreover in relation to possible sources of social activities, we find evidence to assist firms 
with the strategic use of CSR activities. That is, we provide managers the knowledge and 
foresight to predict varying impacts to the CSR–CFP relationship, and consequently allow 
more appropriate CSR strategies to be designed in their own respective industries or 
underlying sectors. For example, we find corporate managers should implement more CSR in 
the sectors of Basic Resources, Food & Beverage, Banks, Real Estate, Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology, and Oil & Gas. The contrary choice of less CSR in Financial Services, 
Industrial Goods & Services, Software & Computer Services, Technology Hardware & 
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Equipment, Telecommunications and Utilities will – all as all else being equal – increase firm 
value.  
Lastly we explain the heterogeneity in our industry results. We conclude that industry 
sensitivity to the end consumer has an overarching mediating effect on the value outcome of 
CSR. Thus we demonstrate CSR activities can indeed be justified in the boardroom, as long 
as corporate managers can explain how social activities can enhance customer satisfaction 
and, in turn, generate greater sales and financial performance.  
6.3 Limitations and avenues for future research 
While the results of this thesis are intuitive for academics, and where applicable can benefit 
corporate managers in a number of ways, we stress that there are a number of limitations to 
this thesis. In this section we formally identify those limitations and where appropriate follow 
with suggestions on avenues for future research.   
The first limitation comes, perhaps unexpectedly, from one of the key advantages of this 
thesis – that is, a short-term event study provides the ability to avoid investigative issues 
related to confounding factors. Thus our exclusive focus is only the short-term impact of 
CSR. Indeed in the long term it is quite possible for CSR activities to generate many value-
enhancing benefits (for example, higher reputation and brand loyalty, greater employee 
morale and productivity etc.), though as our results imply, these are only obtainable (if at all) 
after our initial period of analysis. Thus our earlier conclusions that CSR is tantamount to 
managers “approaching fraud” (Friedman, 1970) may only be temporary, and, once short-
term costs are absorbed, may begin to significantly contribute to firm value. We stress for this 
reason that while our results are negative in the short term, they should not be used in 
isolation as grounds to avoid the adoption of CSR practices. Definitive conclusions regarding 
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the long-term consequences of CSR will require a longer-term analysis, but one we stress 
must continue to systematically address the confounding factors inherent in this choice of 
analysis.  
Moreover our interpretations, particularly relating to our industry results, require some level 
of caution. The first relates to statistical inferences from studies of small sample sizes. For 
instance, the industries of Telecommunications (n = 16), Oil & Gas (n = 10) and Utilities (n = 
18) are characterised by small samples. A similar caution can be extended to our super-sector 
groups; for instance, Retail (n = 17), Health Care Equipment & Services (n = 18), and Basic 
Resources (n = 22). Thus in order to provide greater robustness to our industry results, future 
research should employ larger datasets.  
Furthermore we stress simply identifying differences in industry context is not enough. 
Future research needs to be able explain why these differences occur and how practitioners 
are able to use these findings to develop more appropriate CSR strategies (even if the 
conclusion is to avoid CSR altogether). In this thesis for instance, we find an industry’s 
sensitivity to the end consumer represents an important mediating factor between the CSP–
CFP link. We note this factor is among many that can potentially provide unique pressures 
and create a ‘specialisation’ of social interest (Holmes, 1977; Ingram, 1978). Thus other 
prospective areas of investigation may include government regulation, community/public 
visibility, patterns of stakeholder behaviour, and degrees of concern for the environment. 
Given the lack of industry-specific studies (for example, to name a few: Ogden and Watson, 
1999; Simpson and Kohers, 2002), and even fewer that investigate the moderating/mediating 
effects of a specific industry characteristic (Baron et al., 2011; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008), 
there seems to still exist something of a black box between CSP and CFP at the industry level 
of analysis. Moreover, given our thesis is the first (to the best of our knowledge) to explore 
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differences in the CSP–CFP relationship across industries, and perhaps more profoundly the 
lack of studies investigating in general the mediating effects,69 we believe our thesis may 
have simply scratched the surface of a potentially rich and burgeoning area of research.  
Another limitation of this thesis is the construction of our ‘industry sector group’ dummy 
variable. Although our classification methodology is founded on the rationale of pre-existing 
literature (i.e Lev et al., 2010), the basis of our classification method is still nevertheless 
qualitative in nature. Thus evaluations of consumer sensitivity can be exposed to the 
subjective selection of the researcher. Further, while we have attempted to employ more 
quantitative measures of consumer sensitivity (for example, the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index), we find these to be too noisy to accurately capture the intended mediating effect. This 
is especially pronounced given the global nature of our study and the limitations on data for 
each representative industry as a consequence. Instead our research relies on the strength and 
judgment of the researcher, and the accuracy of ICB sub-sector definitions to capture details 
on the primary goods or services provided. A valuable line of future research thus can explore 
other datasets that allow quantitative measures of consumer sensitivity to be employed.  
Lastly, our study uses a global sample of firms spanning 24 countries. While such a dataset 
can provide results robust to a worldwide scale, aggregate results such as this can easily mask 
important differences between country effects. Certainly our results partitioned at the country 
level are testament to these important differences. For instance, while firms in the US and UK 
are found to experience significant and negative abnormal returns, firms in Japan experience 
significant and positive abnormal returns. Without further analysis, we can only hypothesise 
                                                            
69 In a recent content analysis, only 7 per cent of studies were found to investigate the underlying mechanisms 
between CSR and the hypothesised outcome (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). 
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this is due to the more socially favorable culture of Japanese firms. Indeed the economic 
system in Japan has been traditionally founded on relational trading between firms and the 
long-term relationships established with employees (for example, life-time employment). 
Further, as CSR research has been majority based on a European or Anglo-American study, 
an investigation of the unique country effects under a Japanese context certainly merits 
further investigation.  
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Appendix 1: Flow chart 1 – structure of Chapter 2  
 
CSP and CFP
relationship 
Is there a theoretical rationale? 
No
Instead scholars have relied on neo‐classical arguments 
Arguments 
supporting CSR 
engagement 
Arguments not 
supporting CSR 
engagement 
What do meta‐analysis reviews indicate?
Small positive correlation, “probably; it depends” (Peloza, 2009) 
What do other empirical studies indicate? 
Positive 
effect 
Negative 
effect 
Non‐linear 
effect 
Neutral 
effect 
Is there an avenue for future research? 
YES, future research needs to begin foremost with a reliable, validated, and significantly “clean” 
measure of the CSR factor. This is achieved in our first empirical chapter via an event study. 
Section 2.1 
Section 2.2 
Section 2.3 
Section 2.4 
Overall mixed evidence 
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Appendix 2: Flow chart 2 – data construction and arrival of final sample of interest  
 
Restrict to only US firms      53 firms 
Final sample size PSM analysis    53 firms 
Initial collection from FTSE4Good     729 firms 
Cross reference with ISIN code     699 firms 
Remove confounding effects    651 firms 
Final sample for event study     651 firms 
Final sample size from event study    651 firms 
Controls + financial constraint variables  450 firms 
Insti. ownership data (2008‐2012)     96 firms 
Final sample for OLS regression     96 firms 
Insti. ownership data (2008‐2012)    96 firms 
Control variables        96 firms 
Evaluating shareholder 
wealth implications 
Explaining sources of 
abnormal returns 
Addressing the 
endogeneity issue 
ICB industry classification      453 firms 
Final sample for consumer sensitivity   453 firms
analysis   
Investigating 
‘Consumer sensitivity’ 
Final sample size from event study    651 firms 
Controls + financial constraints    453 firms 
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Appendix 3: Flow chart 3 – analysis and empirics  
 
Empirics: Event study
‐ What is the direction and significance 
of abnormal returns? 
Question: What are the sources of abnormal 
returns? 
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o Firm size 
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o Profitability 
o Asset turnover 
o Growth in total assets 
o CAPEX 
o Dividend payout 
o Cash holdings 
o Investor Turnover  
o Changes in Institutional 
Ownership 
o Industry Sector Group 
Question: Is there an endogeneity issue 
between institutional ownership and CSR?  
Empirics: Propensity score matching (PSM) 
‐ Is the CSR factor significant?  
CONCLUSION
Event study 
OLS cross sectional 
regression 
Propensity score 
matching (PSM) 
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
Question: Is consumer sensitivity a strategic 
motivation?  
Empirics: Consumer sensitivity methodology 
‐ Is the ‘industry sector group’ 
significant? 
Consumer 
sensitivity 
methodology 
CONCLUSION
Question: What are the shareholder wealth 
implications of CSR impact?  
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Appendix 4: Full list of subsectors and categorisation outcome  
Table 33: Full list of subsectors categorised as ‘industry sector group’  
This table presents subsectors included under ‘industry sector group’. Following our consumer sensitivity methodology 
(refer to section 5.3.3) we divide subsectors into either ‘industry sector group’ or ‘consumer sector group’. This table 
presents the former.  
Industry Sector Group  
Industry Group  -  
level 4 
Industry Group -  
level 2 
ICB Definitions 
Aerospace Industrials Manufacturers, assemblers and distributors of aircraft and aircraft parts 
primarily used in commercial or private air transport. Excludes 
manufacturers of communications satellites, which are classified under 
Telecommunications Equipment. 
Asset Managers Financials Companies that provide custodial, trustee and other related fiduciary 
services. Includes mutual fund management companies.  
Auto Parts Consumer Goods Manufacturers and distributors of new and replacement parts for 
motorcycles and automobiles, such as engines, carburetors and batteries. 
Excludes producers of tires, which are classified under Tires. 
Building Materials & 
Fixtures 
Industrials Producers of materials used in the construction and refurbishment of 
buildings and structures, including cement and other aggregates, wooden 
beams and frames, paint, glass, roofing and flooring materials other than 
carpets. Includes producers of bathroom and kitchen fixtures, plumbing 
supplies and central air-conditioning and heating equipment. Excludes 
producers of raw lumber, which are classified under Forestry. 
Business Support 
Services 
Industrials Providers of nonfinancial services to a wide range of industrial 
enterprises and governments. Includes providers of printing services, 
management consultants, office cleaning services, and companies that 
install, service and monitor alarm and security systems. 
Commercial Vehicles 
& Trucks 
Industrials Manufacturers and distributors of commercial vehicles and heavy 
agricultural and construction machinery, including rail cars, tractors, 
bulldozers, cranes, buses and industrial lawn mowers. Includes non-
military shipbuilders, such as builders of cruise ships and ferries. 
Commodity 
Chemicals 
Basic Materials Producers and distributors of simple chemical products that are primarily 
used to formulate more complex chemicals or products, including plastics 
and rubber in their raw form, fiberglass and synthetic fibers. 
Computer Hardware Technology Manufacturers and distributors of computers, servers, mainframes, 
workstations and other computer hardware and subsystems, such as mass-
storage drives, mice, keyboards and printers.  
Computer Services Technology Companies that provide consulting services to other businesses relating to 
information technology. Includes providers of computer-system design, 
systems integration, network and systems operations, data management 
and storage, repair services and technical support. 
Containers & 
Packaging 
Industrials Makers and distributors of cardboard, bags, boxes, cans, drums, bottles 
and jars and glass used for packaging. 
Conventional 
Electricity 
Utilities Companies generating and distributing electricity through the burning of 
fossil fuels such as coal, petroleum and natural gas, and through nuclear 
energy. 
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Diversified Industrials Industrials Industrial companies engaged in three or more classes of business within 
the Industrial industry that differ substantially from each other. 
Diversified REITs Financials Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that invest in a variety of property types without a 
concentration on any single type. 
Electrical 
Components & 
Equipment 
Industrials Makers and distributors of electrical parts for finished products, such as 
printed circuit boards for radios, televisions and other consumer 
electronics. Includes makers of cables, wires, ceramics, transistors, 
electric adapters and security cameras. 
Electronic Equipment Industrials Manufacturers and distributors of electronic products used in different 
industries. Includes makers of lasers, smart cards, bar scanners, 
fingerprinting equipment and other electronic factory equipment. 
Electronic Office 
Equipment 
Technology Manufacturers and distributors of electronic office equipment, including 
photocopiers and fax machines.  
Equity Investment 
Instruments 
Financials Corporate closed-ended investment entities identified under 
distinguishing legislation, such as investment trusts and venture capital 
trusts. 
Exploration & 
Production 
Oil & Gas Companies engaged in the exploration for and drilling, production, 
refining and supply of oil and gas products. 
Financial 
Administration 
Industrials Providers of computerized transaction processing, data communication 
and information services, including payroll, bill payment and employee 
benefit services. 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
Telecommunications Providers of fixed-line telephone services, including regional and long-
distance. Includes companies that primarily provides telephone services 
through the internet. Excludes companies whose primary business is 
Internet access, which are classified under Internet. 
Gas Distribution Utilities Distributors of gas to end users. Excludes providers of natural gas as a 
commodity, which are classified under the Oil & Gas industry. 
General Mining Basic Materials Companies engaged in the exploration, extraction or refining of minerals 
not defined elsewhere within the Mining sector. 
Heavy Construction Industrials Companies engaged in the construction of commercial buildings, 
infrastructure such as roads and bridges, residential apartment buildings, 
and providers of services to construction companies, such as architects, 
masons, plumbers and electrical contractors. 
Industrial & Office 
REITs 
Financials Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that primarily invest in office, industrial and flex properties. 
Industrial Machinery Industrials Designers, manufacturers, distributors and installers of industrial 
machinery and factory equipment, such as machine tools, lathes, presses 
and assembly line equipment. Includes makers of pollution control 
equipment, castings, pressings, welded shapes, structural steelwork, 
compressors, pumps, bearings, elevators and escalators. 
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Industrial Suppliers Industrials Distributors and wholesalers of diversified products and equipment 
primarily used in the commercial and industrial sectors. Includes builders 
merchants. 
Integrated Oil & Gas Oil & Gas Integrated oil and gas companies engaged in the exploration for and 
drilling, production, refining, distribution and retail sales of oil and gas 
products. 
Iron & Steel Basic Materials Manufacturers and stockholders of primary iron and steel products such 
as pipes, wires, sheets and bars, encompassing all processes from 
smelting in blast furnaces to rolling mills and foundries. Includes 
companies that primarily mine iron ores. 
Marine Transportation Industrials Providers of on-water transportation for commercial markets, such as 
container shipping. Excludes ports, which are classified under 
Transportation Services, and shipbuilders, which are classified under 
Commercial Vehicles & Trucks. 
Mobile 
Telecommunications 
Telecommunications Providers of mobile telephone services, including cellular, satellite and 
paging services. Includes wireless tower companies that own, operate and 
lease mobile site towers to multiple wireless service providers. 
Multiutilities Utilities Utility companies with significant presence in more than one utility. 
Nonferrous Metals Basic Materials Producers and traders of metals and primary metal products other than 
iron, aluminum and steel. Excludes companies that make finished 
products, which are categorized according to the type of end product. 
Oil Equipment & 
Services 
Oil & Gas Suppliers of equipment and services to oil fields and offshore platforms, 
such as drilling, exploration, seismic-information services and platform 
construction. 
Pipelines Oil & Gas Operators of pipelines carrying oil, gas or other forms of fuel. Excludes 
pipeline operators that derive the majority of their revenues from direct 
sales to end users, which are classified under Gas Distribution. 
Railroads Industrials Providers of industrial railway transportation and railway lines. Excludes 
passenger railway companies, which are classified under Travel & 
Tourism, and manufacturers of rail cars, which are classified under 
Commercial Vehicles & Trucks. 
Residential REITs Financials Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that primarily invest in residential home properties. Includes 
apartment buildings and residential communities. 
Retail REITs Financials Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that primarily invest in retail properties. Includes malls, 
shopping centers, strip centers and factory outlets. 
Semiconductors Technology Producers and distributors of semiconductors and other integrated chips, 
including other products related to the semiconductor industry, such as 
semiconductor capital equipment and motherboards. Excludes makers of 
printed circuit boards, which are classified under Electrical Components 
& Equipment. 
Software Technology Publishers and distributors of computer software for home or corporate 
use. Excludes computer game producers, which are classified under Toys. 
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Specialty Chemicals Basic Materials Producers and distributors of finished chemicals for industries or end 
users, including dyes, cellular polymers, coatings, special plastics and 
other chemicals for specialized applications. Includes makers of 
colorings, flavors and fragrances, fertilizers, pesticides, chemicals used to 
make drugs, paint in its pigment form and glass in its unfinished form. 
Excludes producers of paint and glass products used for construction, 
which are classified under Building Materials & Fixtures. 
Specialty Finance Financials Companies engaged in financial activities not specified elsewhere. 
Includes companies not classified under Equity Investment Instruments or 
Nonequity Investment Instruments engaged primarily in owning stakes in 
a diversified range of companies. 
Specialty REITs Financials Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that invest in self storage properties, properties in the health 
care industry such as hospitals, assisted living facilities and health care 
laboratories, and other specialized properties such as auto dealership 
facilities, timber properties and net lease properties. 
Telecommunications 
Equipment 
Technology Makers and distributors of high-technology communication products, 
including satellites, mobile telephones, fibers optics, switching devices, 
local and wide-area networks, teleconferencing equipment and 
connectivity devices for computers, including hubs and routers. 
Transportation 
Services 
Industrials Companies providing services to the Industrial Transportation sector, 
including companies that manage airports, train depots, roads, bridges, 
tunnels, ports, and providers of logistic services to shippers of goods. 
Includes companies that provide aircraft and vehicle maintenance 
services. 
Trucking Industrials Companies that provide commercial trucking services. Excludes road and 
tunnel operators, which are classified under Transportation Services, and 
vehicle rental and taxi companies, which are classified under Travel & 
Tourism. 
Water Utilities Companies providing water to end users, including water treatment 
plants. 
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Table 34: Full list of subsectors categorised as ‘consumer sector group’  
This table presents subsectors included under the “Consumer Sector Group”. Following our consumer sensitivity 
methodology (refer to section 5.3.3) we divide subsectors into either “Industry Sector Group” or “Consumer Sector group”. 
This table presents the latter.   
Consumer Sector Group  
Industry Group  - 
level 4 
Industry Group  - 
level 2 ICB Definitions 
Airlines Consumer Services Companies providing primarily passenger air transport. Excludes 
airports, which are classified under Transportation Services. 
Alternative 
Electricity 
Utilities Companies generating and distributing electricity from a renewable 
source. Includes companies that produce solar, water, wind and 
geothermal electricity. 
Apparel Retailers Consumer Services Retailers and wholesalers specializing mainly in clothing, shoes, jewelry, 
sunglasses and other accessories. 
Automobiles Consumer Goods Makers of motorcycles and passenger vehicles, including cars, sport 
utility vehicles (SUVs) and light trucks. Excludes makers of heavy 
trucks, which are classified under Commercial Vehicles & Trucks, and 
makers of recreational vehicles (RVs and ATVs), which are classified 
under Recreational Products. 
Banks Financials Banks providing a broad range of financial services, including retail 
banking, loans and money transmissions. 
Biotechnology Health Care Companies engaged in research into and development of biological 
substances for the purposes of drug discovery and diagnostic 
development, and which derive the majority of their revenue from either 
the sale or licensing of these drugs and diagnostic tools. 
Brewers Consumer Goods Manufacturers and shippers of cider or malt products such as beer, ale 
and stout. 
Broadcasting & 
Entertainment 
Consumer Services Producers, operators and broadcasters of radio, television, music and 
filmed entertainment. Excludes movie theatres, which are classified 
under Recreational Services. 
Broadline Retailers Consumer Services Retail outlets and wholesalers offering a wide variety of products 
including both hard goods and soft goods. 
Business Training & 
Employment 
Agencies 
Industrials Providers of business or management training courses and employment 
services. 
Clothing & 
Accessories 
Consumer Goods Manufacturers and distributors of all types of clothing, jewelry, watches 
or textiles. Includes sportswear, sunglasses, eyeglass frames, leather 
clothing and goods, and processors of hides and skins. 
Consumer Electronics Consumer Goods Manufacturers and distributors of consumer electronics, such as TVs, 
VCRs, DVD players, audio equipment, cable boxes, calculators and 
camcorders. 
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Consumer Finance Financials Credit card companies and providers of personal finance services such as 
personal loans and check cashing companies. 
Delivery Services Industrials Operators of mail and package delivery services for commercial and 
consumer use. Includes courier and logistic services primarily involving 
air transportation. 
Drug Retailers Consumer Services Operators of pharmacies, including wholesalers and distributors catering 
to these businesses. 
Durable Household 
Products 
Consumer Goods Manufacturers and distributors of domestic appliances, lighting, hand 
tools and power tools, hardware, cutlery, tableware, garden equipment, 
luggage, towels and linens.  
Farming, Fishing & 
Plantations 
Consumer Goods Companies that grow crops or raise livestock, operate fisheries or own 
nontobacco plantations. Includes manufacturers of livestock feeds and 
seeds and other agricultural products but excludes manufacturers of 
fertilizers or pesticides, which are classified under Specialty Chemicals. 
Food Products Consumer Goods Food producers, including meatpacking, snacks, fruits, vegetables, dairy 
products and frozen seafood. Includes producers of pet food and 
manufacturers of dietary supplements, vitamins and related items. 
Excludes producers of fruit juices, tea, coffee, bottled water and other 
non-alcoholic beverages, which are classified under Soft Drinks. 
Food Retailers & 
Wholesalers 
Consumer Services Supermarkets, food-oriented convenience stores and other food retailers 
and distributors. Includes retailers of dietary supplements and vitamins. 
Footwear Consumer Goods Manufacturers and distributors of shoes, boots, sandals, sneakers and 
other types of footwear. 
Full Line Insurance Financials Insurance companies with life, health, property & casualty and 
reinsurance interests, no one of which predominates. 
Furnishings Consumer Goods Manufacturers and distributors of furniture, including chairs, tables, 
desks, carpeting, wallpaper and office furniture. 
Gambling Consumer Services Providers of gambling and casino facilities. Includes online casinos, 
racetracks and the manufacturers of pachinko machines and casino and 
lottery equipment. 
Health Care 
Providers 
Health Care Owners and operators of health maintenance organizations, hospitals, 
clinics, dentists, opticians, nursing homes, rehabilitation and retirement 
centers. Excludes veterinary services, which are classified under 
Specialized Consumer Services. 
Home Construction Consumer Goods Constructors of residential homes, including manufacturers of mobile and 
prefabricated homes intended for use in one place. 
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Internet Technology Companies providing Internet-related services, such as Internet access 
providers and search engines and providers of Web site design, Web 
hosting, domain-name registration and e-mail services. 
Investment Services Financials Companies providing a range of specialized financial services, including 
securities brokers and dealers, online brokers and security or commodity 
exchanges. 
Life Insurance Financials Companies engaged principally in life and health insurance. 
Media Agencies Consumer Services Companies providing advertising, public relations and marketing 
services. Includes billboard providers and telemarketers. 
Medical Equipment Health Care Manufacturers and distributors of medical devices such as MRI scanners, 
prosthetics, pacemakers, X-ray machines and other non-disposable 
medical devices. 
Medical Supplies Health Care Manufacturers and distributors of medical supplies used by health care 
providers and the general public. Includes makers of contact lenses, 
eyeglass lenses, bandages and other disposable medical supplies.  
Nondurable 
Household Products 
Consumer Goods Producers and distributors of pens, paper goods, batteries, light bulbs, 
tissues, toilet paper and cleaning products such as soaps and polishes. 
Paper Basic Materials Producers, converters, merchants and distributors of all grades of paper. 
Excludes makers of printed forms, which are classified under Business 
Support Services, and manufacturers of paper items such as cups and 
napkins, which are classified under Nondurable Household Products. 
Personal Products Consumer Goods Makers and distributors of cosmetics, toiletries and personal-care and 
hygiene products, including deodorants, soaps, toothpaste, perfumes, 
diapers, shampoos, razors and feminine-hygiene products. Includes 
makers of contraceptives other than oral contraceptives, which are 
classified under Pharmaceuticals. 
Pharmaceuticals Health Care Manufacturers of prescription or over-the-counter drugs, such as aspirin, 
cold remedies and birth control pills. Includes vaccine producers but 
excludes vitamin producers, which are classified under Food Products. 
Property & Casualty 
Insurance 
Financials Companies engaged principally in accident, fire, automotive, marine, 
malpractice and other classes of nonlife insurance. 
Publishing Consumer Services Publishers of information via printed or electronic media. 
Real Estate Holding 
& Development 
Financials Companies that invest directly or indirectly in real estate through 
development, investment or ownership. Excludes real estate investment 
trusts and similar entities, which are classified as Real Estate Investment 
Trusts. 
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Real Estate Services Financials Companies that provide services to real estate companies but do not own 
the properties themselves. Includes agencies, brokers, leasing companies, 
management companies and advisory services. Excludes real estate 
investment trusts and similar entities, which are classified as Real Estate 
Investment Trusts. 
Recreational Products Consumer Goods Manufacturers and distributors of recreational equipment. Includes 
musical instruments, photographic equipment and supplies, RVs, ATVs 
and marine recreational vehicles such as yachts, dinghies and speedboats. 
Recreational Services Consumer Services Providers of leisure facilities and services, including fitness centers, 
cruise lines, movie theatres and sports teams. 
Renewable Energy 
Equipment 
Oil & Gas Companies that develop or manufacture renewable energy equipment 
utilizing sources such as solar, wind, tidal, geothermal, hydro and waves. 
Restaurants & Bars Consumer Services Operators of restaurants, fast-food facilities, coffee shops and bars. 
Includes integrated brewery companies and catering companies.  
Soft Drinks Consumer Goods Manufacturers, bottlers and distributors of non-alcoholic beverages, such 
as soda, fruit juices, tea, coffee and bottled water.  
Specialized 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Services Providers of consumer services such as auction houses, day-care centers, 
dry cleaners, schools, consumer rental companies, veterinary clinics, hair 
salons and providers of funeral, lawn-maintenance, consumer-storage, 
heating and cooling installation and plumbing services. 
Specialty Retailers Consumer Services Retailers and wholesalers concentrating on a single class of goods, such 
as electronics, books, automotive parts or closeouts. Includes automobile 
dealerships, video rental stores, dollar stores, duty-free shops and 
automotive fuel stations not owned by oil companies. 
Tires Consumer Goods Manufacturers, distributors and retreaders of automobile, truck and 
motorcycle tires. 
Toys Consumer Goods Manufacturers and distributors of toys and video/computer games, 
including such toys and games as playing cards, board games, stuffed 
animals and dolls. 
Travel & Tourism Consumer Services Companies providing travel and tourism related services, including travel 
agents, online travel reservation services, automobile rental firms and 
companies that primarily provide passenger transportation, such as buses, 
taxis, passenger rail and ferry companies. 
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